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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation addresses how media was used and functioned as a discursive 
tool in the legitimisation of violence in the Liberation War of Bangladesh in 1971. It 
explores the role of the media as an ideological state apparatus used by the Pakistani 
government to frame religion-based ideology in order to construct nationalism and 
identities, and legitimise political and sexual violence. Using discourse analysis of two 
East Pakistani newspapers, the Dainik Sangram and Dainik Pakistan during the nine 
months of the war between March and December 1971 as well as a number of interviews 
with eye witnesses to the war, the study examines the media frames which served to 
construct divisive discourses of nationalism, identity and violence in conflict.  
The study shows how the media, acting as an ideological and discursive tool of 
the state, interpellates or addresses the audience and summons them to action. By 
representing the nation as sacred and defining identities, in this case, of the good Muslim 
Pakistani Self posited against the evil Hindu enemy Other, the media discourse justifies 
the use of violence against the Bangali enemy in the form of jihad represented as 
mandatory, sacrifice as necessary and martyrdom as desirable, while remaining silent on 
the issue of sexual violence against Bangali women, and, as such, indicating tacit 
acceptance of it.    
Rooted in archival research, the key themes and methodology of this thesis are 
highly relevant in an era characterised by increasing religiously-motivated violence in 
Bangladesh and around the world, and can be applied to the study of both traditional and 
digital media and their role in serving the purpose of both state and non-state actors in 
ideological conflicts.   
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
On July 1, 2016, Bangladesh faced a major terrorist attack, the first of this 
particular kind in the country. Five young men, armed with swords, guns and bombs, 
took hostage the staff and guests at an upscale café-restaurant in Gulshan, the capital 
Dhaka’s elite residential area populated by, along with affluent locals, foreign diplomats 
and expatriates. Twenty hostages – 18 of them foreigners – two police officers, and four 
of the attackers were killed. According to hostages who were released or rescued, the 
attackers performed a religious background check of the restaurant’s guests, asking them 
to recite from the Quran. Those who passed were released, except for one 20-year-old 
man who refused to leave without his two friends, an Indian girl and an American girl of 
Bangladeshi origin dressed in Western clothes who the terrorists would not release. They 
claimed that foreigners in their “skimpy clothes” and “drinking alcohol” were influencing 
locals to do the same and polluting the country with their “un-Islamic” ways. 
The attack can be seen as a culmination of the religion-based violence in 
Bangladesh in the last decade, and particularly in the last three years. Over 40 people, 
including secular writers, academics and activists, along with members of the minority 
Hindu, Christian and Buddhist communities and a few foreign expatriates, have been 
killed allegedly by religious extremists. This is shocking for people who live in or have 
ever been to Bangladesh, which has always been known for its communal harmony and 
hospitality to foreigners. Yet the phenomenon of religion-based violence is not 
completely new.  
In 1971, when Bangladesh, then East Pakistan, fought for independence from 
Pakistan, religion played a significant role, at least for those who opposed liberation, as 
		 11	
this thesis hopes to show. They believed that Pakistan was the homeland of Muslims and 
its breakup would mean defeat not only of the nation but of Islam. Interestingly, those 
who were fighting for independence were also predominantly Muslim with a sizeable 
Hindu population; only their struggle was for political, economic and cultural 
emancipation from their rulers who viewed ethnic Bangalis1 as “lesser Muslims”.2 As 
such, the West Pakistani government, army and its supporters in the eastern wing framed 
the battle as a religious war between Muslims and Hindus, Pakistan and India. To this 
day, the collaborators now under trial for war crimes, while denying their role in war 
crimes and crimes against humanity, stand by their belief in a united Pakistan.  
This study seeks to understand how discourse based on religious ideology is used 
to legitimise conflict. It critically engages with the relationship between religion, identity 
and culture and how these may have played a role in the violence around the Liberation 
War of Bangladesh. The study, thus, is particularly interested in exploring the role of the 
media in disseminating discourses of nationalism, identity and difference, and violence 
using an ideology based on religion.   
In this context, this dissertation will examine the anti-liberation discourse used in 
the wartime media of East Pakistan in 1971 and analyse the use of religion-based rhetoric 
in  
a) the construction of the nation and nationalism;  
b) the formation of identities;  
																																																						
1	While	most	references	cited	use	the	term	‘Bengali’	for	both	the	race	and	the	language,	the	authentic,	
Bangla	word	for	the	race	–	Bangali,	and	the	language	–	Bangla,	as	used	by	its	native	speakers,	will	be	used	
throughout	this	paper.	
2	The	post-liberation	government	of	Bangladesh	in	1972	was	quick	to	enshrine	secularism	as	one	of	the	
key	principles	of	its	Constitution,	along	with	nationalism,	socialism	and	democracy.		
	
		 12	
c) the legitimisation of political violence through the tropes of jihad, 
sacrifice and martyrdom; and  
d) the validation of sexual violence through its silent/absent 
representation. 
The research uses an inter-disciplinary approach and discourse analysis of the 
East Pakistani newspapers Dainik Sangram, the mouthpiece of the main anti-liberation 
religion-based political party in East Pakistan, the Jamaat-i-Islami, and the Dainik 
Pakistan, a government-owned national daily, and will examine the prevailing anti-
liberation discourse during the nine months of the war from March to December 1971. 
The discourse analysis of news, editorials, commentaries and op-ed articles, features, 
letters to the editor and even poems and songs published in these newspapers aims to 
provide new knowledge of the political-religious rhetoric of political and religious 
leaders, the media, as well as their audiences at the time. The research also relies on a 
brief review of advertisements published nearing the end of the war in the West Pakistan-
based daily Dawn. A small selection of interviews of eye witnesses to the war will serve 
to provide a social context to the war as well as support the primary findings.  
 
1.1 Structure of the Thesis 
This introductory chapter is followed by Chapter 2 which will provide a historical 
context, briefly, of the Partition of India and the Language Movement which is seen as 
the beginning of Bangladesh’s struggle for independence, followed by a more 
comprehensive overview of Pakistani identity politics leading up to the actual war.  
Chapter 3 consists of a review of the related literature detailing the main 
conceptual frameworks of this study. It is pertinent to understanding questions of 
nationalism and its construction, how identities are formed, religion-based political and 
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sexual violence, and the role of the media and communication in legitimising these 
practices. It begins with the general, addressing Stuart Hall’s theorisations of identity, 
Anthony Smith, Eric Hobsbawm and Ernest Gellner’s theories of nationalism and 
Benedict Anderson’s notion of imagined communities. It then moves on to address the 
scholarship on gendered violence in wartime. The chapter then surveys the more specific 
literature on communication, discourse and the rationalisation of violence through 
propaganda and rhetoric followed by literature on religion-based rhetoric and violence in 
particular. Running throughout the theoretical framework are Louis Althusser’s notions 
of ideological state apparatuses (ISA) and Michel Foucault’s theory of discourse in 
facilitating all the above in the construction of nationalism, formation of identities and the 
legitimisation of violence.    
Chapter 4 discusses the research methods used for this study, which include 
archival research and interviews, to be examined through the lens of discourse analysis. 
Discourse, initially a linguistic concept referring to ‘passages of connected writing or 
speech’ was defined by Michel Foucault more broadly as ‘the production of knowledge 
through language’ (cited in Hall, 2004: 346). Discourse examines the context of and 
relationships within communication (Garrett and Bell 1998). Discourse consists of 
language as well as practice, situating a topic in a particular historical context, defining it 
and determining what is and is not to be talked about and how people should conduct 
themselves in relation to it, thus linking power to both the mind (knowledge) and the 
body (practice) (Hall 2004). Fairclough and Wodak (2004) have shown how discursive 
practices may have major ideological effects, producing and reproducing unequal power 
relations, passing off something as common sense, thus making discourse analysis the 
most useful methodological tool of analysis for this study. Similar to Majid 
Khosravinik’s (2015) study of discourse, identity and legitimacy (in relation to Iran’s 
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nuclear programme), this thesis will attempt to explore how ‘conflictual identities and 
legitimations are substantiated via discourse’ (2015: 3) in the case of 1971 Pakistan, 
religion-based discourse. As such, it will demonstrate how religious ideology was framed 
in the media which was used as a tool of discourse, by those in positions of power.  
This methodology chapter also details the research material used. Of the three 
broad categories of media – Pakistani, East Pakistani or Bangali, and foreign – circulating 
at the time, this study examines the discourse about the war in the West Pakistani 
government owned, controlled or affiliated media. It focuses on the newspaper Dainik 
Sangram, owned and operated by affiliates of the main anti-liberation party in East 
Pakistan, the Jamaat-i-Islami, and the Dainik Pakistan, a Pakistani government-owned 
newspaper. The chapter outlines the challenges of gaining access to these papers as well 
as the lack of availability of other material such as television and radio content and 
posters and leaflets, which was expected at the outset of this research. It also deals with 
the ethical issues that have arisen, and challenges which had to be or limitations which 
could not be overcome, for example, in gaining interviews with the victims of sexual 
violence during the war. Last but not least, this chapter addresses the positionality and 
self-reflexivity of the researcher as a subject of the pro-liberation discourse researching in 
2013-2016 on anti-liberation discourse during the war of 1971. 
The subsequent four chapters detail the findings. Chapter 5 is an examination of 
Pakistani nationalism prior to and during the war. It demonstrates how, in the wartime 
media discourse studied here, Pakistan and Islam become one and the same, Pakistani 
nationalism becomes indistinguishable from “Islamic nationalism” – a complex concept 
blurring the lines between nation and religion. This is evident in the media discourse of 
the time, making Pakistan out to be the homeland of Islam and Muslims not only in 
Pakistan but from around the world. Repeated reference is made to the hundreds of 
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thousands of lives lost during Partition with a call to honour their sacrifice by defending 
Pakistan and as a result Islam, in 1971. Islamic ideology is categorically defined as 
Pakistani ideology, its founding philosophy and the only ideology that can hold the nation 
together. 
Following on from this, Chapter 6 deals with identity formation – of the genuine 
Pakistani, the true Muslim, the Indian Hindu, the Bangali, the enemy – and how the 
Pakistani media of 1971 examined here contributed to this process, particularly with its 
focus on the religious. As Stuart Hall articulates, identities use the ‘resources of history, 
language and culture’ and arise within ‘specific discursive formations and practices, by 
specific enunciated strategies’ (1996: 3). While identities are most often referred to as 
being common between people who share it, Hall points out that they also ‘emerge within 
the specific modalities of power, and thus are more the product of the marking of 
difference and exclusion’ (1996: 4). In 1971 Pakistan, too, identities were, as the research 
will show, constructed through a discourse which used religion to differentiate between 
“us”, the Muslim Pakistani and “them”, the enemy, the Hindu Indian. As Husain Haqqani 
argues: ‘The fears of dilution of Muslim identity that had defined the demand for carving 
Pakistan out of India became the new nation-state’s identity, reinforced over time through 
the education system and constant propaganda’ (2005: 14) and this phenomenon was very 
much in play well into the war of 1971. Analysis of the media shows that those 
constructed as ‘true’ Pakistanis were also constructed as Islam-loving Muslims, and those 
constructed as ‘true Muslims’ were constructed as those prepared to fight for Pakistan 
and Islam. The findings of these two chapters provide the basis for the last two chapters 
which discuss how identity formation and the construction of a religious nationalism can 
legitimise political violence and how the media can be used as a tool in these processes.  
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Chapter 7 specifically addresses how religious-based rhetoric in the media 
implicitly and explicitly sought to mobilise people and incite violence in the name of 
Allah and religion through the construction of the necessity of jihad as a religious duty, 
and through the glorification of sacrifice and martyrdom. Jihad, as the research findings 
show, is portrayed by the media as a test of faith and the only means to defend Islam and 
Pakistan. Sacrifices made in the battles of Islamic history as well as deaths in the current 
war are highlighted as events to be proud of, and martyrdom or sacrifice made for a 
higher cause is depicted as necessary.  
Chapter 8 discusses the almost absent discourse on sexual violence in the media, 
thus underlining how both victims and perpetrators are made invisible through this 
silencing. Evidence of the mass rape of between 200,000 and 400,000 Bangali women 
abounded after the war. After the war, the Bangladeshi media carried stories of women 
who were impregnated and had to terminate their pregnancies or put up the children for 
adoption, women who felt compelled to leave the country or else live on in silent 
suffering in Bangladesh, as well as women who had killed themselves (Islam 2012). But 
as the incidents were taking place, they were strangely absent from the anti-liberation 
media discourse, the silence itself around the issue discursive, distortive and in a way 
validating the violence.  
The concluding chapter of this thesis consists of a summary analysis of the 
findings, contributions of the research and a list of limitations which may be seen instead 
as opportunities for future study. This includes looking at alternative narratives on the 
war such as that of Urdu, pro-liberation and Indian media as opposed to the Bangla anti-
liberation media studied here. It also suggests that the methodology used in this paper can 
be effectively applied to studies of religion-based conflict and the role of media and 
communication in a global context today, such as on the widespread use of media and 
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social media by groups such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS, from hereon 
referred to as IS) and their use of religious rhetoric in the legitimisation of violence.  
While the ultimate goal of any study on religion-based violence is to prevent it in 
the long run through an understanding of why and how it occurs, countering such a 
historical phenomenon is complex, to say the least, and this research is a mere 
contribution to the study from a media and communication perspective. Of course it 
cannot and does not leave history aside, for history is the basis from which it, which 
anything, arises. This study, then, uses historical analysis in an attempt to understand not 
only the past but also the present, and to comprehend the complex interplay of politics, 
religion and culture and the role of communication in it all.        
 
1.2 Religion as War Rhetoric: The hypotheses of the study 
The key to understanding the motivations behind religion-based conflict lies in 
the study of the use of religious rhetoric for different purposes, including for violence 
during times of conflict. In Bangladesh, in November 2012, when the Jamaat-i-Islami 
took to the streets in protest against the war crimes trial, leaders of its student wing, 
Islami Chhatra Shibir, were found sending out text messages encouraging its activists to 
fight, as “the police brutality and torturous imprisonment and punishment suffered in this 
life will be rewarded manifold times in the next”. In 2014, prior to the execution of one 
of the convicted war criminals, he told his wife he ‘was being “killed” because he was 
trying to establish Islam in the country… he was sacrificing his life for the cause of Islam 
and that many more such sacrifices were needed’3. In 2015, one of the accused in the 
killing of a blogger claimed he did not know what a blog was but had been told by his 
																																																						
3	The	Daily	Star	7	November	2014,	online,	Available	at	http://www.thedailystar.net/propaganda-and-the-
war-crimes-trial-49149	[Accessed	13	October	2016].	
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religious teacher that the blogger had written against Islam and the Prophet and that it 
was his (the accused’s) religious responsibility as a Muslim to kill him.   
The promise of martyrdom, the glory of sacrifice and violent jihad as a religious 
duty are common tropes that often run through religion-based conflict and its 
legitimisation. This study, based on empirical evidence, aims to show how the 
communication of these tropes was a central strategy in Bangladesh’s Liberation War and 
how a religion-based ideology was used to legitimise the violence.  
Bangladesh’s struggle for freedom from Pakistan, particularly the extent of 
atrocities committed, is little known outside the country due to a dearth of solid academic 
exploration both at home and abroad.4 In fact, there is little research on the religious 
aspect of the war and even less on the use of religious discourse as a political tool. What 
Bangladeshis consider to have been a genocide has not yet been recognised 
internationally as such and is missing from otherwise comprehensive collections 
dedicated to genocides perpetrated in the 20th century such as those by Bartov (2001) and 
Merriman (2009). The year 1971 was an important moment in the history of Bangladesh 
and Pakistan and for South Asian politics overall.5  
																																																						
4	Sarmila	Bose’s	Dead	Reckoning:	Memories	of	the	1971	Bangladesh	War	is	one	of	the	first	research-based	
works	by	a	Western	author.	It	is	regarded	as	highly	controversial	in	Bangladesh,	for	downplaying	both	
numbers	–	projecting	casualties	between	30,000-100,000	and	rape	of	even	lower	numbers	–	and	the	
philosophy	and	intensity	of	the	war,	terming	it	a	‘civil	war’	(whereas	Bangladeshis	regard	it	as	their	
liberation	war),	etc.	(Bose,	2011).	Naeem	Mohaiemen	(2011)	argues	that	Bose’s	research,	among	other	
things,	is	methodologically	flawed	in	terms	of	its	bias	in	source	selection	of	both	documents	and	
interviewees.	While	I	would	argue	that	exact	figures	are	not	what	is	important	and	not	the	focus	of	this	
research,	I	understand	Woollacott’s	(2011)	assertion	in	reference	to	the	1971	war:	‘The	numbers	
mattered,	and	matter	still,	because	they	make	the	difference	between	seeing	the	war	as	a	tragedy	and	
seeing	it	as	a	terrible	crime,	indeed	as	a	genocide.	That	in	turn	is	important	because	it	profoundly	affects	
the	way	in	which	the	peoples	of	South	Asia	understand	both	their	separate	and	their	common	histories.’		
5	The	unrelenting	struggle	between	India	and	Pakistan	over	Kashmir	is	only	one	of	these	issues.	Ganguly	
(2007)	shows	how,	with	the	breaking	away	of	East	Pakistan,	‘Pakistan’s	moral	claim	to	Kashmir	became	
hollow.	If	religion	alone	could	not	serve	as	the	basis	of	Pakistan’s	unity	and	territorial	integrity,	it	could	
not	legitimately	claim	Kashmir	on	the	basis	of	its	Muslim-majority	status’	(2007:	75).	Neither	could	India,	
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The following chapter provides a historical context of the political situation and 
the struggles over national, cultural and religious identities in post-Partition East 
Pakistan/pre-liberation Bangladesh, before laying out the theoretical framework and 
methodology of the study and the empirical findings and their analysis in subsequent 
chapters. 
																																																																																																																																																																	
however,	on	the	basis	of	its	claim	to	secularism,	a	commitment	to	which	was	increasingly	weakening	
(ibid).	
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CHAPTER 2 
SETTING THE STAGE FOR WAR:  
CULTURE, IDENTITY AND RELIGION IN EAST PAKISTAN 
Bangladesh, a small country in South Asia, has a population of over 160 million. 
It is the world’s third largest Muslim majority country after Indonesia and Pakistan, with 
almost 89 per cent of its population Muslim. The largest religious minority is Hindu at 9 
per cent, followed by a small percentage of Christians and Buddhists. After independence 
from Pakistan in 1971, under the continuing government-in-exile which was established 
by leaders of the Awami League (AL) party during the war in April 1971, secularism was 
enshrined in the Constitution as one of the fundamental principles of state policy, along 
with nationalism, socialism and democracy. Within three years, however, following the 
assassination of Prime Minister Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and other founding leaders in a 
violent military coup d’etat, the principle of secularism was removed from the 
Constitution. Under subsequent periods of military rule from 1975-19906,  ‘the state 
actively encouraged the role of Islam in public life’ (Riaz 2010: 45).  
Also during this time, under the rule of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), 
the ban on forming political parties based on religious ideology was removed, allowing 
those who had collaborated with the Pakistani army during the war, namely the Jamaat-i-
Islami (JI), to participate in national politics (ibid). Ironically, as JI later lent its tacit 
support first to the BNP, then AL and then again to the BNP in the 1990s, the party – 
comprised of leaders known to be collaborators, and who are now being tried for war 
																																																						
6	For	a	concise	summary	of	the	political	history	of	Bangladesh	and	a	comprehensive	overview	of	the	
interplay	of	politics	and	religion	between	1971-2008,	see	Ali	Riaz	edited	Religion	and	Politics	in	South	Asia.	
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crimes and crimes against humanity in Bangladesh’s war crimes trial – came to power in 
an alliance with the BNP in 2001. The JI secured 12.13, 8.60, 4.28 and 4.6 per cent of the 
votes in the general elections of 1991, 1996, 2001 and 2008 respectively (ibid).  
Although Bangladeshi formal politics is dominated by the AL and BNP, 
according to political scientist Ali Riaz, voting trends have shown that ideological 
cohesion among the rightist and Islamist political parties is strong, and that the centre-
right coalition (the BNP was in alliance with three religion-based political parties in 
2008) was much better organised than its secular counterparts (2010: 54). Riaz notes the 
general ‘phenomenal rise of political parties and organizations with an Islamist agenda… 
i.e., those which utilize religion as a political ideology and, in some forms, 
“instrumentalize religion to pursue political objectives”’ (Riaz 2010: 55). Also interesting 
is the fact that it was after the restoration of democracy in 1991, characterised by 
antagonistic politics between the AL and BNP, that Islamist militancy saw a rise in 
Bangladesh.7   
For centuries, although Islam has been an important part of East Bengal, it has 
evolved into a syncretistic form, a key feature of which is its connection to personal lives 
and social space but not political ideology (Riaz 2010). Riaz summarises the role of Islam 
for Bangalis through the Partition and Pakistan movement to Bangladesh’s Liberation 
War thus: 
Even during the movement for Pakistan, emphasizing a Muslim identity did not mean 
that Bengalis were favouring a heightened role of religion in politics. The rise of Bengali 
nationalism, not too long after the establishment of Pakistan, is testimony to the fact that 
Bengalis were uncomfortable with the linkage between national identity and religion. 
Discrimination, exploitation and marginalization in the name of Islam by the Pakistani 
																																																						
7	Elsewhere,	Riaz	(2003)	has	argued	that	the	rise	of	Islam	as	a	political	ideology	and	the	growing	strengths	
of	Islamist	parties	in	Bangladesh	were/are	due	to	‘the	crises	of	hegemony	of	the	ruling	bloc;	and	politics	of	
expediency	by	the	“secularist”	parties’	(2003:	302).	He	claims	that	these	factors	‘created	an	environment	
conducive	to	the	rise	of	religious	rhetoric	in	political	discourse	and	sub-	sequently	allowed	the	Islamist	
parties	to	become	a	significant	force	in	the	Bangladesh	polity’	(ibid).	
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rulers strengthened the resolve of the majority of the Bengali population that a separation 
between religion and politics was necessary (Riaz 2010: 57).      
This chapter looks at the growing crisis of cultural and religious identity not so 
much as articulated by the Bangali population as imposed by the Pakistani ruling elite, 
and how this built up into Bangladesh’s struggle for independence and its framing by the 
two warring sides. 
  
2.1 The Struggle over Identities 
National, religious and cultural identity have always been complex issues in 
Bangladesh, particularly during 1971 and after. The debate over Bangali versus 
Bangladeshi identity, the struggle over the primacy of ethnic versus religious identity 
have shadowed the Bangali Muslim throughout history. As Bangali Muslim Pakistanis, 
this became further complicated with even Muslim identity becoming divided. Social 
economist Naila Kabeer (2011) notes that the Islam of Bengal and that of Pakistan are 
very different due to the imprint of very different historical and social forces. She argues 
that the crisis over identity goes back to the Partition of 1947, with Partition actually 
heightening the ‘problematic nature of the Bengali Muslim identity’ which comprised 
two parallel belief-systems. While both claimed to be Muslim, one was of the ‘Orthodox 
elite’ and the other ‘more syncretic and personal version’ belonged to the ‘Bengali 
peasant’ (2011: 141). Differences in the practice of Islam in Bengal and West Pakistan 
are also argued by other writers such as Ganguly (2007) who states that other than the 
core elements, there was little in common.  
Within these two versions of religious identity loomed even greater differences of 
ethnicity and culture. As Roy (2006) notes, Bangladesh faces ‘the pressures of a dual 
identity of which Islam is one and vital; the other no less seminal is the local Bengali 
linguistic-cultural identity’ (2006: 219). Historically, Bangalis had been, by and large, 
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under Hindu domination, economically, intellectually and politically. As such, Pakistan 
was their chance to ‘emerge from Hindu domination and wield power as the majority in 
their own land’ (Oldenburg 1985: 723). Perhaps Oldenburg (1985) put it best in his 
article on Pakistan as being ‘insufficiently imagined’8. Referring to the lack of 
understanding between its two wings, Oldenburg writes how Pakistanis: 
saw the state of Pakistan as inseparable from the Muslim nation of the Indian 
subcontinent, a nation locked in combat with the Hindus. For the Pakistanis, safeguarding 
and strengthening the Indian Islamic heritage in which Urdu played a major role was 
what Pakistan meant above all. Bengalis, on the other hand, viewed Pakistan primarily as 
a place where Muslims would rule, secure from Hindu domination. Their view of how 
their Bengali identity and language would contribute to the Pakistan they believed in 
differed significantly from that of their west- wing compatriots. (Oldenburg 1985: 712) 
 
However, after the formation of Pakistan, ‘Bengalis still found themselves dominated, 
now by Pakistanis whose class background and political and intellectual advancement 
were similar to those of the erstwhile Bengali Hindu elite’ (Oldenburg 1985: 723). Thus, 
while East Bengal participated in the Pakistan movement leading up to the Partition of 
1947,  
the failures, inadequacies, and insincerities of the Pakistan rulers, repeatedly 
demonstrated in their dealings with Islam, caused a Bengali backlash in its vigorous and 
chauvinistic affirmation of the Bengali self to the point of almost undermining Islamic 
relevance to the Bangladeshis (Roy 2006: 219).  
 
This is echoed by others. For example, Alavi (2011) argues that,  
the moment that Pakistan was established, Muslim nationalism in India had fulfilled itself 
and outlived its purpose. Now there was a fresh equation of privilege and deprivation to 
be reckoned within the new state. Virtually overnight there were ethnic redefinitions. 
[These included the] new bearers of privilege, the true “Muslims” for whom Pakistan was 
created…and the lesser, weaker, Bangalis, Sindhis, Pathans and Baluch, whose 
nationalist movements exploded into view the day after Pakistan came into being (2011: 
96). 
 
Riaz (2002) argues, ‘what the Indian Muslims asked for was an affirmation of 
their difference and recognition of their nationhood; what they got was a geographical 
partition of India and a division of their own “nation”’ (2003: 54) and that ‘Islam as a 
																																																						
8	Oldenburg’s	article	contains	an	array	of	perspectives	and	some	interesting	insights	into	whether,	why	
and	how	the	secession	of	East	Pakistan	was	“inevitable”.	
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mobilization tool outlived its purpose as soon as Pakistan was created’ (ibid). This was 
understood by the first generation of Pakistani leaders, argues Riaz, but that their 
emphasis on the secular nature of the state faced resistance from sources such as the 
Jamaat-i-Islami which had also opposed the Muslim nationalist movement in India.  
In Pakistan, Islam was then elevated to the pedestal of “national identity” by the ruling 
regimes, especially after 1954, primarily to contend with the assertion of regional and lin- 
guistic ethnic identities by Bengalis, Sindhis, Pathans, and Baluchs. What should have 
been an open discourse on national identity, and an effort to accommodate the regionally 
differentiated, economically disparate, and culturally different nations was wrecked by 
the Punjabi-dominated state machin- ery’s insistence that “Islam” was the raison d'être of 
Pakistan. (Riaz 2002: 55) 
 
While Islam was seen as a binding factor for the nation, differences of sect, 
language, region, and social class soon arose (Ganguly 2007). Not only difference but 
also a form of discrimination came to the fore. Ganguly, who premises his argument on 
the fact that polyethnic states lacking a commitment to ethno-religious pluralism, 
protection of minority rights and democratic procedures will fall victim to ethno-religious 
conflict and violence (2007), also finds that Bangalis were viewed with disdain and 
distrust by their West Pakistani counterparts. According to Wilhelm van Schendel, too, 
Bangali Muslims were viewed by West Pakistan as not only socially inferior but also 
‘lesser Muslims’ as they did not adhere to all the practices deemed ‘properly Islamic’ and 
that ‘however passionately Bengalis might think of themselves as Muslims, they fell 
short of the mark and they could not be fully-fledged Pakistanis unless they shed much of 
their Bengaliness’ (van Schendel 2009: 111). Naila Kabeer (2011), for her part, contends 
that Pakistan’s rulers, ‘unable to ignore or unify its dissatisfied minority 
nationalities…still relied on Islam to keep the nation intact’ (Kabeer 2011: 140). She 
quotes the late president Zia-ul Haq as having said, “Take Islam out of Pakistan and make 
it a secular state; it would collapse” (ibid). This is indeed what happened once religion 
came to take second place for the Bangalis.    
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In the absence of a coherent national ideology in Pakistan, Islam has been used 
throughout its history as a tool by its ruling elite, arguably in vain, to unite its ethnically 
diverse population (Khan 2006). Khan makes a distinction between Islam as a belief 
system which is a part of everyday life of the people and as an ideology projected by the 
state, ‘an instrument to deny diversity and difference’, going as far as to say that in 
Pakistan it is ‘strategically deployed by the rulers to legitimize their misconduct and to 
cover their failings’ (Khan 2006: 188). He sees Islam as being used to ‘justify [the early 
rulers’] coercive and authoritarian methods in dealing with ethnic, regional, and 
economic discontent’ and presented as a ‘symbol of unity’ (Khan 2006: 189).  
The need to conform to a singular religious identity disregarding ethnic and 
cultural differences soon after Partition was what ignited the discontent which ultimately 
led to the declaration of independence over 20 years later. In 1948, Pakistan’s Governor-
General Muhammad Ali Jinnah proclaimed that Urdu – the language of 3.7 per cent of 
the population (Khan 2006) would be the lingua franca of Pakistan and that Bangalis – 
who comprised 54 per cent of the population (ibid) – must learn to speak it. This was 
based on the fact that Urdu was ‘above all a language that more than any other provincial 
language embodies the best that is in Islamic culture and Muslim tradition and is nearest 
to the languages used in other Islamic countries’ (as quoted in Uddin 2006). From a 
collection of his speeches, Jinnah is quoted in Khan (1985) as having said, ‘…what is the 
use of saying…we are Bengalis or Sindhis, or Pathans, or Punjabis? No, we are Muslims’ 
(Khan 1985: 25).9  
The Bangalis saw their ethnicity coming under attack and ethnic difference 
became a prominent issue (Uddin 2006). Officially, Urdu was viewed as a Muslim 
																																																						
9	For	a	more	detailed	account	of	the	relationship	between	language	and	religion	in	post-colonial	Pakistan,	
see	Neilesh	Bose’s	(2014)	book	Recasting	the	Region:	Language,	Culture,	and	Islam	in	Colonial	Bengal.	
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language and Bangla as a Hindu language, supported by attempts to de-Sanskritise and 
Arabicise Bangla – such as by introducing Arabic script, the Harful Quran, for the Bangla 
language and incorporate Perso-Arabic words (Anisuzzaman 1995) in order to purify it of 
Hindu influences (van Schendel 2009). Soon, anything Bangali was either banned, such 
as the songs of Rabindranath Tagore on state-controlled radio and television, or looked 
down upon as Hindu (Kabeer 2011, Khan 2006). Singing the songs of Tagore, wearing 
bindis (decorative marks on the forehead), allowing middle class Bangali girls to train in 
the arts and perform in public – regarded as expressions of cultural difference between 
Muslims and Hindus, Pakistanis and Bangalis – all came to be viewed as acts of political 
dissent (Kabeer 2011). Indeed, ‘the cultural and linguistic affinity between the Hindus 
and Muslims of Bengal was… profoundly threatening to a state which had only Islam to 
hold together its fragmented and divided people’ (Kabeer 2011: 141).  
Sufia Uddin (2006), in her exploration of the formation of community identity 
and the negotiation and contestation of Islam and nationhood in Bangladesh, argues that 
rather than being a monolithic culture, Islam is regionally informed and in then East 
Pakistan, too, a uniquely Bangali vision of Muslim community gave rise to a ‘Bengali 
informed’ Muslim community. West Pakistan frowned upon this Bangali informed 
culture and criticised the Bangla language as being foreign to Islam. Bangali Muslims, on 
the other hand, concluded that ‘the common bond of Islam provided an insufficient basis 
to believe in the success of a nation’ (Uddin 2006: 119). Thus, while the basis of 
solidarity during the 1947 Partition of India and Pakistan was religion, in 1971 East 
Pakistan, it was ‘racial unity based on all the people of its territory, irrespective of faith’ 
(Hossain and Khan 2006). The people fought for a Bangali identity and Bangali 
nationalism was based on ‘ethno-linguistic’ and ‘ethno-cultural’ characteristics based on 
Bengal’s own culture, customs and racial identity. A national consciousness, which 
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Hossain and Khan define as an attitude with responsibility which develops into a bond or 
feeling of solidarity, was formed.  
Murshid (1993) also talks about the ‘switched allegiance from a religion-based 
Pakistani nationalism founded on the notion that Hindus and Muslims were two nations, 
to a composite, culture-based non-religious Bangali nationalism’ (1993:67). She notes 
how a non-Bengali, mainly Punjabi-dominated, ruling elite projected itself as the 
‘defender of the faithful’ using religion to maintain itself in power, frequently using the 
slogan of ‘Islam in danger’ (Murshid 1993: 68). ‘The method of the ruling elite to stay in 
power was to politicize religion, to establish an equation between the ruling party, which 
was the Muslim League, and Islam. The two were presented as coterminous, such that 
any opposition to the Muslim League was treated as an attack on Islam’ (ibid). Murshid 
(1995) contends that ‘in the struggle for Pakistan, religion had become a political rather 
than a personal issue, particularly because religion determined nationhood’ (1995: 335), 
and because Islam did not distinguish between the spheres of religion and politics, 
religion could acquire a greater political significance and was used by the ruling Muslim 
League to seek legitimacy. The Bengali nationalists, on the other hand, in order not to 
frighten the non-Muslim minorities, did not adopt a religious framework for their public 
utterances (1993:68). But Murshid (1995) shows how while the vernacular intelligentsia 
represented a secular challenge to the politicization of religion, expressing their economic 
grievances, this was ‘not meant to contradict the earlier demand for a separate homeland 
for Muslims’ or that ‘the vernacular intelligentsia had become less religious’ (1995: 336). 
She cites a study conducted in 1963-64 which revealed that ‘to the East Pakistani Muslim 
there was no acute sense of conflict between his identity as a Bengali, a Muslim and a 
Pakistani’ (ibid). Murshid argues: 
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The secular opposition was neutral in relation to the personal religiosity of the vernacular 
intelligentsia. However, it did indicate their disillusionment with successive non-Bengali 
dominated central governments which constantly invoked Islam to keep them from 
voicing their legitimate grievances. (Murshid 1995: 336).10 
   
Sufia Uddin, on the other hand, argues that construction of a ‘single sustainable 
national culture that bonds people together in a convincingly imagined community’ is 
crucial to the success of nationalism and that ‘traditions are created, intentionally 
sculpted to promote a particular nationalism’ (2006: 122-123) and that this nationalism 
can be based on a variety or combination of common bonds such as secularism, ethnic 
unity, religious unity, etc. For Pakistan, religion was such a basis. However, as Uddin 
notes, Bangladesh was founded in direct contrast to the nationalism on which Pakistan 
was founded – on a ‘secular nationalist unity based on Bengali language and ethnicity’ 
(2006: 123). In fact, Bangali nationalism was one of the four fundamental principles of 
state policy in 1971 – along with secularism, socialism and democracy – all of which 
were incorporated into the 1972 Constitution of Bangladesh. As Uddin notes: ‘The 
religious minority status that inspired the creation of Pakistan is viewed as an insufficient 
bond when compared with ethnic identity and common language’ (Uddin, 2006: 129).  
Ali Riaz also maintains that the nationalist movement of the Bangalis leading to 
the ultimate secession of East Pakistan grew over decades from opposition to the 
Pakistani rulers’ use of religion in politics and that the ‘emergence of Bangladesh as an 
independent nation was…seen by the protagonists as a victory over the abominable use 
of religion’ (Riaz 2010: 45).  
 
 
																																																						
10	 The	 complex	 relationship	 between	 religion	 and	 politics	 and	 clashes	 between	 religious	 and	 secular	
ideologies	 is	 discussed	 in	 depth	 in	 Tazeen	Murshid’s	 (1995)	 book	 The	 Sacred	 and	 the	 Secular:	 Bengal	
Muslim	Discourses,	1871-1977.	
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2.2 The Battle for Independence 
The rising discontent of the Bangalis after Partition based on the socio-cultural, 
political and economic discrimination they faced, could not be suppressed with the lure of 
a unifying religion. The Language Movement of 1952 in which Bangalis laid down their 
lives in the struggle for their mother tongue, culminated throughout their thwarted efforts 
to participate in the decision-making process of the country through democratic electoral 
processes in 1954 and 195811 to the 1970 elections – the results of which would have 
meant the ‘transfer of power from the Muhajir-Punjabi oligarchy to the Bengali majority’ 
(Khan 2006: 185) – into the war of liberation which brought into being the independent 
state of Bangladesh.  
Following the declaration of Urdu as the nation’s lingua franca, the Bangalis, who 
made up the majority population, revolted. In the Language Movement of February 1952, 
several people, four of them students of Dhaka University, gave their lives. Eventually, 
Bangla was given the status of one of the state languages along with Urdu in 195612, but 
the struggle for autonomy continued and grew. In Pakistan’s first national elections in 
1970, East Pakistan’s Awami League led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman won an absolute 
majority in the National Assembly but the West Pakistani military-bureaucratic elite 
refused to hand over the reins of power to the East Pakistani leadership. By 1971, it 
became clear that, other than the religion of Islam, the two wings of Pakistan shared little 
else. In March 1971, the Bangalis, victims of political, economic, social and cultural 
																																																						
11	For	a	more	detailed	account	of	the	political	situation	leading	up	to	the	war	and	the	phases	of	the	war	
itself,	see	Rounaq	Jahan’s	Pakistan:	failure	in	national	integration.	
12	This	did	not	go	unchallenged,	however.	In	a	history	of	the	press	in	Pakistan,	Zamir	Niazi	(2010)	describes	
how	the	decision	to	declare	Bangla	a	second	language	was	seen	by	much	of	the	West	Pakistani	population	
and	press	as	‘treason	against	Pakistan	and	a	threat	to	the	existence	of	Urdu’	(2010:	83).	
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discrimination,13 declared independence (Ganguly 2007, Khan 2006, Khan 1985, 
Thompson 2007, van Schendel 2009).  
Not only did the Pakistani government and army rise in bloody battle against the 
Bangalis, but they also succeeded in recruiting collaborators from the East Pakistani side. 
A number of right-wing politicians, many of them belonging to the religion-based 
political party Jamaat-i-Islami14, formed the Citizen’s Peace Committee, later renamed 
the East Pakistan Central Peace Committee and commonly known as Shanti (peace) 
Committee, in order to ‘bring back normal conditions to the country and to eliminate 
irrational fears from the minds of the people’ (Sharif et. al. 1988: 39) but who in fact 
prepared lists of patriotic Bangalis to be killed and assisted in their killing along with 
looting and rape (ibid). The committee organised paramilitary forces called the Razakars, 
Al-Badr and Al-Shams which functioned as their extensions across the country, acting as 
‘death squads and providers of counterinsurgency intelligence’ (van Schendel 2009).  
As the newspaper Dainik Sangram reports, the anti-liberation forces opposed the 
war of independence based on the belief that “Pakistan was created as a separate 
homeland for Muslims in order to free them from Hindu exploitation and persecution” 
(Dainik Sangram 7 May 1971, p. 1) and that “if Pakistan is destroyed then Muslims will 
																																																						
13	Among	other	examples,	East	Pakistan,	which	comprised	54	per	cent	of	the	country’s	total	population,	
constituted	only	11.1	per	cent	of	the	civil	service	(Khan	2006).	They	made	up	3	per	cent	of	the	higher	
ranks	in	the	armed	forces	and	7	per	cent	of	the	higher	posts	in	the	central	administration	(van	Schendel	
2009).	Two-thirds	of	Pakistan’s	foreign	exchange	was	earned	in	the	eastern	wing	but	much	of	it	diverted	
to	the	western	wing,	while	only	a	quarter	of	the	nation’s	budget	was	spent	in	East	Pakistan,	where	the	
majority	population	lived	(ibid).	At	the	time	of	Urdu	being	declared	the	state	language	of	Pakistan,	Khan	
(2006),	Thompson	(2007)	and	van	Schendel	(2009)	put	the	proportion	of	Urdu	speakers	at	3.7,	3.5	and	3	
per	cent	and	Bangla	speakers	at	54,	56	and	57	per	cent	respectively.	
14	Interestingly,	the	party	still	manages	to	have	a	3	per	cent	vote	bank	in	Bangladesh	and,	in	coalition	with	
the	then	ruling,	now	major	opposition	party,	the	Bangladesh	Nationalist	Party	(BNP),	its	leaders	have	held	
key	positions	in	the	2001-2004	cabinet	as	ministers	and	members	of	parliament,	some	of	whom	are	also	
under	trial	and/or	have	been	convicted.	The	Jamaat-i-Islami	is	currently	under	investigation	for	having	
committed	war	crimes	in	1971	as	a	political	party	and	there	is	a	bid	to	ban	the	party	in	Bangladesh.	
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lose their separate characteristics and be locked in the chains of Hindu slavery” (Dainik 
Pakistan 27 September 1971, p. 6). In fact, Pakistan was portrayed as the sacred 
homeland of Muslims around the world. This is also apparent in the statement of the 
founder of Jamaat-i-Islami, Islamic scholar Sayyid Abul A’la Maududi15 who declared 
that,  
Pakistan’s security is the security of Islam in the whole world, Pakistan is Islam’s 
strongest citadel, if the enemies of Islam succeed in destroying this citadel then it will not 
be possible to save Islam and Muslims anywhere in the world. If God forbid, East 
Pakistan separates from West Pakistan, Islam and Muslims will be finished in East 
Pakistan. Thus defending East Pakistan means defending Islam” (Dainik Sangram 9 
October 1971, p. 1).  
 
In this way, Pakistan and Islam were depicted as one and the same, and the battle to 
defend them justified.  
On the other hand, the Bangalis of East Pakistan came together as a linguistic and 
ethnic community (Hossain and Khan 2006, Uddin 2006). As Riaz (2003) argues: 
Bengali language and culture had been portrayed as the unifying point of the entire 
nation. The conflict between the Bengali political leadership and Pakistani rulers since 
the inception of Pakistan was explained in terms of a conspiracy against the Bengali 
nation as a whole. Aspirations of different classes—subaltern, intermediate, and nascent 
bourgeoisie—were articulated in their own idiom and thus brought together on a common 
platform under the ideological hegemony of the petty-bourgeoisie against the colonial 
domination. (Riaz 2003: 306) 
  
These groups formed the Mukti Bahini or Freedom Brigade in the struggle for 
independence (muktijuddho). According to many freedom fighters, most of whom said 
that they were devoted Muslims, the struggle for independence had nothing to do with 
religion, but that their struggle was for political, economic, cultural and social 
emancipation. The freedom fighters were provided with support and training from India, 
																																																						
15	Maulana	Sayyid	Abu	A	‘la	Maududi	was	the	founder	of	the	Jamaat-i-Islami,	a	modern	Muslim	movement	
and	political	organisation.	His	ideas	and	writings	have	influenced	a	wide	circle	of	Muslim	thinkers	and	
their	followers	who	believed	in	a	revivalist	vision	of	Islam,	grounded	in	a	view	of	traditions	reflecting	
idealised	norms.	He	believed	an	Islamic	framework	could	be	used	to	arrange	all	aspects	of	contemporary	
life	and	society	(Nanji	2008).	Maulana	Maududi	was	the	Ameer	of	Jamaat-i-Islami	while	Ghulam	Azam	was	
the	Ameer	of	Jamaat-i-Islami	in	East	Pakistan.	
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who also housed the countless refugees fleeing East Pakistan and who, in the last days of 
the war, joined in the battle, largely, argue sceptics, for its own geopolitical interest of 
weakening Pakistan. Indian “Hindu” support for the Bangali Mukti Bahini served to 
reinforce the claims of the anti-liberation forces that this was a war between Hindus and 
Muslims, India and Pakistan and that Indian Hindus were trying to destroy Pakistan and 
Islam.   
In the nine-month-long struggle that ensued, between one and three million 
Bangalis were killed16, including the targeted killings of intellectuals and professionals in 
the capital Dhaka two days before the Pakistani army surrendered, presumably as a last 
desperate attempt to destroy the future of the Bangalis. Between 200,000-400,000 
Bangali women were raped. Over 10 million people were left homeless. On December 
16, 1971, the independent nation of Bangladesh was born.  
 
2.3 The Media Landscape of 1971 Pakistan 
 In the year 1971, there were a total of 138 publications in East Pakistan – 26 
dailies, three bi-weeklies and 109 weeklies (Dhar 1985). The two main pro-liberation 
media which functioned at the time were the Swadhin Bangla Betar Kendra (Free Bangla 
Radio Centre) and a newspaper published from the Mujibnagar government-in-exile, but 
a number of underground papers were published from within Bangladesh as well (ibid) 
which attempted to publish as often as possible and to uphold the spirit of liberation of 
the Bangalis. 
																																																						
16	The	official	Bangladeshi	figure	is	3	million,	but	unofficial	claims	have	been	as	low	as	1.8	million.	Official	
Pakistani	figures,	however,	claim	the	number	of	casualties	to	be	at	26,000	(Ganguly	2007,	Sharif	et	al,	
1988,	van	Schendel	2009).	
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During the war, the East Pakistani press became enemies of the Pakistani 
government and military. During the very first military crackdown, Operation 
Searchlight, on the night of March 25, 1971, the military crushed the police and 
paramilitary East Pakistan Rifles (the only organisations which coud have offered serious 
armed resistance); set ablaze slums and gunned down fleeing inhabitants; and targeted the 
students and faculty of Dhaka university, including a dormitory for Hindu students and 
teachers. On that same night, they also burned down the newspaper offices of major East 
Pakistani dailies Ittefaq, The People and Sangbad, killed local journalists and confined 
foreign correspondents inside a hotel in Dhaka (van Schendel 2009).  
On March 26, President Yahya Khan under Martial Law Rule 77 restricted the 
press from publishing anything which directly or indirectly criticised the indivisibility 
and solidarity of Pakistan; criticised the martial law administration; created fear or 
disappointment in the minds of the population; criticised the army, police or government; 
created enmity or hatred among Pakistanis; and insulted Islam or disrespected Qaed-e-
Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah (Dhar 1985). Neither was the press permitted to print 
anything political without clearance from the government authorities. Within a few days, 
however, in order to create an impression of normalcy, all newspapers were given an 
unwritten directive to resume publication. By March 29, Morning News, Purbodesh and 
The Observer resumed publication, while Dainik Pakistan resumed printing on March 30, 
and eventually Ittefaq, the major papers being published from East Pakistan. Dhar (1985) 
states that research on the 1971 media in later years has shown that most of these 
newspapers, for various reasons, were aligned with the Pakistani government, though 
some journalists working with them were pro-liberation. All news to be published was 
vetted by a censorship house established in Dhaka under the central information office 
but more than these two bodies, the press was controlled by the Inter Services Public 
		 34	
Relations (ISPR) department. For almost a month, the only news published were from 
news agencies and not staff correspondents of the papers. The ISPR, led by an army 
major by the name of Salek, would oversee all the news to be printed, demanded that 
editorials be written when they were being avoided by some of the Bangla dailies, and 
often provided “press advice” to the papers (ibid).           
The next chapter explores in greater depth the theoretical frameworks relevant to 
this study – the concepts of ideology and myth, nationalism, identity formation, political 
and sexual violence in wartime. It then looks more specifically at their relationship to 
religion and discursive practices of communication in the legitimisation of violence, and 
the role of propaganda, rhetoric, and the media as a discursive tool in this process.    
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CHAPTER 3 
IDENTITIES AND NATIONS IN CONFLICT: THE MEDIA AS DISCURSIVE 
TOOLS 
Ideology ‘expresses a will, a hope or a nostalgia, rather than describing a reality.’  
–Louis Althusser  
 
This research is a study of how ideology is framed and used in the formation, 
validation and strengthening of discourse disseminated through the media. It focuses on 
two newspapers in Pakistan in 1971 and their use of discourse based on religious 
ideology to construct particularistic identities, difference, particular imaginations of the 
nation and nationalism, and the legitimisation of violence and sexual violence. Before 
moving to detail the empirical evidence, however, it is necessary to understand these 
concepts in their core as well as in relation to the basic theme of this study – religion-
based discourse and the role of the media. This chapter begins by unpacking the essential 
concepts of ideology, identity, nationalism and religiously motivated violence. It then 
moves to the role of communication, propaganda, media and discourse in formulating and 
disseminating these ideologies.  
 
3.1 Ideology and Myth 
Ideology is difficult to define clearly. It is often associated with Marxism and the 
notion of “false consciousness”, about the power to make people believe in something 
and act upon that belief. As Szeman and Kaposy (2011) note, addressing ideology as a 
concept has changed much since its original definition of pre-Enlightenment times ‘when 
eighteenth-century ideologues claimed to unfold the laws of human 
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consciousness…[with the goal of] prevent[ing] popular use of superstition for political 
gain and replac[ing] such practices with public, scientific projects in which reason would 
prevail’ (2011: 157). For example, contemporary cultural theorists study how ideologies 
enable different social classes to coexist despite various inequalities, from religious 
beliefs which ‘provided a comprehensive moral narrative which helped to maintain the 
social and economic status quo’ (Szeman and Kaposy 2011: 158) to conceptions of false 
consciousness and social determination. This study will draw upon French Marxist 
philosopher Louis Althusser’s conceptualisation of ideology, and its production of 
subjects through interpellation as shown below. Before that, however, it is important to 
present an overview of the rather complex notion of ideology.    
 Terry Eagleton writes in his comprehensive examination of ideology in a book by 
the same name that while it is understandable that people may struggle and even kill for 
reasons related to their physical survival, it is more difficult to understand why they 
would do so for ‘something as apparently abstract as ideas’ (Eagleton 1991: xiii). In his 
book, Eagleton lists several definitions of ideology popular in the early 1990s, from ‘the 
process of production of meanings, signs and values in social life’ to ‘(false) ideas which 
help to legitimate a dominant political power’, ‘socially necessary illusion’ and ‘the 
process whereby social life is converted to a natural reality’ (ibid: 1-2). Eagleton also 
notes the contradictions and complications of such definitions, where, for example, not 
all ideologies may be dominant, or where the word, seemingly pejorative, may not be 
applied to people’s selves but only to others.  
In the case of Pakistan, however, as we shall see in subsequent chapters, Islam 
was framed openly as an ideology, in fact, as Pakistan’s national ideology itself, an 
ideology by which Pakistan was born, by which it should live and based on which it will 
survive. This assessment may be applied to Eagleton’s third issue with the definitions of 
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ideology and the discrepancy among thinkers who see it as ‘illusion, distortion and 
mystification’ versus those who focus on its ‘function of ideas within social life than with 
their reality or unreality’ (ibid: 2-3). For Eagleton, ideologies are not nonsense, they 
‘encode, in however mystified a way, genuine needs and desires’ (ibid: 12). Similarly, 
Islam, the religion of the majority population of Pakistan, was used as the basis of its 
national ideology. Citing Jon Elster, Eagleton suggests that, 
ruling ideologies can actively shape the wants and desires of those subjected to them; but 
they must also engage significantly with the wants and desires that people already have, 
catching up genuine hopes and needs, reinflecting them in their own peculiar idiom, and 
feeding them back to their subjects in ways which render these ideologies plausible and 
attractive. They must be ‘real’ enough to provide the basis on which individuals can 
fashion a coherent identity, must furnish some solid motivations for effective action, and 
must make at least some feeble attempt to explain away their own more flagrant 
contradictions and incoherencies. (ibid: 15)   
 
For Marxist philosopher Louis Althusser, however, ideology ‘represents the 
imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence’ (Althusser 
2011: 213); it is an illusion which makes an allusion to reality. This illusion is needed, 
according to Althusser, for two reasons, so that ‘Priests or Despots’ can dominate and 
exploit people or for people themselves to be able to deal with their material alienation. 
This alienation occurs, according to Marxist theory, when people become estranged from 
the products of their own activity, seeing them as material things and their existence as 
inevitable (Eagleton 2007).  
However, Eagleton notes that ideologies often contain false propositions which no 
rational person would accept, but that there is also an issue of empirical truths and 
ideological falsehoods as well as ideological affirmations of certain truths and exclusion 
of others. Willibald Steinmetz (2011), for example, considers the relationship between 
language and political power through the rise of the communist and fascist regimes in 
Europe up to the end of the Cold War. He cites Czech playwright and civil rights activist 
Vaclac Havel’s analysis of intellectual immobility and how ‘post-totalitarian’ states no 
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longer required crude terror (or what Althusser would refer to as repressive state 
apparatuses) but relied on the compliance of its citizens to uphold the political system.  
This articulation is important for this research which will show that mainstream 
Pakistani media discourse underlined that Hindus had oppressed Muslims throughout 
history and killed them during the Partition of India. The media, as this research will 
show, ignored the role of Muslims in such violence in which Muslims also killed Hindus, 
and that it was not acceptable to keep killing Hindus and establishing Pakistan as a nation 
based solely on the religion of Islam. In this way the Pakistani media under study 
reinforced the ruling ideology. Eagleton suggests that the prevailing understanding of 
ideology is the legitimating of power of a dominant social group or class and involves six 
strategies:  
promoting beliefs and values congenial to [the group/class]; naturalizing and 
universalizing such beliefs so as to render them self-evident and apparently inevitable; 
denigrating ideas which might challenge it; excluding rival forms of thought, perhaps by 
some unspoken but systematic logic; and obscuring social reality in ways convenient to 
itself. (Eagleton 1991: 3, original italics) 
 
This study will show that the Pakistani media under study employed all these 
aspects to promote, naturalise and universalise anti-liberation discourses through the use 
of Islam as the only good and true ideology to live by and on which Pakistan, as a nation, 
should draw. Furthermore, Hindu identity was constructed as ‘the Other’, as everything 
Muslim Pakistanis were not – as the enemy, thus confirming Eagleton’s argument that ‘a 
successful ruling ideology…must engage significantly with genuine wants, needs and 
desires; but this is also its Achilles heel, forcing it to recognize an “other” to itself and 
inscribing its otherness as a potentially disruptive force within its own forms’ (Eagleton 
1991: 45). Importantly, Eagleton points out that ideology is more to do with discourse 
than language, which means that one aspect of language may be ideological in one 
context but not in another. What this means is that any study of ideology must be a study 
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of discourse, which means placing meanings within words, sentences, grammar, etc., 
within a larger socio-historical context. In fact, this study agrees with Eagleton that it is 
important to view ideology ‘less as a particular set of discourses, than as a particular set 
of effects within discourses’ (1991: 194).  
 Althusser, too, suggests that ideology is ‘a particular organization of signifying 
practices which goes to constitute human beings as social subjects, and which produces 
the lived relations by which such subjects are connected to the dominant relations of 
production in a society’ (cited in Eagleton 1991: 18). More simply put, it is ‘the system of 
the ideas and representations which dominate the mind of a man or social group’ 
(Althusser 2011: 212). This definition, according to Eagleton, is similar to the broader 
meaning of culture which, this research will show, is a part, process and product of the 
other.  
Myth is another concept that needs exploring, as it also has interesting parallels to 
ideology. Just as Eagleton suggests that ideology ‘goes to work on the “real” situation in 
transformative ways’ (Eagleton 1991: 209), Roland Barthes also contends that ‘myth 
does not deny things, on the contrary, its function is to talk about them; simply it purifies 
them, it makes them innocent, it gives them a natural and eternal justification, it gives 
them a clarity which is not that of an explanation but of a statement of fact’ (Eagleton 
1991: 199). According to Barthes, myth does not evolve from the nature of things but is 
chosen by history, and, rather than the object of its message, it is defined by the way in 
which it is uttered. Mythical speech, according to Barthes, is ‘made of a material which 
has already been worked on so as to make it suitable for communication: it is because all 
the materials of myth (whether pictorial or written) presuppose a signifying 
consciousness, that one can reason about them while discounting their substance’ 
(Barthes 2009: 133). For example, Mitja Velikonja (1998) in her study on the role of 
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mythology in fanning war in the Balkans refers to American religiologist Paul Mojzes’ 
notion of myths common to the collective memory of the Balkan states. These include the 
“myth of land and blood” in which the native soil is seen as sacred and there is a constant 
threat from foreigners who are responsible for all the present problems; the “crucifixion 
and resurrection syndrome”, which turns defeats into victories; the “mythological 
perception of time” which results in the blurring of the past and present, making the 
current enemy the eternal enemy; and the “glorification of war and violence” as the best 
way to keep or reclaim one’s freedom. All of these myths are rooted in the history of the 
Balkans, and as we will see in subsequent chapters, it was the similar use of such 
histories and myths that also contributed to the process of identity construction of 
Pakistan, Pakistanis and the Other, paving the way for conflict in 1971.  
Helen Fulton’s discussion of narrative is also reflective of conversations around 
ideology and myth. Fulton argues that narrative is neither natural nor universal, but is a 
form of representation that is ‘historically and culturally positioned to turn information 
and events into structures that are already meaningful for their audiences’ (2005: 1), with 
the most natural stories being those which the media have familiarised us with. She 
discusses the role of narrative as cultural production and in the construction of the 
audience (though largely as consumers of global capitalism), but more relevant to this 
work is the parallel function of narrative and myth, ‘the stories in which we encode truths 
about ourselves and our society’ (Fulton 2005: 6). In her work, Fulton criticises Barthes’ 
double-layered theory of denotation and connotation as flawed because, as she argues, 
denotation is ideological. As such, she reinterprets Barthes’ notion of myth as 
‘narrativised ideology, the formulaic articulation and naturalisation of values, truths and 
beliefs’ (ibid: 7). Fulton argues: 
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The mythical function of most media narratives is to return us to a stable subjectivity, to 
remind us of who we are and what reality is… News reporting mythologises, and 
therefore normalises, the existence of universal truths and an objective reality that can be 
retrieved and represented without ideological mediation. By constructing these powerful 
narratives of who ‘we’ are, the media separate ‘us’ from ‘them’, those others who don’t 
share or understand the stories we know and believe to be true’. (Fulton 2005: 7) 
 
In the context of news in particular, Stuart Hall, as quoted in Matheson (2005), 
also talks about ‘cultural maps’, maps of meaning or a range of social and cultural 
identifications within which events and things make sense. 
Ideology and myth, of course, function through discourse formed by language, 
and, as this research will later argue, its absence as well. Languages make meaning and 
form ideological discourses in several ways.  
Ideology in reality is not as abstract as it sounds, but can be seen as a solid, 
purposefully constructed set of ideas arranged as a discourse to maintain the status quo. 
As Italian philosopher Antonio Gramsci noted, domination can either be direct or through 
the creation of hegemony, the latter exercised by dominant groups either through 
spontaneous consent of the population or legally enforced by the apparatus of state 
coercive power. This approach reminds us of Althusser’s notions of repressive and 
ideological state apparatuses, whereby repressive state apparatuses (RSA) include (as per 
Marxist theory) the government, administration, army, police, courts, prisons, etc., and 
the ideological state apparatuses (ISA) include religious bodies, educational bodies, the 
family, the legal, political, trade-union, communications and cultural ISA. As Diane 
Macdonnell (1986) puts it, it was Althusser who reorientated the study of ideology, from 
an approach that supposed its abstract existence and being shaped by consciousness to 
one that focused on its material existence and the politics of meaning.  
Whether through the establishement of ideology through repressive or ideological 
means, power is an important component, whether it is applied physically or discursively. 
For French theorist Michel Foucault (1980), power is not only a constraining but also a 
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productive force, not only saying no but also inducing pleasure, forming knowledge, 
producing discourse, determining what can/will and cannot/will not be talked about, thus 
excluding certain voices and ways of talking and being. This study will attempt to unpack 
the anti-liberation discourse of 1971 Pakistan as reflected in the newspapers examined, 
and the framing of religion-based ideology in the media in order to construct the nation, 
identities, and the role and actions of the “true Muslim”.  
For Althusser, an important part of ideology is not only ideas and illusions, but 
also action. Ideology makes a subject of everyone, and every ‘“subject” endowed with a 
“consciousness” and believing in the “ideas” that his “consciousness” inspires in him and 
freely accepts, must “act according to his ideas”, must therefore inscribe his own ideas as 
a free subject in the actions of his material practice. If he does not do so, “that is wicked”’ 
(Althusser 2011: 215). This study will focus on the role of the communications ISA with 
focus on the press of Pakistan in wartime 1971 and touch upon the cultural, in its analysis 
of how the ideology of religious nationalism and warfare were put to work through 
discourse. While traditional conceptualisations of ideology dealt with the workings of 
capitalist (and later, communist) society, this study will look at its application in the 
workings of religion, culture and society. It will argue that the wartime media discourse 
of Pakistan used religious ideology to construct identities and subjects (e.g., Muslim, 
Hindu), interpellate them and call them to action, i.e., war.  
In what follows, I address the other key concepts that underpin this research, 
namely, identity, nationalism, gender and wartime sexual violence, religion, rhetoric and 
propaganda. This project will show how basic concepts from various disciplines such as 
sociology, political science and gender studies are transformed into or used as ideologies 
and myths with reference to the anti-liberation discourse during Bangladesh’s war of 
independence.   
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3.2 Nationalism and Identity Formation 
3.2a Nationalism as a construction 
There has been an overwhelming interest in the study of nationalism beginning 
from the 1980s and 1990s, with key theorists such as Benedict Anderson, Michael Billig, 
Ernest Gellner, Eric Hobsbawm and Anthony D. Smith, taking it up in the first decade of 
the 21st century and relating it to issues of ethnicity and, to some extent, religion. The 
high interest may be related to the end of the Cold War, break-up of the Soviet Union and 
the nationalist struggles which in some cases continue to this day in the nations which 
comprised it as well as the former Yugoslavia. Even more current are nationalist 
movements in the Middle East and Asia. As Delanty and Kumar (2006) point out, 
nationalism is both old and new which means that the breadth of the literature, both 
theoretically and geographically, is extremely wide.  
The literature on nationalism in Bengal itself is substantial, though primarily 
written in Bangla and not highly relevant to this project. More pertinent for this study is 
Pakistani nationalism after the Partition of India and, later, the rise of 
Bangali/Bangladeshi nationalism as discussed in the previous chapter. Western literature, 
on the other hand, while vast, has yet to take into detailed consideration the nationalist 
struggles of the non-West and even more so in the context of religion. Thus, for the 
purposes of this research, following a general survey of the concept(s) of nationalism as a 
construction, the focus will be on its relationship with ethnicity and, more importantly, 
(what is available on) religion.        
Anthony D. Smith, one of the key theorists of nationalism, defines it as ‘an 
ideological movement for the attainment and maintenance of autonomy, unity, and 
identity on behalf of a population some of whose members deem it to constitute an actual 
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or potential “nation”’ (Smith 2003: 24) where nation is defined as ‘a named human 
population occupying a historic territory and sharing common myths and memories, a 
public culture, and common laws and customs for all members’ (ibid). Ernest Gellner, 
another important theorist, includes the conditions of violation of nationalist sentiment, 
the key one being the separation of ‘the power-holders from the rest’, that is, where ‘the 
rulers of the political unit belong to a nation other than that of the majority of the ruled’ 
brought on by colonisation or by the ‘local domination of an alien group’ (Gellner 2006: 
1). The key terms here are ‘ideological’ and ‘common’. While the eastern wing of 1971 
Pakistan was fighting for the ‘attainment’ mentioned by Smith, the western wing was 
trying to maintain it. The basis of both was nationalism but with different rationales. The 
lack of commonness is brought out by Gellner with the West Pakistani rulers being 
viewed as an ‘alien’ group in terms of the differences in ethnicity, language and culture 
from the Bangali-majority population.  
Benedict Anderson, however, regards such commonness, indeed, the entire 
concept of nation and the struggles of nationalism to achieve it as ‘imagined’. According 
to him, the members of even the smallest nations will never know each other personally 
because, as he writes, it is only ‘in the minds of each [that] lives the image of their 
communion’ (Anderson 1997: 44). The community in which people regard themselves is, 
in Anderson’s view, non-existent. However, as this case study shows, while the 
nationalist struggle may in some cases be as a community, for example in the way it was 
for West Pakistan and its collaborators from the eastern wing in their aim to uphold an 
Islamic nation, it may also be based on individual, albeit ethnic, identity, as was the 
struggle on the part of many Bangalis, who fought for their right to speak a certain 
language, practise a certain culture, etc., which they deemed to be their own.  
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Anderson addresses language as one of the key factors contributing to national 
consciousness – and indeed it was a vital catalyst in the case of Bangladesh’s 
independence struggle – but this too he sees as a result of capitalism, print capitalism in 
particular, which brings together people in communities of millions sharing a ‘print-
language’. Whether or not these are ‘limited imaginings’, however, Anderson states 
fittingly that despite actual inequality and exploitation, this is what enables people to kill 
others and be prepared to die themselves.  
Historian and nationalism scholar Eric Hobsbawm, too, sees both nations and 
nationalism as products of ‘social engineering’, ‘invented traditions’ which he defines as 
‘a set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual 
or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by 
repetition’ (Hobsbawm, cited in Ozkirimli 2010: 94), a strategy employed by the ruling 
elite of any society to counter the threat of ‘mass democracy’. According to Hobsbawm, 
in the face of social fragmentation and disintegration, the idea of ‘national community’ 
can bring social cohesion. This idea is developed and reinforced by primary education, 
public ceremonies and the mass production of public monuments. Thus, contrary to 
popular understanding, in Hobsbawm’s view, it is not the people who rise in nationalist 
fervour but states which create it (ibid: 95). 
Along similar lines, Michael Billig (2001) explores the notion of ‘banal 
nationalism’ – ‘the ideological habits which enable the established nations of the West to 
be reproduced’ (2001: 6) daily. Through this ‘flagging’, an ideological consciousness of 
nationhood is naturalised, made to seem like common sense. The media, which routinely 
addresses its readers as members of a nation, readying them for times of crisis when they 
may be called upon to sacrifice themselves for the cause of nationhood, is one of the tools 
used for this purpose. For Billig, there is nothing natural about nationalism, it did not 
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even exist two centuries ago. Rather, nationalism is ‘a way of thinking or an ideological 
consciousness’ (Billig 2001: 10) instilled into citizens. He goes so far as to argue that 
language, which is widely considered to be a key determinant of national identity, rather 
than creating nationalism is created by nationalism. Both language and religion have 
always existed in some form, but nationalism as an ideology has not, and in order for any 
of these factors to contribute to nationalism, one must, again, imagine their identity and 
themselves as part of a community.  
While the abovementioned works focus on the West and rarely address religion 
except Billig’s passing reference to Saddam Hussein’s and George W. Bush’s use of 
religious rhetoric during the Gulf War (Smith’s later work on nationalism and religion is 
outlined below), they are relevant to the study at hand in terms of the notion of 
nationalism as a construction – that it is not primordial, a given or unchanging – and the 
ways in which this is achieved. 
 
3.2b Nationalism(s) of the West and its ‘others’ 
Most theorisations of nationalism have been in the context of the evolution of 
European nations, their particular histories and epistemes. Umut Ozkirimli (2010) 
provides a comprehensive critical introduction to theories of nationalism from the 18th 
and 19th centuries to the present day, including some of those discussed above. In this, he 
discusses the (relatively) new approaches to nationalism, influenced by the cultural turn 
in social sciences, which ‘challenges the purported homogeneity of national cultures and 
identities in the West’ (Ozkirimli 2010: 169). According to this, culture is a deeply 
contested, continually negotiated, revised and reinterpreted concept, and more than what 
people share on the basis of class, gender, sexuality, ethnicity, etc., it is based on what 
they choose to fight over.  
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For example, one of the first and most important challenges to the theorisation of 
nationalism came from feminist writers ‘who sought to provide a gendered understanding 
of nationalism by exploring the various ways in which women contributed to the 
biological, symbolic and ideological reproduction of their respective nations’ (Ozkirimli 
2010: 170). While women have figured centrally in nationalist discourse, gender relations 
have been ignored as irrelevant and nationalism generally regarded as a male 
phenomenon. Nationalism as a gendered discourse must be understood through a theory 
of gender power, not added as a missing dimension to discussions of nationalism but 
integrated into them (Ozkirimli 2010). 
Perhaps most relevant to the research at hand is the approach to nationalism in 
relation to post-colonial theory. One of the most renowned scholars of the Subaltern 
Studies Group coming out of Indian Marxism which explored the relationship between 
Europe/the West and its ‘others’ is Partha Chatterjee, who has studied the ‘peculiarities of 
nation-building in the post-colonial world’ (Ozkirimli 2010: 183). Chatterjee argues that 
nationalist imagination in Asia and Africa has been colonised by the West, with Western 
theories of nationalism being the reference point. Chatterjee provides a different 
interpretation of nationalism as a process of three stages – the moment of departure, an 
awareness and acceptance of an essential cultural difference between East and West; the 
moment of maneouvre, characterised by the rejection of the “modern”; and the moment 
of arrival, a passive revolution, ‘a discourse of order, of the rational organization of 
power’ (ibid: 185).   
The understanding that there is no single process of nationalism is relevant for the 
study of Pakistan, which was created in 1947 and divided in 1971. Religious nationalism, 
as this study shows, was used to pull together a nation divided by ethnicity and culture.  
Indeed, the use of religion as an ideology was in response to existential crises as Pakistan 
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sought to build a viable state that would bring together divided communities. However, 
while those supporting Pakistan attempted to legitimise their fight based on an ideology 
of “Islamic nationalism” as will be demonstrated in the empirical chapters, the pro-
liberation Bangalis of East Pakistan claimed to be fighting for their identity and existence 
based on their language, ethnicity and culture. 
     
3.2c The social psychology of nationalism 
What is it that drives people to commit acts of violence in nationalist movements, 
however? Langman (2006) explores the social psychology of nationalism, the feeling of 
loyalty to one’s nation and its members, although unknown to them, which leads them to 
commit acts of self-sacrifice as well as brutal torture. She notes that ‘most social or 
cultural explanations allude to social-psychological factors ranging from conceptions of 
self, identity and Other, to primordial needs for communities, unconscious desires and 
attachments, passions and emotions’ (Langman 2006: 66). Referring to the founder of 
psychoanalysis Sigmund Freud’s writings on civilisation, she points out that ‘the most 
important desires, sex and aggression, prompted attachments to some people, desires to 
hurt or destroy Others’ (ibid: 67) where even slight differences with others are 
exaggerated in order to enhance one’s own self-esteem. These identifications and 
attachments act as a defence against feelings of anxiety and fear that can be traced back 
to the helpless and powerless infant stage of life and the ‘lure of charismatic leaders 
[functioned as] unconscious parent figures who embodied group values and secured the 
bonds that held people together’ (ibid).  
Human desire can purportedly attach itself to symbols and enable attachments to 
abstract entities such as the nation, which can provide gratifications and assuage fears. 
Langman finds the use of Freudian theory in the works of Reich and Fromm on character, 
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repression, authoritarianism, leadership, mass media and propaganda. Fromm suggested 
that in the face of major social changes, such as World War I, people faced anxiety, 
powerlessness and meaninglessness and seeking to ‘escape from freedom’, they 
submitted themselves to ‘powerful, charismatic leaders who promised love in exchange 
for obedience and compliance’ (ibid: 68) such as Hitler. Nationalism, according to 
Fromm as cited in Langman, ‘depended on needs to belong to a group that provided 
community, pride in membership and a framework of meaning’ (ibid). This might explain 
how nationalism functions at the psychological level, what inner needs and desires it 
fulfils, which enables it to be used in the constructive process conceptualised by the 
theorists mentioned above. It may also be argued that religion, whether or not combined 
with nationalism, can function in the same way and did so in 1971 Pakistan and continues 
to do so among people around the world, providing them with a sense of belonging to a 
group for which they are prepared to fight, putting their lives at stake.      
 
3.2d Nationalism and the discursive formation of religious and ethnic identities 
While the literature on nationalism is vast, there is relatively less work done on it 
in relation to religion. Ozkirimli (2010) provides a comprehensive review of nationalism, 
its historical and contemporary relevance, with passing references to the significance of 
religion. He cites Anderson’s reference to the decline of religion and opposing arguments 
which find that not only is religion not replaced by nationalism, in some cases, it has 
reinforced nationalism and that they have actually grown together.   
Smith (2003) succinctly summarises this complex relationship in the introduction 
to his study of the ‘sacred sources of national identity’. Examining the works of British 
historian of the Middle East Elie Kedourie, Smith identifies three main positions – the 
secular replacement approach, according to which religion is a basic component of 
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traditional society and eventually disappears while nationalism flourishes; the neo-
traditional approach, in which religion is viewed as an ally of nationalism; and the third 
in which religion and nationalism share a complex relationship, borrowing aspects from 
each other, with ‘an ability to transmute the values of traditional religion into secular 
political ends’ (2003: 14). Smith argues that in Kedourie’s view, religion is vital to 
nations and nationalisms and that nationalists must draw upon the ‘very core of 
traditional religions, their conception of the sacred and their rites of salvation… in 
fashioning their own ideas of community, history, and destiny’ (ibid: 15). Smith himself 
believes that there is little difference between nationalism and religion, ‘for, at the heart 
of both are the cult and the faith’ (ibid: 28). 
Smith (2006), in a later work makes a link between ethnicity and nationalism. He 
argues that rather than dominant perspectives – the first that sees ethnicity as playing a 
minor role in what is mainly a ‘civic-territorial’ nationalism or the second that states 
ethnicity is nation and vice versa where ‘ethnic’ nations emphasise issues such as 
common descent, language, culture and history – a combination of the two is at work. As 
such, he proposes three levels of ethnicity, ranging from the least aware and distinguished 
group characteristics or ‘ethnic categories’, through ‘ethnic networks and associations’ to 
the most developed level – ‘ethnic community or ethnie’, which he defines as ‘a clear 
conception of not only “who” but “where” and “when” we are,’ ‘a named and self-
defined human population sharing a myth of common ancestry, historical memories and 
elements of culture (often including a link with a territory) and a measure of solidarity’ 
(Smith 2006: 171-172). Though he discusses issues of religion and ethnicity in separate 
works, Smith (2003) notes that in practice, the two are rarely divorced from each other. In 
his 2009 work on hierarchy and covenant in the formation of nations, Smith categorises 
three principles of ‘sacred cultural community’ – the hierarchal, the covenantal and the 
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civic, the first two relevant to the situation in 1971 Pakistan as this study will show. In 
one version of the hierarchical, ‘the ruler is the god’s representative on earth, issuing 
commands in his name’ (Smith 2009: 25) and the people, because of the purity of their 
faith, become a ‘chosen people’. In the covenantal, ‘the deity chooses a community to 
carry out his will by separating itself from others and devoting its members to the sacred 
task of performance and witness entrusted to it… usually involv[ing] regulating the life 
of the community and the individual through a moral and ritual code that sanctifies the 
community, and through it, the world’ (ibid: 28). The people have God’s blessing as long 
as they abide by His commandments.  
Eriksen (2010), in his study on ethnicity and nationalism, maintains that 
‘nationalism stresses the cultural similarity of its adherents and, by implication, it draws 
boundaries vis-à-vis others, who thereby become outsiders’ (2010: 10). This was 
essentially the case with the Bangalis of East Pakistan who came together on the basis of 
their ethnic and cultural identity despite the religious commonness which they shared 
with the people of West Pakistan.  
Amartya Sen in his book Identity and Violence (2006) discusses identity, or rather 
its use and/or manipulation, in situations of violence. In discussing the religious and 
cultural divisions of the world, about ‘civilizational partitioning’, a ‘solitarist approach’ 
(which sees human beings as members of a single group, and ‘singular identities’ which 
basically transform ‘multidimensional human beings into one-dimensional creatures’) 
(2006: 174) is at work and ‘nurture[s] violence in the world through omissions as well as 
commissions’ (ibid: p. xiv). For him ‘violence is promoted by the cultivation of a sense 
of inevitability about some allegedly unique – often belligerent – identity that we are 
supposed to have and which apparently makes extensive demands on us…’ (ibid: xiii). 
For, while identities are plural, they are also in competition for priority through choices 
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made by individuals. But often, it is an assumption of a lack of choice or a forcible 
imposition of a singular identity – as seen in the anti-liberation propaganda media of 
1971 under study here – that compels people to focus on a single aspect of their identity 
and act based on it.  
In discussing nationalism – whether based on religious or ethnic identity – a 
discussion of identity itself, and shifts in the predominance of different identities within 
individuals and nations and the divisions it creates, is needed.  
 
3.2e Identity, difference and the Other 
National identity is defined by Smith (2003) as ‘the maintenance and continual 
reinterpretation of the pattern of values, symbols, memories, myths, and traditions that 
form the distinctive heritage of the nation, and the identification of individuals with that 
heritage and its pattern’ (Smith 2003: 25). This idea of ‘continual reinterpretation’ 
combined with Billig’s notion of banal nationalism as outlined above, suggests that 
national identity may be like any other identity, such as gender, which Butler (1990) 
explains as not being fixed but fluid and free-floating, and a result of repetitive 
performance.  
As Stuart Hall also articulates, identity is never unified but rather ‘fragmented and 
fractured, never singular, multiply[ing] constructed across after different, often 
intersecting and antagonistic, discourses, practices and positions’ and identification as ‘a 
construction, a process that is never completed’ and ‘constantly in the process of change 
and transformation’ (1996: 2-3). Ferguson (2003), too, claims that local cultural identities 
are not fixed but ‘socially and historically constructed’ and ‘manipulated for political 
advantage’ (2003: 30). This is apparent in the cases of both the formation and 
disintegration of Pakistan with the secession of Bangladesh – there was a shift in the 
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importance of different identities. While India and Pakistan were divided along religious 
lines with a Hindu majority population in the former and Muslim majority in the latter, 
the same Muslim-majority population later called for the division of Pakistan along 
ethnic lines, placing greater significance on their ethnic rather than their religious 
identity. To quote Hall again, identities use the ‘resources of history, language and 
culture’ and arise within ‘specific discursive formations and practices, by specific 
enunciated strategies’ (1996: 3). While identities are most often referred to as being 
common between people who share it, Hall points out that they also ‘emerge within the 
specific modalities of power, and thus are more the product of the marking of difference 
and exclusion’ (1996: 4). Hall cites Derrida, Laclau and Butler in noting the ‘Othering’ 
function of identity – that ‘it is only through the relation to the Other, the relation to what 
it is not, to precisely what it lacks… that identity can be constructed’ (1996: 5).  
Bruce Lincoln describes the process of Othering in specific relation to religion:  
When social groups constitute their identity in religious terms and experience themselves 
as a sacred collectivity (the faithful, the righteous, or God’s chosen people, for instance), 
as a corollary they tend to construe their rivals in negative fashion (heretics, infidels, 
apostates, evil, bestial, demonic, satanic, e.g.) Under such circumstances, the pursuit of 
self-interest…can be experienced as a holy cause, in support of which any violence is 
justified. (Lincoln 2003: 94) 
In 1971 Pakistan’s anti-liberation discourse, too, as this study will argue, Bangalis were 
posited as the ‘Hindu Other’ against the Muslim Pakistani. 
Eriksen (2010) also highlights ‘Othering’ in discussing Kapferer’s 1988 study on 
state power, nationalist ideology and the Sinhalese-Tamil conflict. Both agree on ‘the 
importance of the Other in the formation of ethnic identity and… the mediating role of 
symbols in ethnic ideologies’ (Eriksen 2010: 135). In order for personal sacrifices to be 
made, symbols are used to justify the power structure as well as give meaning to people’s 
experiences so as to motivate them, argues Eriksen. As Ferguson (2003) points out, 
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‘political and military mobilization can be much easier and more excitable when there is 
a clear-cut, personal enemy, a scapegoat’ (2003: 39). 
Manuel Castells introduces the notion of ‘cultural nationalism’ which addresses 
the ‘distinctiveness of the cultural community as the basis of a nation’ and is also relevant 
in this regard. In this context, the nation is seen as a product of its history and culture, and 
arises when a people’s cultural identity is perceived to be lacking or threatened’ (2004: 
17). Castells, who defines identity as people’s source of meaning and experience, also 
makes the ‘distinction between self and other, me and they’ (2004: 6). Identity, then, 
seems based not only on commonness as we have seen it unite people on the basis of 
various factors, but also difference, for example, different religious identities, cultural 
identities, political identities, etc., which is applicable to the formation of Bangali 
nationalism. Castells also talks about the plurality of identities and how this causes stress 
and contradictions in both self-representation and social action. Identities are constructed 
from ‘history, geography, biology, productive and reproductive institutions, collective 
memory, personal fantasies, power apparatuses and religious revelations’ (Castells 
2004:7).  
Ferguson (2003), too, notes that along with cultural difference or ethnicity, factors 
such as ‘region and rural/urban location, political-economic position, religion, language, 
caste, race, tribe, clan, gender and age’ (2003: 30) are important aspects of identity. 
Claiming that identity and interest are often fused, he prefers to replace the ‘ethnic’ 
labelling of groups and conflicts with the neologism ‘idinterest’ and distinguishes their 
four overlapping opening phases – ‘formation of a core idinterest group; creation of 
mutual fears or a “secret dilemma”; polarization and projection of negative attributes; and 
calculated violence’ (Ferguson 2003: 30), which may lead to a full scale war.    
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Who constructs identity and for what purpose largely determines the symbolic 
content of its construction. Castells (2004), for example, argues that the social 
construction of identity takes place in a context marked by power relationships. In terms 
of the origins of identity building, he categorises three types: legitimising identity 
(organisations, institutions and social actors introduced by the dominant institutions of 
society to reproduce, extend and rationalise their domination); resistance identity 
(constructed by those devalued by the logic of domination who go on to form 
communities of the excluded which exclude the excluders) and project identity (whereby 
new identities are redefined through the transformation of social structures) (Castells 
2004: 8-9). The processes of legitimising identity and resistance identity are relevant to 
the current research, first in the examination of the construction of a Pakistani Muslim 
identity by the dominating institutions and authorities, and second, in that of the Bangali 
ethnic identity used to resist the former. Castells’ theory can be applied to identity-
building in 1971 Pakistan – of the Pakistani, the Muslim and the Bangali – and it will be 
interesting to see by whom, how and for what purposes this was done.  
The process of identity construction is part of the wider struggles of power which, 
as Michel Foucault has pointed out, extend beyond the limits of the state. For one, the 
state cannot control all power relations, and secondly, it operates on the basis of existing 
power relations. Relations of power, as Foucault suggests 
permeate, characterise and constitute the social body, and these relations of power cannot 
themselves be established, consolidated nor implemented without the production, 
accumulation, circulation and functioning of a discourse… We are subjected to the 
production of truth through power and we cannot exercise power except through the 
production of truth. (Foucault 1980: 93) 
 
Althusser (1971) makes a similar argument about ideology, interpellation and the 
formation of subjects. According to him, individuals are addressed by ideologies similar 
to the way they address each other, as if saying, “Hey, you there!” ‘Ideology “acts” or 
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“functions” in such a way that it “recruits” subjects among the individuals (it recruits 
them all), or “transforms” the individuals into subjects (it transforms them all)’ 
(Althusser 1971: 162-163) by interpellation or hailing. Ideology addresses people as 
subjects, thereby making them feel that they are subjects of the said ideology or 
discourse. His enunciation of the subject of the Christian religious ideology interpellated 
by the ideological state apparatus of the Church can be compared to the subject of any 
similar ideology or discourse, including nationalism – where one is the subject of a 
nation, and religion – where one is the subject of a faith. The ‘Unique and Absolute 
Subject’ (ibid: 168), such as God in Christianity, can as easily be the Supreme Being in 
any other faith, and even in the context of nationalism, can be used to refer to the nation 
or the exemplary patriot that one should strive to be. Criticism of Althusser’s theory 
stems from the fact that he does not allow room for resistance, assuming that one always 
accepts the subject position allocated to them. While this may often be the case, it is not 
always so. Neither are the readers/audience/receivers of text passive – they may decode 
messages differently from the meanings intended by the encoders. There is also often not 
only a single discourse but multiple discourses floating about and these may all provide 
for the subject, different, even contradictory, positions from which to speak. As 
Jorgensen and Phillips (2002) note, ‘there is a consensus in cultural studies, 
communication research and discourse analysis that the dominant ideology thesis 
underestimated people’s capacity to offer resistance to ideologies’ (2002: 16). 
Both ideology and resistance to it are, of course, articulated through language. 
The next section looks briefly at the little-addressed role of language and language policy 
in nationalism and conflict.  
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3.2f Nationalism, language and conflict 
While the Language Movement of 1952 was a critical turning point and catalyst 
in the run-up to Bangladesh’s war of independence, the significance of language in 
nationalist and separatist movements has been important in conflicts around the globe, 
not least of all in Europe. Colin H. Williams (1984), who is one of the few scholars to 
have approached directly the subject of language in conflict, describes this form of 
conflict, at least in the context of nation-state building processes in nineteenth-century 
Europe, as ‘ethnic separatism’. According to Williams, ‘the goal of state formation, 
which was to realise a single citizenry despite ethnic or cultural variety, would be 
achieved through resolving a series of crises’ related to identity, legitimacy, participation, 
distribution and penetration (cited in Chriost 2003: 150). Language, most frequently, and 
religion in some cases, are bases of community that ‘provide for the basis of separateness 
and community in the potential nationality’ argues Williams (1984: 183). As such, 
language is a potential marker of ethnicity. According to Williams, language is one of the 
three factors (along with group customs and institutions and religion) which reflect 
cultural separateness. Language, argues Williams, is not only a functional means of 
communication but an instrument for cultural division and often provides the most 
tangible barrier to assimilation. Williams looks at how minority groups use language 
promotion not merely as a cultural attachment ‘but often a rational and instrumental 
attempt to reduce socio-economic inequality, to wrest more power from the state and 
opposition groups, and to determine an increasing amount of the ethnic group’s role in 
the wider political structure’ (1984: 215). Language is not only useful as a potential 
marker of ethnicity but also functions as a tool of group mobilization for ethnic 
separatists (Chriost 2003: 151). It functions as a political resource with matters of 
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language in conflict largely relating to the contestation of state policy and the distribution 
of resources.  
In Iran, for example, Kia (1998) in an article on Persian nationalism and language 
purification, argues that Persian nationalism divided the world of ideas and institutions 
into the material and the spiritual, where Europe dominated Iran and the world in the 
material domain and so Iran would have to be superior in its ‘inner domain’, and preserve 
the distinctiveness of its spiritual culture and national identity. To do this, Persian 
nationalism had to battle Islamic hegemony, emphasising Iran’s pre-Islamic history and 
culture as well as the Persian language and its literary heritage, transforming ‘history, 
culture and language into ideological tools for building a modern homogenized national 
identity which was Persian rather than Islamic, secular rather than religious’ (Kia 1998: 
9). One of the main ways of doing this was through the ‘purification’ of the Persian 
language, which they believed was losing its independence due to the large borrowing of 
Arabic words, and in order to revive it, it had to be purged of foreign words and 
terminologies. In the process, however, Kia argues that Persian nationalists ignored the 
‘multi-ethnic, multi-linguistic, multi-cultural, and multi-religious reality of the Iranian 
state’, overlooking ‘the fundamental fact that Iran was not Persia or Persian but rather a 
mosaic of diverse ethnic, linguistic and religious groups’ (ibid). It may be argued that the 
West Pakistan government did something similar, ignoring the ethnic, linguistic, cultural 
and religious diversity of the Pakistani population in order to unify it with a common 
state language but based on religion rather than secularism as in the case of Persian 
nationalism, and trying to make Pakistan more rather than less Islamic. Language was 
used as an ideological tool in both cases but to different ends.       
While Williams (1984) discusses ethnic separatism in the context of minority 
groups who felt threatened and vulnerable to assimiliation within nation-states, the 
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Bangalis of East Pakistan formed the majority of the population of Pakistan overall. In 
the case of East Pakistan, the Bangalis acted in response to the West Pakistani 
government attempting to impose Urdu – the language of the ruling elite minority of 
Pakistan – as the sole state language. Pakistani Prime Minister Liaqat Ali Khan in the 
Constituent Assembly in 1948 ‘linked Urdu to the central role of religion in the division 
of India and Pakistan, and therefore to Pakistani nationalism and identity’ (Hossain and 
Tollefson 2007: 245). On the other hand, the imposition of Urdu as the state language 
was met with suspicion and distrust among the Bangalis of East Pakistan, who felt their 
cultural being threatened (as described in the previous chapter), leading to a political 
movement which it may be argued gave birth to linguistic nationalism in East Pakistan 
(Akand 2013).   
The political events on the ground were reflected in the media which acted as a 
tool of interpellation of the audience. This process, and the use of communication and the 
media in interpellation, identity formation and the legitimisation of violence through the 
instrumentalisation of religion as ‘truth’, will be elaborated upon below. 
 
3.3 Communication, Discourse and the Legitimisation of Violence  
The role of communication in the creation of bonds, the formation of identities, 
the framing of ideologies and the legitimisation and possible mobilisation of groups to 
violent action is key to these processes. As early as the 1950s, Deutsch (1966) theorised 
on the role of social communication in nationalism, in the ability to communicate 
effectively over a wide range of subjects with the members of a large group as being key 
to membership in a people or nation. In the context of conflict, Ferguson (2003) has 
argued that,  
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ideas about violence affect its usage, and its usage is itself an expressive, communicative 
act that redefines a conflict situation. Ideas of historical origins are also critical in 
providing lessons and symbols that can be used to define collective identity, and to 
variably construct understandings of current circumstances and options. (Ferguson 2003: 
30)  
 
Simon Cottle too, notes that regardless of their sources, locations and forms of 
expression  
conflicts are necessarily defined, mobilized and populated by people. Thinking, feeling, 
sentient, human beings define and engage in disputes, prosecute ideologies and interests, 
participate in forms of struggle, and wage wars… For the participants, conflicts are made 
sense of discursively and culturally – they are often high in meaning and affect – and they 
are invariably pursued purposefully, strategically and practically. (Cottle 2006: 5) 
 
As such, it is important to address the content, form and style of communication that may 
induce people to kill others and even themselves for what they believe to be a just or 
legitimate cause. Diverse approaches have considered how ideology is transmitted by 
various means of communication and how it becomes or is made meaningful for 
recipients, the most prominent approach being that of propaganda. 
 
3.3a Propaganda, rhetoric and charismatic authority 
Propaganda is one of the key tools used for persuasion. French philosopher 
Jacques Ellul (2006) writes that the characteristics of propaganda are based on scientific 
analyses of psychology and sociology where knowledge of people – their ‘tendencies, 
desires, needs, psychic mechanisms, condition’ – as well as of the environment, is put to 
use. Any propaganda, according to Ellul, is aimed at both the individual and the masses, 
partly as it is difficult to isolate the two, and even if this was possible, working on each 
individual would take too long. More importantly, when part of a mass, the individual’s 
‘psychic defences are weakened, his reactions easier to provoke, and the propagandist 
profits from the process of diffusion of emotions through the mass, and, at the same time, 
from the pressure felt by an individual when in a group (Ellul 2006: 4). For him, 
‘emotionalism, impulsiveness, excess’ (ibid) can all be more easily exploited on a group. 
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But just as propaganda must move the masses, to do so, it must also touch every 
individual in a crowd.  
The mass media has an important role to play in this: it facilitates propaganda. As 
Ellul argues, while the media consumer is concerned about issues as an individual, they 
are also concerned, as a group, ‘moved by the same motives, receive the same impulses 
and impressions, find themselves focused on the same centers of interest, experience the 
same feelings, have generally the same order of reactions and ideas, participate in the 
same myths… as a psychological, if not a biological mass’ (Ellul 2006: 5). Ellul also 
states that propaganda is most effective when groups are fragmented by psychological 
means – ‘only when very small groups are annihilated, when the individual finds no more 
defences, no equilibrium, no resistance exercised by the group to which he belongs, does 
total action by propaganda become possible’ (ibid: 6). The fragmentation of identities, as 
mentioned above by Hall (1996) and fluidity of identities as illustrated by Butler (1990) 
and Matar (2008), are then perhaps what make way for propaganda to seep into the mind 
of the individual and, simultaneously, the group. In addition, as Matar points out, 
‘moments of crises are good opportunities for contestations and redefinitions of identities 
and communities’ which ideologues and leaders use ‘to push through and mobilize their 
own alternative reading of identities’ (Matar 2008: 132).  
In the context of this research, it may be argued that “religious propaganda” can 
be used effectively to interpellate the individual and the group, particularly if reinforced 
by the conviction of the masses and that it can function simultaneously as a divisive 
factor between people who accentuate difference, while bringing together people who 
emphasise the similarities between them. For Ellul (2006), propaganda must be total, it 
must come from all sides and sources, and in the case of media, all media – press, audio-
visual media and personal communications – for it to be most effective. It is a matter of 
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‘reaching and encircling the whole man and all men… furnish[ing] him with a complete 
system for explaining the world, and provid[ing] immediate incentives to action’ (2006: 
7). Ellul distinguishes between direct and sociological or pre-propaganda, the former 
‘aimed at modifying opinions and attitudes’, the latter ‘seeking to create a climate, an 
atmosphere of favorable preliminary attitudes’ (ibid: 9); and covert or ‘black’ and overt 
or ‘white’ propaganda, the first hiding its ‘aims, identity, significance, and source’, where 
the people are unaware of the attempts to influence them, the second, the exact opposite, 
‘open and aboveboard’ (ibid: 10). Propaganda must also have continuity and a long 
duration, he argues. As such, the nature of propaganda has changed from 1850, dealing 
with beliefs or ideas; now it is about provoking action. In order for anti-liberation 
discourse to be labelled as propaganda then, it must be tested for the above criteria. 
Though it is much too vast a topic to elaborate on in this study, historically, no 
review of propaganda, whether or not it is based on religious factors, can disregard the 
Holocaust and the Nazi propaganda against Jews. In fact, Hitler made ‘adversaries of 
different fields appear as always belonging to one category’ (quoted in Burke 2006: 151), 
as a common enemy, and made references to religion similar to those made by the anti-
liberation forces mentioned above against Bangalis and Hindus.17 Burke’s analysis of 
Hitler’s “Battle” may prove useful in the study of anti-liberation discourse in terms of the 
styles and techniques employed by Hitler, such as ‘the power of endless repetition’, ‘ 
																																																						
17	‘I	am	acting	in	the	sense	of	the	Almighty	Creator:	By	warding	off	Jews	I	am	fighting	for	the	Lord’s	work”	
(Burke	2006:	151,	original	italics).	In	a	similar	vein,	the	anti-liberation	forces	of	Pakistan	in	1971	declared,	
‘Everyone	of	us	should	assume	the	role	of	a	Muslim	soldier	of	an	Islamic	state	and	through	cooperation	to	
the	oppressed	and	by	winning	 their	 confidence	we	must	kill	 those	who	are	hatching	conspiracy	against	
Pakistan	 and	 Islam’.	 (Manik,	 The	 Daily	 Star	 26	 March	 2009,	 p.	 1).	 Parallels	 are	 also	 apparent	 in	 the	
references	drawn	to	Aryan	superiority	‘which	must	be	fought	for	if	the	laws	of	God	are	to	be	obeyed	and	
any	 contradictions	 would	 only	 be	 “Jewish	 arrogance”’	 (quoted	 in	 Burke	 2006:	 151)	 and	 ‘The	 cowards	
[freedom	fighters]	who	are	against	Allah	have	attacked	this	holy	land	[Pakistan]’	(Manik,	The	Daily	Star	26	
March	2009,	p.	1).	
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“curative” unification’, ‘bastardization of fundamentally religious patterns of thought’ 
(Burke 2006: 164-165) and other techniques.  
In their propaganda model, Herman and Chomsky (1994) demonstrate how issues 
of ownership, wealth and profit; advertising; reliance on official sources and experts; flak 
or disciplining from the state; and (in its case and period in history) anticommunist (but 
really any form of) ideology; are used to manufacture consent in society. However, the 
model’s limitations include its focus on the US, its economic determinism, its lack of 
focus on the finer details of narrative, discourse, meaning, etc., and the belief that the 
state and media are always in all-powerful, unchallenged cohort with each other. While 
the 1971 media of Pakistan falls into this model in terms of ownership, the goals of 
economic profit through advertising are not as relevant. Reliance on official sources as 
well as flak were factors as the media were “directed” and disciplined by the state. The 
main factor, however, was ideology, in this case religious ideology, which was the main 
resource of the media in manufacturing consent. As such, while propaganda theory is 
certainly worth considering for the case study at hand, this research shows that the 
discourses in Pakistan in 1971 involve practices and forms of communication that are less 
organised, less intentional, less theorised; and yet more spontaneously and subtly 
standing on religion, culture and ideology. These, and specifically ideological state 
apparatuses as defined by Althusser, are the concerns this research will underline and 
explore.  
Bennett and O’Rourke (2006) distinguish between rhetoric and propaganda – the 
first, often used in reference to democratic governments, the second to government-
controlled media, and the frequent conflation of the two as ‘persuasion’. In fact, their 
reference to Plato’s Giorgas and Phaedrus makes clear the distinction between true 
rhetoric which is good and consists of passion, sincerity and good intentions towards the 
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hearers; popular rhetoric, which is effective, commonly accepted, popular but has 
unacknowledged intentions, e.g., demagoguery; and manipulative rhetoric, which 
employs highly skilled technique, excludes competing ideas, gives an appearance of 
reason and hides the real intentions from hearers, e.g., propaganda. Thus, the audience is 
able to choose and judge the flexible and adaptive content and intentions of true or good 
rhetoric. 
Berger (2011) provides a comprehensive overview of rhetoric, referring to 
Aristotle’s division of rhetoric into public speaking and logical discussion and the modes 
of persuasion speakers can use. He suggests that while the study of rhetoric was 
originally used for oratory, it is relevant to conversation and to the mass-mediated culture 
of today. He refers to Kenneth Burke and Wayne Booth, according to whom ‘symbolic 
communication is inherently rhetorical because it is intended to communicate, and 
rhetorical criticism is concerned with how symbols communicate’ (Berger 2011: 77).    
An intriguing combination of propaganda and rhetoric, as well as the figures of 
authority rendering them, can be traced in Max Weber’s notion of charismatic authority. 
According to Weber, the natural leaders in times of crisis are not professional, educated, 
trained and paid to be so, but possess an inherent charisma, ‘holders of specific gifts of 
the body and spirit; …gifts… believed to be supernatural, not accessible to everybody’ 
(Gerth and Mills 1991: 245). These leaders prove themselves and are thus recognised by 
the people as leaders not through the usual means of attaining leadership such as elections 
but through their charismatic qualities; their leadership legitimised only by personal 
strength. They also reject any ‘rational economic conduct’ (ibid: 247); ‘pure charisma’ is 
never about personal, monetary gain. If successful, the charismatic leader takes on the 
position of a ‘God-willed master’ (ibid: 249), their power springing from ‘faithful 
devotion’ (ibid). This notion of charismatic authority can arguably be found in spiritual 
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leaders whose authority is most often based on the ‘God-given’, derived from their 
spiritual followers. As Marranci (2009) points out, much of the literature on Islamic 
fundamentalism, extremism and radicalism focuses on the appeal of charismatic leaders, 
for example Iran’s Khomeini, the Muslim Brotherhood’s Hassan al-Banna and 
Hizbullah’s Hassan Nassrallah. Though the anti-liberation discourse of 1971 may not fall 
into these categories, the notion of charisma may still be worth considering in terms of 
the political players who based their case for opposing liberation and fighting for a united 
Pakistan as a duty to God and Islam. For example, the speeches and quotes of the 
charismatic founder of Pakistan, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, are often used by political 
leaders and the media to establish their case for the Muslims of both wings of Pakistan 
remaining united. It may also be applied to Bangali leaders, in particular, Sheikh Mujibur 
Rahman, known as “Father of the Nation” and “Bangabandhu” or friend of Bengal in 
Bangladesh for having led the independence movement by mobilising the Bangalis 
through his inspiring speeches and charismatic leadership. However, the line between 
rhetoric and propaganda is a fine one and the differences highly subjective. While both 
theories need to be studied for the purposes of this research, it may be difficult to isolate 
which form was used in the discourses of 1971. Thus it is worth exploring other aspects 
of communication.   
 
3.3b Religion-based discourse and political violence 
Propaganda, rhetoric or charisma are all modes of communication used to 
mobilise target populations. In this regard, Atef Alshaer, working on the Arab and 
Islamic worlds, suggests language and culture are important tools for power and political 
mobilisation which all cultures use to impose particular worldviews. He conceptualises a 
‘culture of communication’ as: 
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a communicated compendium of religious, historical, literary and mythological 
references used by a community as valid tropes for all times and, as such, are acted upon 
and treated as having authenticity. Authenticity in a culture of communication serves to 
manipulate language as a residue of resonant power embodied in culture as an 
anthropological, historical and literary space in which the powerful, the spiritual and the 
pertinent (to the moment) are drawn on, selectively reproduced, idolized, talked of and 
visualized. (Alshaer 2008: 104)  
 
Alshaer makes a link between culture and language as mechanisms of control and 
in the way that ‘political groups with specific agendas, cultural underpinnings and 
outlook, mobilize communicative channels and modes to publicize and reinforce their 
ideologies’ (2008: 102). As such, these channels are similar to Foucault’s ‘micro-physics 
of power, the institutions and bodies of regulation and ritualization that include, along 
with formal institutions, different cultural spaces, such as mosques, churches and the 
like’… which promote activities of ideological and religious movements, ‘reflecting an 
emerging political culture which banks on the support of the “street”’, which is also 
echoed in Gramsci’s idea of ‘hegemony as consent’, induced not only through state 
apparatus but similar ‘movement-affiliated media’ (ibid). As Foucault argued, power is 
not always and only repressive. It is and can be exercised because ‘it doesn’t only weigh 
down on us as a force that says no; it also traverses and produces things, it induces 
pleasure, forms of knowledge, produces discourse’ (Foucault 1980: 119). This study will 
show how religious ideology as a culture of communication was used in the formation 
and validation of anti-liberation discourse in 1971 East Pakistan.  
The relationship between politics, religion and communication, particularly the 
issue of sacred authority and how it is applied has been discussed by Eickelman and 
Piscatori (2004), as has the relationship between culture, religion, language and ideology 
(Sreberny-Mohammadi and Mohammadi 1994). Eickelman and Piscatori, for example, 
consider the importance of symbols in discourse and images, maintaining that the 
symbolic component of politics can be used as instruments of both persuasion and 
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coercion, but that it is increasingly being used for the former. The tool of persuasion is 
language, a ‘social and political practice’ used ‘to construct communal identities and 
promote and defend our aspirations’ and ‘to affirm and reaffirm hierarchies of power’ 
(2004: 11). In their work on Iran, they cite Iranian revolutionary and sociologist ‘Ali 
Shari‘ati, who claimed that the language of religion in general and of the Semitic 
religions in particular is symbolic, expressing meaning through images and symbols and 
thus having more permanence than simple language, and give examples of the religious 
rhetoric of Saddam Hussein during the Gulf War.  
Sreberny-Mohammadi and Mohammadi (1994) find that, in Iran, more than 
mainstream media, the role of social communication such as in the bazaar and traditional 
religious activity such as in mosques is important. These informal networks – ranging 
from preachers at mosques in Egypt to sports associations in Algeria and shanty-housing 
and the streets in Tunisia – and their setting the secular, modern, Western ‘Other’ against 
conservative Islam, have also been discussed in Ismail’s (2006) more recent work on 
Islamist politics. Wickham (2002), too, describes the da’wa or ‘call to God’ and the 
Islamist project of ideological outreach in Egypt, ranging from interpersonal to 
institutional communication, including, again, preachers at mosques and religious classes, 
as well as Islamic books, pamphlets and cassette tapes. 
In the context of South Asia, Zahab (2007) studied the discourse employed by the 
Pakistani Lashkar-e Taiba18 and its network of Al Daawat schools which use modern 
technology as well as textbooks to inspire the spirit of jihad, sacrifice and martyrdom in 
																																																						
18	The	Lashkar-e-Taiba,	literally	“army	of	God/the	righteous”,	is	a	terrorist	organisation	operating	mainly	
from	Pakistan.	Founded	in	1987,	it	has	been	held	responsible	for	several	terror	attacks	in	South	Asia,	
particularly	against	India	in	the	form	of	scores	of	suicide	attacks	in	the	Kashmir	Valley,	the	2001	
parliament	attack	and	2008	Mumbai	hotel	attack.	Its	stated	objective	is	the	introduction	of	an	Islamic	
state	in	South	Asia	and	the	liberation	of	Indian-administered	Kashmiri	Muslims.				
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young children. These tools have been used along with propaganda in the state media 
depicting atrocities against Muslims, particularly women and children, by Indians in 
Kashmir, and therefore invoking the horrors of Partition which they want to avenge and 
mobilising them to rise in defence of the honour of their mothers and sisters in their 
movement for an independent Jammu and Kashmir. In a related study on the 
Markaz/Lashkar discourse, Sikand (2007) posits the conflict in Kashmir as not a 
territorial dispute but ‘a war between two different and mutually opposed ideologies: 
Islam… and disbelief (kufr)’ and characterization of the Hindu Other as having ‘no 
compassion in their religion’, being ‘effeminate and cruel’, ‘oppressive’, ‘terrorists’, 
‘traitors’, ‘cowards’, ‘enemies’ (Sikand, 2007: 253-254) echoes the anti-liberation 
discourse in 1971 East Pakistan. 
In other scholarship focusing specifically on rhetoric and politics, Peter Anthony 
DeCaro’s (2003) Rhetoric of Revolt: Ho Chi Minh’s discourse for revolution pays 
attention to non-Western discourses of Vietnamese communist revolutionary leader and 
later prime minister and president of Vietnam, Ho Chi Minh, which mobilised and 
sustained revolution in Vietnam. More pertinent to this project, however, is Hoigilt’s 
(2011) study of Islamist rhetoric in contemporary Egypt. Focusing on three prominent 
Islamic figures in Egypt – Yusuf al-Qaradawi, ‘Amr Khalid and Muhammad ‘Imara – 
Hoigilt examines the persuasive tools used to convey their Islamist ideology (along with 
the social and political roles of the discourses). In this work, Hoigilt examines two points 
in particular, the use of pronominal reference and mood structures to build relations with 
readers (the material analysed is all written text), and ‘the use of grammatical devices to 
construct images of Islam, Muslims and the “others”’ (Hoigilt 2011: 4). Quoting and 
translating extensively from the works of his subjects of study, Hoigilt provides a detailed 
analysis of rhetoric in relation to social reality, ideology, and religious authority, passion 
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and polemics. While the geographical area of focus is different, the conceptual 
framework of the work should prove useful for this research.    
Jefferis (2010) also looks at the role of rhetoric in the relationship between 
religion and political violence in the United States and Egypt. In comparing the Christian 
Coalition and the Army of God on one hand and the Muslim Brethren and al Jama’a al 
Islamiyya on the other, she argues that the use of religious rhetoric ‘quicken[s] the 
closing of the window of opportunity available to [supporters], forcing religious 
movements to either move closer to the political center to preserve their waning 
influence, or further out to the fringes of the political arena to preserve the purity of their 
cause’ (Jefferis 2010: 58). Importantly, she studies ideological framing such as those of 
violent duty, neglected duty, just war, etc., and concludes that in the case of both the 
Army of God and al Jama’a al Islamiyya, ‘violence has been transformed from an 
extreme act requiring justification by external events to a moral responsibility whose 
abdication must be justified’ (ibid: 136). As such, the failure to use or even the 
questioning of the use of violence is seen as a rejection of God. Religion-based actions 
are committed at the bequest of and not on behalf of a superior being, and the 
‘ideological frame of religious belief can act as an intangible alternative to the violence-
inducing elements of structure’ (ibid: 137), casting violence as a responsibility rather than 
a right. 
More specifically relevant to this study, Wright (2009) explores the link between 
warfare frames and religious violence and suggests that ‘the framing of political conflict 
in terms of a “sacred struggle” elevates violence to a moral imperative’ and that in these 
circumstances, ‘violence becomes sacralized as a heroic act and a religious duty’ (Wright 
2009: 17). Dehumanisation, demonisation and classification of the victim as an inferior 
species is a part of war framing, claims the author, and ‘religion is a dynamic force that is 
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frequently marshalled to mobilize aggrieved or disenfranchised populations against 
perceived enemies’ (ibid: 21). Matar’s (2008) article is useful in this regard in the 
analysis of Hizbullah’s political communication strategies – the mediated charisma, 
political-religious discourse, communication style and rhetoric used by its secretary-
general Sayyed Hassan Nassrallah. Interesting comparisons can be drawn between the 
mediated images of religious/political leader Nassrallah and similar political players in 
1971 who opposed liberation such as Ghulam Azam, who shares his intimacy, credibility, 
popular reputation as a superior mythical figure as well as being a man of the masses and 
Delwar Hossain Sayedee, whose language, though ideologically powerful, is accessible 
and comprehensible; and almost all the members of the religion-based political parties, 
his style of dressing, which ‘projects an asceticism as opposed to conspicuous 
consumption’ (Matar 2008: 131). 
How far religious rhetoric in general and the media in particular can cause people 
to act violently or kill is open to question, but Al-Rasheed and Shterin suggest that the 
media ‘certainly disseminate the poetics by which killing can be made meaningful to an 
audience’ (Al-Rasheed and Shterin, 2009: xxix). In fact, Ghassem-Fachandi (2012), in 
his study of the anti-Muslim pogrom in Gujarat in 2002, describes how references to 
meat consumption, butchering, and bodily mutilation in the media and in conversations 
among people and particularly political actors, ‘played a major role in Gujarati 
imaginaries leading to and accompanying the pogrom’ (Ghassem-Fachandi 2012: 14). In 
Indonesia, too, a Muslim man was charged with inciting anti-Christian violence in 
December 1998 using flyers, banners and graffiti (Sidel 2006).  
In contrast to all of the above, Cavanaugh (2009) in The Myth of Religious 
Violence challenges the conventional notion that religion has a tendency to promote 
violence, not by denying the fact that religions can and do promote violence under certain 
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conditions, but by arguing that ‘ideologies and institutions labeled “secular” can be just 
as violent as those labeled “religious”’ (2009: 3). He contends that attempts to separate 
religious violence from secular violence are ‘incoherent’; that such distinctions are a 
function of different configurations of power and that such attempts to create a 
‘transhistorical and transcultural concept of religion that is essentially prone to violence is 
one of the foundational legitimating myths of the liberal nation-state’ (ibid: 4).  
It is worth noting here that, just as Cavanaugh’s work is not a ‘defense of religion 
against the charge of violence’ (ibid: 5) but an exploration of the myth of religious 
violence, this study is not an attack on religion as a promoter of violence but an analysis 
of the discourse surrounding violence purportedly rooted in religion. It does not suggest 
that it is the essence of any religion which is used in the mobilisation of violence. Rather, 
the focus throughout this thesis is on ideological framing – in this case it happens to be 
that of religion-based discourse – in violence. This is why it demonstrates an almost 
complete process in which this occurs – through the construction of the nation and 
identity, followed by the framing of religious justification for violence.  
Violence, in times of both war and peace, is not limited to physical aggression but 
also includes sexual violence, often on a mass scale that can even end up taking the form 
of genetic imperialism and ethnic cleansing as it did in Bangladesh, Bosnia, Rwanda and 
Sudan (Card 1996, Goldstein 2001, Sajjad 2009). In 1971 East Pakistan, the mass rape of 
hundreds of thousands of Bangali women has even been argued as being a form of 
genocide (Halder 2012). I would argue that in such contexts, sexual violence is a form of 
wider political violence and merits a similar but focused study of the process of 
provocations leading to perpetration.  
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3.4 Sexual Violence in Wartime 
While there is ample literature on sexual violence in wartime and its motivations 
and consequences, how this is mobilised in relation to religion has hardly been studied. 
This research thus aims to study the ideology and rhetoric, if any, whether nationalist, 
religious, etc., which might have encouraged such violence during Bangladesh’s 
liberation war. It should be noted, however, that while the mass rape was primarily 
perpetrated by the Pakistani military, collaborators from East Pakistan also took part by 
handing over Bangali, many of them Hindu, women to the army as well as committing 
acts of sexual violence themselves.  
Sexual violence is a specific form of violence perpetrated mostly against women. 
Rape in general and in wartime in particular has historically been used as a weapon of 
power to humiliate and demoralise the enemy. As Yuval-Davis states, ‘women are often 
required to carry the “burden of representation” as they are constructed as the symbolic 
bearers of the collectivity’s identity and honour, both personally and collectively’ (1998: 
29) and systematic rape is often targeted, along with the women, at the ‘enemy 
collectivity’ (ibid). In fact, ‘women are regarded as carriers of culture whose bodies are 
symbols of the nation to be defended by men’ (Islam 2012: 1).  
The widespread practice of rape in wartime has been attributed to three primary 
motivations – winning the enemy women as booty or the spoils of war, humiliating their 
men, and promoting soldierly solidarity among the perpetrators (Cockburn 2001). Rape is 
also used to impregnate women with the ‘enemy’s’ children, to make them socially 
unacceptable or physically unable to bear children and have them ostracised from society 
for bringing dishonour to their families and communities (Sharlach 2000). As Yasmin 
Saikia writes with specific reference to 1971, ‘Women served the purpose of being 
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objects for men to carry out the will of terror required by the state for establishing its 
power’ (Saikia 2011: 98). 
In the case of Bangladesh, official and unofficial estimates of rape range between 
200,000 and 400,000 women (Debnath 2009, Mookherjee 2002). Girls and women from 
the ages of seven to seventy-five were raped, gang-raped, and either killed or taken away 
by the military to become sex slaves to officers and soldiers for the duration of the war. 
Some of them killed themselves. The tragic stories of those who survived are documented 
in, among other texts, Ibrahim (2007), Mookherjee (2002) and Saikia (2011). Even on the 
day of surrender, the Pakistani military claimed to be leaving their ‘seed’ behind in the 
women impregnated in the mass rape (Sharlach 2000).  
Soon after the war ended, the state bestowed upon the women the title of 
“Birangona” or “war heroines”. I have argued elsewhere (Islam 2012) that despite this 
apparent discourse of honour, the women remained victims of rape in wartime and 
neglect and dishonour in the peacetime that followed while Bina D’Costa (2011) has 
argued that the government-sponsored official narrative which glorifies the war, the 
fiction and non-fiction Bangla literature which touches upon people’s suffering, and ‘the 
experiences of survivors as found in their silences’ (2011: 104), particularly women and 
girls who were raped and impregnated or raped and killed, and their families, have all 
contributed to the general silencing and secrecy of women who endured sexual violence 
during the war. The perpetration of rape in 1971 necessitates the examination of the role 
of discourse, whether based on religion or nationalism, in the provocation and 
justification of such acts. The instrumentalisation of religion in particular, in the 
formation of national identity and the mobilisation of violence both physical and sexual, 
and, more specifically, the means, forms and styles of communication used to promote it, 
are the focal points of this research project. The silence on sexual violence during the 
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war, the silencing of the Bihari narrative in post-liberation Bangladesh as well as the 
silence around the entire war in Pakistani history and current narratives have arguably 
created a ‘memoricide’ – a term used by Palestinian historian Nur Masalha (2012) in 
relation to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict – the changing, distorting and silencing of 
narratives, through which a destruction of memory takes place. Silences, absences and 
memoricide are also thus key issues which need to be explored in this study of the 
narratives surrounding Bangladesh’s liberation war. 
The media play an important role in the formation of discourses, making use of 
both language and the absence of language. This thesis is a study of media discourses 
based on the print media, that is, two newspapers from 1971 Pakistan and their role in the 
promotion of an ideology of religious unity over ethnic difference during Bangladesh’s 
independence movement.      
 
3.5 Discourse and Narrative 
 For Michel Foucault, power and knowledge are closely connected, and it is 
knowledge that produces discourse. Discourses produce the subjects we are and the 
objects we have knowledge about (Jorgensen and Phillips 2002). ‘Truth is a discursive 
construction and different regimes of knowledge determine what is true and false’ (ibid: 
13). Foucault studies the infinite ways of formulating statements, of including and 
excluding voices, of similarity and repetition, and of absence, arguing that ‘“truth” is 
embedded in, and produced by, systems of power’ (ibid) and so, because it is 
unattainable, asking what is true or false is pointless, rather, it is the process of how 
effects of truth are created in discourses, ‘the discursive processes through which 
discourses are constructed in ways that give the impression that they represent true or 
false pictures of reality’ (ibid: 14) that is important. In this context, this study explores 
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the representation of reality and the construction of the nation and identities through the 
framing of religion-based ideology in the media during the 1971 war. 
Matheson (2005) proposes that media is neither a reflection of the world, nor is it 
a constructed picture of reality. Instead, ‘news makes sense within a social context: if it 
acts at all as a mirror, it reflects preoccupations within that society, and when it 
constructs a picture of the world, that picture is often very close to what members of that 
society already know’ (Matheson 2005: 1). In his work on discourses produced by media 
texts, he shows how reporters and subeditors draw upon and reproduce social reality, re-
emphasise social roles, feed fears, etc., and argues that news can only appear as a 
reflection of society and make sense ‘if it adheres to a set of social norms and principles 
of discourse’ (ibid: 2). This is, again, similar to the workings of ideology and myth 
discussed in the sections above.  
According to Matheson, besides journalistic conventions, there are also social 
conventions on which the news depend, such as ‘what people are like, what words mean, 
what is natural and commonsensical, who gets to speak in society and what is real’ (ibid). 
News discourse, he argues, is the ‘coming together of a variety of norms and principles 
and unstated assumptions’ and by analysing news languages, he suggests that the social 
basis of news can be uncovered and whether news perpetuates or challenges this social 
basis and its power to convince and manipulate (ibid). However, Matheson shows that ‘it 
is important to see texts within their contexts, and particularly as language in action as 
part of a social practice, rather than as stand-alone texts’ (2005: 5). There is also a need to 
acknowledge that the same words and language can hold different meanings in different 
contexts, as part of different discourses, depending on who is using them and how. Thus, 
for example, the concept of nationalism in 1971 Pakistan specifically meant Islamic 
nationalism based primarily on religion, both of which were used to mobilise people 
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against the liberation of Bangladesh, whereas in then East Pakistan as well as Bangladesh 
today, nationalism was and is strongly associated with Bangali ethnic identity and 
secularism, based on which the Bangalis fought for independence then and fight religious 
extremism now.  
The literature on news and representation is vast, as is the literature that considers 
news as narrative (see Jack Lule, Barbie Zelizer, for example). However, Fulton (2005) 
distinguishes between news as information and news as narrative, though she does 
suggest that all news is narrativised. In her discussion around the role of narrative as 
cultural production and in the construction of the audience, she outlines the strategies 
used to narrativise news – angle, point of closure, individualisation, focalisation and 
chronology – all of which, through focus on particular events, angles, sources and 
attributing characteristics to them, often end up telling stories in the style of fiction rather 
than providing objective information in the form of hard news. As the empirical chapters 
of this study will demonstrate, the news published in the Pakistani wartime media was 
largely narrativised. While positioned most often on front pages and given the treatment 
of hard news, they focused on and were slanted towards anti-liberation discourse, using 
selective sources, heroising certain characters, and providing opinion and commentary on 
events and their outcomes. For example, front page news stories went beyond reporting 
war casualties to “martyrdom” of the Pakistani forces who would be going to heaven, as 
opposed to the “killing” of Hindu “miscreants” who, judging by the tone of the reports, 
were getting what they deserved. Not only did editorials and commentaries in the papers 
examined here take an obvious one-sided stand against liberation, but news itself took the 
form of storytelling, with characters of Muslim Pakistani brothers, mothers and sisters 
being killed and violated and thus avenging themselves against Hindu Indian 
“criminals/goons/oppressors”, etc. The news coverage of the war over the nine months, 
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rather than the reporting of facts, indeed, ignoring important news values such as balance 
and objectivity, became a story, almost like a film script, that carried a specific message 
for its target audience.       
 
3.6 Significance of the Study 
As this chapter has discussed, while there are many studies on nationalism and 
identity, politics, violence and religion, the relationship between all these and the role of 
communication and the media has been less explored, especially in the context of South 
Asia in general and Bangladesh in particular. The rising violent religious extremism in 
Bangladesh in recent times – some but not all of it related to the liberation war and the 
ongoing war crimes trial – and the use of communication technologies by local 
perpetrators and foreign extremist groups and its coverage in the media makes this study 
not only relevant but necessary. This research seeks to complement these works, but will 
focus on the role of ideology/myth/narrative/discourse in the construction of nation, 
identities, subjectivities and the Other as strategies of legitimisation in purportedly 
religion-based conflict, that is, using or abusing religion to instigate violence for what are 
at least not obviously economic class-based reasons. It will look at the role of ideology 
and power in the formation of discourses that act as representations of reality and truth, 
invoking history and religion and provoking belief and action.  
The following chapter will discuss the methodology, detailing the research 
methods selected for this study, particularly discourse analysis but also interviews, their 
use and usefulness in the context of this research, as well as their limitations. It will also 
address the issue of ethics and the positionality and self-reflexivity of the researcher. 
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CHAPTER 4 
METHODOLOGY 
This chapter provides insight into the methods and significance of this research 
project, describing the research methods employed, the tools of data collection, selection 
and analysis, and, in the last section, the issue of reflexivity of the researcher, including, 
in brief, the limitations of the study. As discussed previously, this study addresses 
ideology and how it is used discursively, but the study itself is not free of ideology. As 
Adrian Holliday states, ‘The ideological nature of qualitative research, both in its impact 
on the research setting and the people in it, and in the way it constructs its own realities, 
makes its writing a highly sensitive task’ (2007: 116). In fact, personal narrative, 
contends Holliday, ‘can often help to give a greater insight and a fresh perspective to the 
data.’ 
It is from this premise that I begin this chapter – with my own story of how this 
research came to be. I present a personal account of growing up as a Bangali woman in 
post-liberation Bangladesh in an era dominated by pro-liberation narratives and the war 
crimes trial underway. I then lay down the current political situation in Bangladesh which 
has been characterised, particularly in the last three years, by religiously motivated 
violence, pointing out the need for this study at this time. I then discuss the practicalities 
of this research – the process of data collection, the methods of data analysis, and the 
limitations of the data and methods of analysis.    
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4.1 Growing up Bangali 
After spending a couple of years in Bangladesh as an infant in the 1980s, and then 
another couple as a teenager in the late 1990s, I really went back home, so to say, when 
starting university. The University of Dhaka is the country’s top public university, with a 
rich historical legacy of having contributed to the nation’s Language Movement of 1952, 
Liberation War of 1971, and the anti-autocratic movement of the 1980s, in all of which 
the institution’s students, teachers, or both, had lost their lives. Surrounded by 
monuments dedicated to these movements, and teachers and students with a keen sense of 
history in general and the country’s liberation movement in particular, I, too, became 
interested in the history, significance and consequences of the war and the principles on 
which it was based – nationalism, secularism, socialism and democracy. I became aware 
of the rather intense resentment of Pakistan among those who had fought or lost anyone 
in the war, but also among many of the pro-liberation younger generation, which, for 
example, came to the fore during cricket matches where any Bangladeshi supporters of 
Pakistan were labelled “razakars” (the name of one of the auxiliary forces of the Pakistani 
army in 1971 but now commonly used in Bangladesh to mean traitor). It was in this 
context that I myself developed a keen sense of “Bangali” identity. As Castells has 
shown, identities are the result of a combination of ‘history, geography, biology, 
productive and reproductive institutions, collective memory, personal fantasies, power 
apparatuses and religious revelations’ (Castells 2004:7). As discussed in the previous 
chapter, whereas legitimising identity is formed by dominant institutions, resistance 
identities are also formed, by those excluded from the first process.  
Interestingly, after the end of a prolonged period of military rule and the end of 
the 20th century seeing a revival in nationalist sentiment in Bangladesh, the beginning of 
the 21st century also brought with it a resurgence in religion-based politics and political 
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violence, particularly after the events of September 11, 2001. Various ‘extremist’ groups 
came into the limelight for their militant operations, and whereas their traditional base 
was in religious schools or madrasas, what intrigued me most, as an upper-middle class, 
English-medium-school-educated, Bangali woman, was the increasing affiliation of 
young men and women from this very class, born and raised in affluent families and 
educated in elite schools and universities, to these extremist outfits. Leaving the root 
causes to be explored by sociologists and political scientists, as a student of 
communication, I was more interested in how these young recruits were mobilised and 
convinced to join the cause and, ultimately, engage in violence.  
I was born a Muslim; almost all members of my family are believers and many of 
them practitioners of the faith. Yet killing in the name of religion was not something that 
seemed acceptable to us or other devout Muslims I knew, and I became interested to 
study how communication and discourse based on religion, or certain ways of framing 
religious ideology, could motivate one to perpetrate acts of violence and the role of the 
media in facilitating this. I decided to start at the beginning, at least in terms of my young 
country, and began to plan my doctoral research around the use of religion during the 
Liberation War of 1971. 
 
4.2 Violence in the Name of Religion 
In 2010, with the commencement of the war crimes trial in Bangladesh, the 
discourse around the war and religion gained momentum. This was largely due to the fact 
that many of those who had opposed and actively fought against liberation and were now 
being tried, claimed to have done so on the basis of religion, as has been shown in the 
introductory chapters. In late 2012, just as I was finalising and sending out my PhD 
proposal and facing scholarship interviews, violence broke out following the conviction 
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of some of the accused, and the main anti-liberation party in then East Pakistan, the 
Jamaat-i-Islami’s student wing Islami Chhatra Shibir, were sending out text messages to 
its activists, encouraging them to fight as, according to television news reports at the time 
which revealed some of these texts, “the police brutality and torturous imprisonment and 
punishment suffered in this life will be rewarded manifold times in the next”.  
When sentencing began and the first convicted war criminal was awarded life 
imprisonment, hundreds of thousands of people gathered in February 2013 around the 
city’s central Shahbagh area, demanding maximum punishment of the convicted war 
criminals, i.e., the death penalty. What has come to be known as the Shahbagh 
Movement, was initially organised by an online community of bloggers, but it soon 
gained momentum as a people’s movement, with people from all walks of life gathering 
there every day in protest, through speeches, chants, songs and the burning of effigies of 
the war criminals. Tributes were paid to the Liberation War and its martyrs, with people 
forming Bangladeshi maps with flowers, candles, painting their faces with the national 
flag, etc. The Shahbagh area and the capital in general seemed to be throbbing with 
nationalist fervour and pro-liberation sentiment, which was understandable as after over 
forty years, justice was finally being served.  
That very month, however, one of the aforementioned bloggers was killed, hacked 
to death outside his home, and this incident arguably turned the whole movement around, 
as suggested in some public spheres. Responsibility for the killing was claimed by 
religious extremists who claimed that the victim was an atheist and had insulted Islam 
and the Prophet Mohammed with the writings on his blog. This eventually led to a 
division in the mass movement, with it now being portrayed as a movement led by 
atheists, which, in a Muslim majority country, did not go down well with the general 
population. While people still gather in Shahbagh in protest or celebration every time 
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another war criminal is sentenced or the sentence is carried out, the mass movement has 
more or less disintegrated.  
Between 2013 and at the time of writing this chapter in July 2016, nearly 50 
people had been killed in attacks blamed on Islamist militants, starting with bloggers in 
2013 and 2015, and going on to include academics, LGBTQ rights activists and, most 
recently, several members of religious minority groups and a few foreigners. Some of 
those arrested in the blogger killings have admitted that they didn’t even know what 
blogs were, but that their religious teachers taught them that these bloggers were “against 
Islam” and that it was their “religious responsibility” to kill them. Along the same 
discursive lines, the war criminals being sentenced and punished were also claiming that 
they were being killed for having tried to establish Islam in the country (in 1971) and that 
they were sacrificing their lives for the cause of Islam. 
What this means is that the use of religion-based discourse did not end with the 
Liberation War but that it has been gaining strength in the present. The media and other 
forms of communication play a significant role in facilitating this, and while the 
relationship between religion and politics has always been an important though 
inconclusive subject of study, the role of the media, especially in the context of Asia and 
Bangladesh particularly, has hardly been examined.  
For this reason, through this research, I go back to history to study the use of 
religion-based rhetoric from the very birth of Bangladesh, which is largely at the root of 
what is happening there today (communal politics obviously goes back to the Partition of 
India in 1947 and earlier). I focus on the framing of religious ideology in the discursive 
construction of the nation and nationalism; the discursive formation of identities; the 
legitimisation of political violence through the tropes of jihad, sacrifice and martyrdom; 
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and the validation of sexual violence through its silent/absent representation in anti-
liberation discourse. 
 
4.3 Collecting the Data  
For my primary data, I have relied on the most visible, tangible and permanent 
form of media – newspapers. In my case, this was also the only feasible data source for 
information and analysis. Unfortunately, preservation and archiving of historical 
documents was not one of the first priorities of the post-liberation Bangladeshi 
government, and not only were other propaganda material which I hoped to get at the 
outset of this research, such as posters or leaflets used by anti-liberation groups not 
available, but even television and radio archives of anti-liberation material from 1971 
was non-existent. Upon finding nothing but a few CDs of pro-liberation material in the 
radio archives, and after being informed that the television archives had none, I decided 
to focus on newspapers backed by interviews of some witnesses to the war. 
 
Fig. 1: Methods 
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Newspapers from that time were not easy to come by. Only a few institutions 
such as the University of Dhaka and the Bangla Academy19 had preserved these crucial 
documents, and these too were seized by the War Crimes Tribunal for purposes of 
research for the war crimes trial, but also to protect them from those trying to destroy 
evidence of the war. The care and security of the newspapers from 1971 was placed upon 
the Bangla Academy, with the slightly less important, less sought after papers available 
in the National Archives. Thus, after securing special permission with the help of 
contacts from my time as a journalist as well as family connections, I gained access to 
both, though it was kept under wraps due to security reasons.  
I spent four months in the room of the Bangla Academy librarian, arriving every 
morning at around 9:30/10am and staying on until past afternoon, unlocking trunk by 
trunk the newspapers from 1971, myself locked into the room. I began to feel partly 
responsible for the preservation of this history, as I went through what were often grimy 
and torn pages, trying not to destroy them further. In their condition photocopying was 
not an option, and so, as I went through every frail page, I would scan the relevant items 
with my handheld scanner, newly discovered through friends and imported from the US 
for this specific purpose. My notes went into a notebook, and later, all the data into an 
Excel sheet (see Appendix), in chronological order and colour coded by theme – blue for 
issues of Islamic identity, green for nationalism in relation to religion, orange for 
references to the Hindu enemy, shades of pink for sacrifice and martyrdom, deep red for 
anything with the mention of jihad, and violet for references to women. Without the use 
																																																						
19	Following	the	Language	Movement	of	1952,	the	Bangla	Academy	was	established	in	1955	for	the	
promotion	of	the	Bangla	language.	The	organisation	conducts	research	on	Bangla	language,	culture	and	
history;	publishes	literary	and	research	work;	organises	a	month-long	book	fair	every	February	to	
commemorate	the	language	movement	and	martyrs;	and	recognises	and	awards	contributions	to	the	
Bangla	language	through	the	Bangla	Academy	Award	every	year.	It	is	also	a	repository	for	newspapers.			
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of any software such as Nvivo, I did everything manually, but for this reason my 
confidence in my empirical data is high, I know almost for certain that I did not miss 
anything. I also went through a few other newspapers from 1971 in the National Archives 
but did not find anything of very great value to my research. 
 
4.4 Sampling and Selection of Data 
My purposive sampling of the newspapers I looked at included, first and 
foremost, the Dainik Sangram. This was the mouthpiece of the main anti-liberation party 
in East Pakistan, the Jamaat-i-Islami. The editor of the paper at the time was Akhter 
Faruk, and its publisher Mohammad Shakhi Mia, and though it is not confirmed whether 
or not they held any official positions in the party, the autobiography of Ghulam Azam, 
the leader of the Jamaat-i-Islami in East Pakistan, mentioned the paper as being published 
to give voice to the party which it was not being given by other media.  
Due to its importance, I studied the paper from its inception in 1970, doing a 
random sampling of five issues per month, and examined each page of every issue from 
1971. Due to the large volume of data gathered from 1971 itself, however, the papers 
discussed in the thesis do not include those from 1970, which only serve to set a context. 
Ultimately, I used 736 items published between March and November 1971, eight of the 
nine months of the war as the December issues were not to be found with the war ending 
in mid-December in any case. The Dainik Sangram is one of the most important sources 
of evidence for the War Crimes Tribunal, because whereas the Jamaat-i-Islami can claim 
that other papers published propaganda against it, it cannot say the same for its own 
publication, which reflected its own discourse and propaganda. Accurate circulation 
statistics for newspapers from that time are difficult to come by but it is safe to say that 
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Sangram was read if not by the general population, then at least by its supporters, i.e., 
those who opposed liberation.   
The second paper I looked at was the Dainik Pakistan, later Dainik Bangla, a 
government-owned paper, selected in order to reflect the general media discourse 
prevalent in the country at the time. According to journalist Saleh Choudhury20, a 
reporter with the daily at the time, the content of the newspaper was “directed” by 
members of the Pakistan army, with the overarching theme being anti-India and giving 
the impression that peace reigned in East Pakistan (even while it was at war).21 For this 
paper too I conducted random sampling of five issues per month and came up with 29 
items relevant to my study.   
The third paper, Dawn, was published in West Pakistan, and while I went through 
its issues of 1971, for the purposes of this study, I decided to focus only on several 
advertisements related to jihad that were published towards the end of the war. 
The analysis in this thesis covers all issues from March-November 1971 of the 
Dainik Sangram, randomly sampled and selected issues from April-December of 1971 of 
the Dainik Pakistan, and advertisements printed in December 1971 issues of Dawn. I use 
many direct quotes in the empirical chapters – quotes made by political and religious 
																																																						
20	Saleh	Choudhury,	journalist.	Personal	interview.	22	October	2014,	conducted	at	his	residence	in	Uttara,	
Dhaka.	
21	This	was	not	unusual	for	the	Pakistani	press	even	before	as	well	as	during	the	war	of	1971.	Niazi	(2010)	
contends	that	it	was	this	betrayal	of	‘Jinnah’s	faith	in	liberalism,	his	regard	for	sanctity	of	fundamental	
human	rights	and	the	freedom	of	the	press,	through	the	imposition	of	‘black	laws’	and	the	prosecution	of	
publications	and	members	of	the	press	who	did	not	toe	the	line,	that	to	a	large	extent	led	to	the	war.	In	
fact,	with	regards	to	the	objectivity	of	the	Pakistani	press,	Niazi	writes:	‘The	most	tragic	example	of	
slanted	reporting,	half	truths	and	naked	lies,	came	to	light	during	the	East	Pakistan	debacle	in	1971’	(Niazi	
2010:	155).	The	government-controlled	press,	radio	and	television	‘was	busy	telling	the	nation	that	
“everything	was	under	control”	and	our	armed	forces	had	“successfully	crushed”	the	“subversive	and	
disgruntled	elements”	in	the	eastern	wing’	as	well	as	promising	‘“war	till	victory”	on	the	western	front’	
(Niazi	2010:	201).	
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leaders cited in the newspapers as well as quotations from news reports, editorials, 
commentaries, etc., – followed by my own analysis and interpretation of their meaning 
and connotations.  
One of the key tasks in writing up as well as analysing these quotes was that of 
translation from Bangla to English and, often, the transliteration of Urdu and Arabic 
words as well which were frequently used in the East Pakistani press. In order to follow a 
standard, the Bangla Academy Bengali-English Dictionary was used for purposes of 
translation, as well as three dictionaries of Islam and Islamic history. Despite this, 
however, as with all translations between all languages, it is never exact, as not every 
language has the exact signifiers for all signifieds, but care has been taken to translate 
words, phrases and their connotations to the closest possible meanings in English. Where 
there was no other recourse, online sources, including Wikipedia, have also been referred 
to.    
 
4.5 Analysing the Data 
Two methods have been selected for the purposes of conducting this research – 
discourse analysis of material collected through archival research and interviews. 
Discourse analysis covers all key aspects of this study – the framing of religious ideology 
by those opposed to liberation to produce discursive knowledge leading to action in 
countering Bangladesh’s independence movement. Interviews act as a secondary method 
affirming the findings of the discourse analysis. 
 
 
 
 
		 89	
4.5a Discourse and its analysis  
In recent years, there has been a ‘sociologizing of discourse research’ (Keller 
2013: 1) with social science analysis of discourse growing and the number of approaches 
expanding. Gumul (2010), for example, in her discussion of ideology, refers to various, 
modified definitions of ideology to suit its more contemporary use particularly in the 
context of critical discourse analysis (CDA). She notes the difference between traditional 
definitions of ideology as a political doctrine or philosophical stance ‘with negative 
connotations denoting overt manipulation and deception’ (2010: 95) and those within 
CDA-oriented approaches where ideology is seen as more neutral and as a reflection of 
the thoughts, beliefs and values of a society.  
Discourse, in everyday English, means ‘a simple conversation’, as Keller states 
(2013: 5), while in French and other Romance languages it refers to ‘“learnéd speech”, a 
lecture, a treatise, sermon, presentation and more besides. Talking of “public or political 
discourses” in both languages refers to the debates in the public (political sphere), 
mediated by mass media’ (ibid). Initially a linguistic concept referring to ‘passages of 
connected writing or speech’, discourse was defined by Michel Foucault more broadly as 
‘the production of knowledge through language’ (cited in Hall 2004: 346).  
As Garrett and Bell (1998) note, while text tends to refer to ‘the outward 
manifestation of a communication event’ (1998: 3), discourse examines the context – the 
actors, their motivations, the environment, medium, evolution of different types of 
communication and their relationship to each other. Talbot (2007) also distinguishes 
between text – ‘the observable product of interaction: a cultural object’ and discourse – 
‘the process of interaction itself: a cultural activity’ (2007: 9), creatively referring to text 
as ‘the fabric in which discourse is manifested’ (ibid).  
		 90	
Discourse consists of language as well as practice. It situates a topic in a 
particular historical context – and thus is subject to change – defining it, determining 
what is and is not to be talked about and how people should conduct themselves in 
relation to it, thus linking power to both the mind (knowledge) and the body (practice) 
(Hall 2004). Foucault views discourse as ‘the historically specific relations between 
disciplines (bodies of knowledge) [such as medicine, sociology] and disciplinary 
practices (forms of social control and social possibility) [and disciplinary institutions of 
social control such as the prison, school, hospital, etc.]’ (McHoul and Grace 2002: 26). 
‘Discursive practices may have major ideological effects’, producing and reproducing 
unequal power relations, ‘passing off assumptions (often falsifying ones) about any 
aspect of social life as mere common sense’ (Fairclough and Wodak 2004: 357). 
Discourse analysis  
examines patterns of language across texts and considers the relationship between 
language and the social and cultural contexts in which it is used… the ways that the use 
of language presents different views of the world and different understandings… the 
effects the use of language has upon social identities and relations… how views of the 
world, and identities, are constructed through the use of discourse. (Paltridge 2012: 2)  
 
Stuart Hall analyses discourse in terms of Foucault’s main subjects of study – 
madness, punishment and sexuality – but this analysis can be applied to any form of 
discourse. In terms of the research at hand, the anti-liberation discourse studied here must 
be examined for the following elements taken from Hall (2004) based on Foucault’s 
definition of discourse: statements which produce a certain knowledge, in this case, about 
the division of Pakistan in relation to religion; the ways of talking about it, what is 
included and what is excluded; ‘subjects’ who personify the discourse – the Muslim 
Pakistani as opposed to the ‘Hindu Other’ freedom-seeking Bangali; how authority is 
bestowed upon knowledge of the topic, that is, the assertions of political and religious 
figures opposed to liberation; institutional practices for dealing with the subjects which 
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would, in this case, include those of the Pakistani government, military and media as well 
as organisers of the anti-liberation forces in East Pakistan.  
The final component of discourse, according to Hall, is an ‘acknowledgement that 
a different discourse or episteme will arise at a later historical moment, supplanting the 
existing one, opening up a new discursive formation … new discourses with the power 
and authority, the “truth”, to regulate social practices in new ways’ (Hall 2004: 347, 
original italics). This is apparent in the fact that liberation was achieved through the 
challenging of anti-liberation discourse which eventually made way for the independence 
of Bangladesh. Jorgensen and Phillips, drawing on Foucault, describe discourse as ‘the 
rules that determine which statements are accepted as meaningful and true in a particular 
historical epoch’ (2002: 12). As Hall too notes, ‘knowledge linked to power, not only 
assumes the authority of “the truth” but has the power to make itself true’ (ibid, original 
italics). and, even if temporary – as all discourses tend to be – the same was true of anti-
liberation discourse and those who believed in it. 
Fairclough and Wodak (2004) also highlight the characteristics of discourse in 
reference to a radio interview by Margaret Thatcher. While theirs is a critical discourse 
analysis, they refer to discourse in general as constituting society and culture, being 
ideological, historical, a form of social action, to power relations as being discursive, and 
to discourse analysis as being interpretative and explanatory. Paltridge, too, writes of the 
importance of ‘social, political underpinnings of spoken and written discourse’ and the 
‘ideological thrust of seemingly ordinary, everyday genres’ (2012: 32).  
 Majid Khosravinik, a specialist on critical discourse analysis, describes it in 
terms of combining ‘topic plus attitude in the recognition of and engagement with a given 
discourse’ (2015: 53). As such, the method is an analysis of the qualities of an 
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“automatically clear” discourse – religious discourse – where critical analysis of the 
discourse is ‘simultaneously the operationalization and realisation of critique’ (ibid: 54). 
Khosravinik (2015), in his book Discourse, Identity and Legitimacy, refers to the 
debate between Billig (2008), on the one hand, and van Dijk (2008), on the other, in 
which Billig expresses concern over the use of technical language in CDA studies as if 
language is the agent of action, whereas the psychology of language users is also 
important.  However, as Khosravinik, drawing on Fairclough, suggests ‘the use of certain 
linguistic forms is not automatically ideological and/or does not always create similar 
effects… power manifests itself in language rather than being derived from language’ 
(Khosravinik 2015: 64) which means one needs to pay attention to the specific contexts 
under which language is used.    
This study also borrows from van Dijk’s (1998) critical discourse analysis of 
editorials and op-eds. In it, he looks at discourse structures which contribute to discursive 
formations. Van Dijk also elaborates on the common “us versus them” or Othering 
strategy, labelling it as the “ideological square”, whereby “our” good properties and 
actions are emphasised, “theirs” mitigated, and “our” bad properties and actions 
mitigated, “theirs” emphasised. 
Particularly useful to this study is Reisigl and Wodak’s (2009) discourse-
historical approach as summarised by Khosravinik (2015). The strategies of nomination 
(linguistically referring to people, objects, events, etc.), predication (characteristics and 
qualities attributed to them), argumentation, perspectivisation, framing or discourse 
representation, and intensification or mitigation (articulation of the utterances) enable the 
attainment of objectives such as discursive construction, discursive qualification, 
justification and questioning claims of truth, positioning of speakers and writers and 
modifying “illocutionary force”. Devices include tropes and metaphors, stereotypes and 
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comparisons, fallacies, speech and quotations, and other linguistic mechanisms. 
However, this study does not  use a micro-linguistic analytical method, but  employs  
broad frames to analyse the discourses in the media under study.   
Marianne Jorgensen and Louise J. Phillips in their book Discourse Analysis as 
Theory and Method (2002) offer three practical streams for the use of discourse analysis 
focusing on discursive struggle, intertextuality and discursive psychology. The first 
stream, as applied by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, focuses on discursive struggle. 
Largely based on Foucault’s poststructuralist idea that discourse constructs the social 
world in meaning, it suggests that because language is not fixed, neither can meaning be 
fixed, but is constantly changing based on different discursive encounters. The second 
stream draws upon Norman Fairclough’s application of critical discourse analysis as 
outlined above. For Fairclough, discourse is one of many aspects of social practice and 
language draws upon already established meanings. Whereas Laclau and Mouffe see the 
process as a struggle, Fairclough sees it as one of intertextuality, where a combination of 
elements from different discourses can influence individual discourses and the social and 
cultural world.  
For this study, I, analyse media texts and their relation to other discourses, such as 
religious discourses, beginning with the premise that neither language nor meaning are 
fixed and as such neither are discourses fixed or constant. In terms of this study, the 
process is one of discursive struggle but I focus on only the one discourse or rather a 
combination of many as represented in the newspapers examined here. I look at the 
intertextuality in terms of the relationship between a variety of discourses as reflected in 
these newspapers and I also use this to analyse the role of discourse in creating and 
negotiating representations of the world. This research is not a comparative study of the 
discourses in the struggle but an analysis of the holistic discourse of anti-liberation as 
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represented in the chosen media. I use the method of discourse analysis as a complete 
theoretical and methodological “package” as described by Jorgensen and Phillips (2002) 
who value multiperspectival work for its ability to combine elements from different 
discourse and non-discourse analytical perspectives in order to produce a broader 
understanding of a phenomenon. The result is thus an analysis of the overall discourse, its 
formation and significance in relation to power, ideology and identity construction, rather 
than a critical discourse analysis of the linguistic and semantic structures and details. I 
look at the framing of religion-based ideology by those in power in the media which was 
used as a discursive tool in the formation of anti-liberation discourse during the war.      
For Keller (2013), there is a distinction between discourse and theories and 
analysis of discourse. He writes: 
Discourses may be understood as more or less successful attempts to stabilize, at least 
temporarily, attributions of meaning and orders of interpretation, and thereby to 
institutionalize a collectively binding order of knowledge in a social ensemble. Discourse 
theories or discourse analyses, on the other hand, are scientific endeavours designed to 
investigate the processes implied here: social sciences’ discourse research is concerned 
with the relationship between speaking/writing as activity or social practices and the 
(re)production of meaning systems/orders of knowledge, the social actors involved in 
this, the rules and resources underlying these processes, and their consequences in social 
collectivities. (Keller 2013: 2) 
 
Discourse theories and analyses are not interested in social-structural formations 
in linguistic usage or linguistic usage as a form or performance of action but is more ‘the 
analysis of institutional regulations of declarative practices and their performative and 
reality-constituting power’ (Keller 2013: 3). Importantly, Keller notes that discourse 
theories and analyses: 
are concerned with the actual use of (written or spoken) language and other symbolic 
forms in social practices; emphasize that in the practical use of signs, meanings of 
phenomena are socially constructed and these phenomena are thereby constituted in their 
social reality; claim that individual instances of interpretation may be understood as parts 
of a more comprehensive discourse structure that is temporarily produced and stabilized 
by specific institutional-organizational contexts; and assume that the use of symbolic 
orders is subject to rules of interpretation and action that may be reconstructed. (ibid) 
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In terms of media discourse, the media, as Khosravinik argues, play an ‘active, 
political role in cultural relations of power… active in the politics of sense-making 
(Khosravinik 2015: 72), or as Fairclough suggests, the media do not just reflect the 
preferences of the audience but ‘justify, preserve, rationalise, conceptualise and represent 
the interests of dominant groups’ (Fairclough 1993 cited in Khosravinik 2015: 72) 
thereby ‘play[ing] a crucial role in the persuasive production of dominant ideologies’ 
(van Dijk 1988 cited in Khosravinik 2015: 72). As Caldas-Coulthard (2003) suggests, 
news is ‘not the event, but the partial, ideologically framed report of the event’ (cited in 
Khosravinik 2015: 73), providing people with ‘a picture of the world which makes the 
development of one kind of attitude more likely than another’ (Hartmann and Husband 
1974 cited in Khosravinik 2015: 73).  
It is important to note, however, that power is not inherent in discourse, it does 
not exist in the words or images that make up a discourse. Norman Fairclough clarifies 
this in Language and Power (2015) and his discussion of power in and behind discourse: 
‘on the one hand that power is exercised and enacted in discourse, and on the other hand 
that there are relations of power behind discourse’ (2015:  98). Power is won, held and 
lost in social struggles in both cases, with discourse being the site of power struggles as 
well as the stake in in it, that is, control over orders of discourse (ibid). Media discourse 
is particularly interesting in this regard as, according to Fairclough, the nature of power 
relations enacted in the media are often unclear, making it a hidden form of and exercise 
in power. 
 
4.5b Why media discourse 
Fairclough (2015) notes that, while in face-to-face interaction and discourse 
participants alternate in their roles as producers and receivers/interpreters of text, with 
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regards to media production and content, this is a more one-sided process, with a sharp 
divide between producers and interpreters, with ‘the media “product” tak[ing] on some of 
the nature of a commodity, between producers and “consumers”’ (2015: 78). Fairclough 
also argues that in face-to-face interactions people adapt their language and 
communication use and patterns based on the feedback they receive during the process of 
interaction, whereas media discourse designed for mass – nameless, faceless, unknown – 
audiences, is most often targeted to an ‘ideal subject’ (ibid, original italics). ‘Media 
discourse has built into it a subject position for an ideal subject, and actual viewers or 
listeners or readers have to negotiate a relationship with the ideal subject’ (ibid). This, 
combined with the fact that ‘producers have sole producing rights and can therefore 
determine what is included and excluded, how events are represented’ (ibid: 79), 
underlines how media producers exercise power over consumers. It may be argued that 
modern media technology enabling interaction and instant feedback, for example in 
digital media, may overcome this to an extent, but especially in the case of the 
mainstream media, power, including the ability to select and control the flow of feedback 
even online, remains with the producers.  
In the case study here, while the focus is on language and discourse, who 
produces this discourse – the selection of sources quoted, the particular journalists and 
writers, the media institutions, their ownership, and their control by the ruling elite must 
be kept in mind, for it is through this network of relationships that power is exercised. 
This is ultimately reflected in the language used and discourse that is constructed. It is 
also important to keep in mind the imagined audience of this discourse, those being 
interpellated, the process of which will be shown in the coming empirical chapters, not in 
terms of how it may have impacted them or driven them to action, as this is not a causal 
study and does not include audience and reception research, but in terms of how the 
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imagination of the existing or desired audience may have influenced the construction of 
the discourse.      
As summarised by Garrett and Bell (1998), the study of media discourse is useful 
for several reasons, including the media’s being a ‘rich source of readily accessible data’, 
but more importantly, the media’s ability to convey ‘social meanings and stereotypes 
projected through language and communication’ and to ‘reflect and influence the 
formation and expression of culture, politics and social life’ (Garrett and Bell, 1998: 3-4). 
For this study, the media has been a rich, indeed the only accessible, resource of data, 
providing a reflection of the prevailing discourses of the time and, in turn, insight into the 
politics, culture and society of that period.   
While this thesis has relied almost entirely on newspapers as this was the only 
medium which has been properly preserved, newspapers provide quite a good idea of the 
situation in other media. Antonio Gramsci considered the press to be a powerful 
ideological and political force, indeed, the most dynamic part of an ideological structure 
(Forgacs 1985). For example, a letter published in the op-ed pages suggests that radio as 
a medium had an important role to play in upholding and spreading Muslim spirit and 
national unity. It claims that during the 1965 Indo-Pak war, Dhaka Betar (Radio) played 
an inspirational role for the people, but since then and before the start of the current war, 
it broadcast content that was not in line with Pakistan’s culture and ideology, including 
the songs of “the Islam-hating Hindu national poet who is a source of national inspiration 
for Hindus” (referring to Bangla poet Nobel laureate Rabindranath Tagore). The letter-
writer says, however, that despite some “cheap and vulgar” songs being broadcast, “many 
patriotic songs, discussions, drama, news, etc., are praiseworthy, especially the previous 
week’s drama ‘Sultan Mahmud’ and some new songs such as ‘Wake up, Muslim, bring 
peace all around you’, ‘What is Pakistan’s origin – la ilaha illallah’, ‘My leader, your 
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leader, world prophet Mustafa’, etc. and poet Nazrul’s and deceased poet Golam 
Mustafa’s nationalistic songs such as ‘We are that people’, ‘Pakistan is that Pakistan’, the 
re-broadcast of which has created waves among people.” (Dainik Sangram 2 May 1971, 
p. 2). This rather detailed description reflects radio content during the war, where not 
only did patriotism mean love for Pakistan but also love for Islam, and whereby Muslims 
were called upon to wake up and defend the nation and the peace.  
Newspaper content also reflects its readership. The findings presented above and 
in the empirical chapters show that the youth were a segment of the population being 
addressed by political and religious leaders at public meetings as well as through the 
media. The importance of Islamic education, formation of Muslim identity, the notion of 
the future of Pakistan and Islam being in the hands of the youth, the specific appeal to 
madrasa students are all testimony to the fact that the youth were a key target audience. 
This was probably even more important at a time when anti-liberation groups initially 
still had the sympathy of much of the older generation, as an interviewee attests to in 
Chapter 6, whereas the pro-liberation army or Mukti Bahini was made up largely of 
young people. 
Perhaps the most important thing to remember about discourse analysis is that 
‘reality can never be reached outside discourses and so it is discourse itself [and not 
reality that is] the object of analysis’ (Jorgensen and Phillips 2002: 21).  
Discourse analysis in this study is also supported by interview findings. 
 
4.5c Interviews 
To complement discourse analysis, I conducted a handful of qualitative, semi-
structured interviews with eyewitnesses to the war, participants in the war and 
researchers on the war. Alan Bryman (2012) distinguishes between structured interviews 
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in quantitative research and semi-structured or unstructured interviews in qualitative 
research claiming that in the case of qualitative research, there is a greater interest in the 
interviewee’s point of view, giving them more time, scope and agency and flexibility, 
resulting in broader, more detailed and rich answers. There is no schedule and no fixed 
script. Bryman also lists the type of questions that commonly feature in qualitative 
interviews, from introductory and follow-up questions to probing, specifying, direct, 
indirect, structuring and interpreting questions to silence, which allows the interviewee 
the opportunity to ‘reflect and amplify an answer’ (Bryman 2012: 476-478). Several 
advantages of qualitative interviewing which Bryman lists in comparison to participant 
observation are advantages of the technique in itself – it allows for a reconstruction of 
events and has a great breadth of coverage but remains focused.  
Interviews serve a number of purposes, but they are of particular relevance to this 
project because they help to understand the social actor’s experience, knowledge, and 
worldviews; enable inquiry about the past; and aid in verifying, validating, or 
commenting on information obtained from other sources (Lindlof and Taylor 2013). For 
this study, interviews were a means of taking a second, subjective look into the past and 
comparing it to the data collected from the more objective and tangible archives. 
The nine interviewees for this study included two journalists from 1971, one of 
whom worked for the Dainik Bangla newspaper and one who worked for Dhaka Betar 
radio; two female human rights activists, one who participated in the war, another who 
was involved in the rehabilitation of the victims of sexual violence; two Hindu survivors 
of the war, one of them female whose father, a university professor was killed; and three 
researchers/historians who have worked extensively on the war and with victims, two of 
them academics, one a writer/activist who was formerly a member of the Pakistan army 
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and later worked with Bangladeshi law enforcement and aided in the rescue of war 
victims.  
Five of these interviews took place in the workplaces of the interviewees, one in a 
home-cum-office and three at the interviewee’s homes. Durations varied between one to 
three hours. The medium of language was both Bangla and English. All the interviews 
were digitally recorded and later transcribed directly into English. As Bryman (2012) 
notes, recording and transcribing of interviews is important to correct the natural 
limitations of memories of both the interviewer and interviewees, as well as allowing for 
repeated and more thorough examination of what people say while also allowing the data 
to be reused in other ways in the future.  
The questions were open-ended, with the aim of bringing out the respondents’ 
direct or indirect experiences of the war and in relation to religion where applicable. All 
barring one of the interviewees had lived through the war (one academic was out of the 
country for the most part); some had lost their loved ones while others had a close call 
and still others worked for the rescue and rehabilitation of the victims. Thus the 
interviews were emotionally charged and sometimes difficult. All the interviewees being 
pro-liberation and several of them practising Muslims, it was also not easy to go in with 
the question of the war rhetoric being a religious one and care had to be taken to make 
them understand that the war may not have been based on religion, especially for those 
fighting for independence, but that religion-based discourse was used to a great extent by 
those against the liberation of Bangladesh and as a result the break-up of Pakistan. The 
Muslim respondents who had lost their loved ones had greater difficulty understanding 
how the war could have been based on religion when their loved ones were also victims. 
But the religious aspect of the war was felt more keenly by the Hindu respondents, who 
felt the discrimination against them more acutely.  
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4.6 Limitations  
This research project has been limited to the anti-liberation discourse circulated in 
1971 East Pakistan only, not West Pakistan, with only a cursory look at the contents of 
one West Pakistani daily. Thus the focus is limited to the coverage and discourse in two 
daily newspapers published in East Pakistan and the propaganda used by the Pakistani 
army’s auxiliary forces comprising local collaborators in the eastern wing. It also focuses 
on the instrumentalisation of religion in the construction of a Pakistani, Muslim identity, 
and much less, if at all, on the opposing construction of the Bangali based on ethnicity 
except to demonstrate the contrast through means of Othering. It will not consider factors 
other than religion which may also have contributed to the discourse and the resulting 
war at the time. 
While the research considers acts of violence committed by the Pakistani army 
and its auxiliary forces in East Pakistan, it is beyond the scope of this work to examine 
the issue of violence against non-Bangali Muslims, commonly known as “Biharis” – 
most of whom sided with the Pakistani authorities – in East Pakistan during the war and 
soon after in newly-liberated Bangladesh. And, while I would have liked to have studied 
the continuation/resurgence of the instrumentalisation of religion in Bangladeshi socio-
politics today22 it will not be possible to do so in this project. Discursive silences are, 
however, discussed in the fourth empirical chapter of this thesis. 
																																																						
22	With	the	war	crimes	trial	underway,	such	discourses	are	vividly	alive.	This	is	also	reflected	in	the	new	
media.	An	interesting	case	in	point	is	the	social	networking	site,	Facebook	page	entitled	“Basher	Kella”	
belonging	to	pro-Jamaat-i-Islami	youth	which	has	become	a	highly	popular	avenue	for	social	and	political	
exchange	centring	on	the	politics	of	and	“against”	religion	in	general	and	the	Jamaat-i-Islami	in	particular. 
More	importantly,	religious	politics	in	Bangladesh	today	is	not	limited	to	the	traditional	religion-based	
parties.	In	the	last	decade,	particularly	since	9/11,	there	has	been	an	increasing	affiliation	of	urban,	
educated,	upper-class	youth	(as	opposed	to	the	traditionally	mostly	rural,	poor,	madrasa-educated	youth)	
with	relatively	new	religion-based,	even	extremist	groups	such	as	the	Jama’atul	Mujahideen	Bangladesh,	
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Rao et. al. (2007) note that, along with the often (self-)censored print media and 
the propaganda of the largely state-owned radio and television stations in South Asia, 
patriotic feature films, too, have played a role in countries’ ‘war efforts’.23 While these 
products are important, this study is limited to newspapers.  
In terms of methods, the main limitation, if it should be called that, of discourse 
analysis is that, as with any other qualitative research method, it is rather subjective. As 
Jorgensen and Phillips note, ‘the analyst has to work with what has actually been said or 
written, exploring patterns in and across statements and identifying the social 
consequences of different discursive representations of reality’ (2002: 21). When 
working with discourses close to oneself, it is difficult to not see them as natural, normal 
and commonsensical. In this regard, however, I am at an advantage, as the particular 
discourse I am working with is far removed from me, not only historically speaking, but 
also in “ideological” terms. There remains instead room for bias against the discourse as 
an outsider, but objective study of meticulously collected empirical data should suffice to 
prevent that to a great extent.   
With interviews and oral histories too, there always remains the ‘possibility of 
bias introduced by memory lapses and distortions’ (Grele 1998 cited in Bryman 2012: 
491). However, employment of a combination of the two methods, with primary focus 
being placed on the former, documented data subjected to careful, rigorous and 
systematic analysis, should minimise this risk. 
																																																																																																																																																																	
Ansar-al-Islam	and	Hizb-ut-Tahrir	(currently	banned	in	Bangladesh),	which	is	what	peaked	my	own	
interest	in	the	process	in	the	first	place	and	materialised	into	this	research.			
23	Sharif	et.	al.	(1998)	cite	the	Nilima	Ibrahim	Report	which	found	that	certain	programmes	telecast	
regularly	on	Dhaka	Television	‘hinder[ed]	the	Bangladesh	movement…[and]	attempted	to	engender	
feelings	of	communal	violence’	(1998:	203).	These	were	not	preserved	in	the	archives,	however,	and	thus	
not	included	in	this	research.			
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Also in terms of interviews, I faced two obstacles in terms of gaining access. 
Firstly, while I spoke to those who were pro-liberation during the war, those who were 
against it were either under trial and in prison, in hiding or else unwilling to speak to me. 
This was true even in the case of those who worked for the government’s national 
television and radio networks during the war. Whether due to fear of legal consequences 
or social stigma, these people refused to talk to me about their wartime experiences.  
The other limitation to interviews was that I did not speak with any survivors of 
sexual violence during the war, whereas the last empirical chapter is centred on the 
silence of these very women and how this contributes to, even forms, a part of the 
discourse on wartime sexual violence. First and foremost, it was difficult to gain access to 
the survivors in question and to get them to speak about their experiences. Secondly, 
however, because this research focuses on the media representation of the wartime 
discourse, I did not think it completely necessary to speak to the victims, especially at the 
cost of dredging up a painful history which they have been keeping buried for the greater 
part of 45 years. Instead, I refer to works already conducted, stories already written, oral 
histories already taken down in order to provide an understanding of what happened. 
As made obvious at the beginning of this chapter, I as a researcher am not free of 
a certain predisposition as far as this research subject is concerned. Born into independent 
Bangladesh, I am influenced by the dominant (particularly since the 1990s)24 pro-
																																																						
24	Under	a	series	of	military	regimes	from	1975-1990,	silence	surrounded	the	issue	of	the	liberation	war.	
Only	after	the	restoration	of	democracy,	with	the	establishment	of	the	Gano	Adalot	or	People’s	Tribunal	–	
a	mock	trial	of	local	collaborators	in	which	some	of	the	war-affected	related	the	experiences	they	had	
during	the	war	–	did	it	regain	momentum	in	public	discourse.	In	March	1992,	thousands	of	people,	
including	writers,	academics,	cultural	activists,	and	students,	joined	the	Ghatak	Dalal	Nirmul	Jatiya	
Samannaya	Committee	(Committee	for	the	Elimination	of	the	Killers	and	Collaborators	of	1971)	led	by	
writer	Jahanara	Imam,	and	staged	this	tribunal.	The	mock	court	tried,	convicted	and	sentenced	war	
criminals	to	death,	urging	the	government	to	bring	them	to	account.	Leading	members	of	the	committee	
were	charged	with	sedition	at	the	time,	but	these	charges	were	later	dropped.			
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liberation discourse that prevails in the country. Forty-five years after the war, the 
memory is still raw in the minds of those who lived through it, and the issue rife in public 
discourse. So much so, that Meherjaan, a film depicting the love between a Bangali 
woman and a Pakistani soldier in wartime had to be withdrawn after only a few 
screenings in 2011. Sarmila Bose’s 2011 book Dead Reckoning came under heavy 
criticism in Bangladesh for downplaying the number of casualties and atrocities 
committed by the Pakistani forces, as does British journalist David Bergman and anyone 
else who questions the number of war dead. With regard to Bose’s book, some have gone 
so far as to claim that such distortions of history were a means to influence, if not outright 
thwart, the war crimes trial which had just begun the previous year. Without giving in to 
such theories, conspiracy or not, I maintain that a war took place in which gross atrocities 
were committed for which justice must be done. I also believe it is important to scrutinise 
why and how these crimes were committed, the motivations behind them translated into 
action, in order to be able to avoid repetition of such tragedies in the future. Examining 
the role of communication is only one aspect of the war in an attempt to see how it was 
waged discursively. 
Secondly, I do not endorse the association of politics and religion. Whether or not 
the two can in fact be separated, however, is open to question. Cavanaugh (2009), for 
examples, argues that it is impossible to separate religious from economic and politics 
and that, in fact, the separation of religion and politics is an invention of the modern 
West. Religion, to me, is a personal issue which may be used by individuals as a guide to 
living their lives, not an ideology to be used and imposed by the state to make people 
who are different in many ways, conform. I am personally against the use of religion to 
political ends, be it for or against liberation or the daily governance of state and society. I 
believe that religion has the power to influence unquestioning individuals and masses in 
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ways which nothing else does. And while I think that every religion essentially teaches 
good, the concoction of such a magical potion with something as volatile as politics 
which can be good or bad, seems to me ominous. This said, whether or not it is “religion” 
per se that is used to such ends or ideological constructs which claim to be based on 
religion is a crucial issue and this study focuses on the latter, not on the use of religion in 
political violence but the ideological framing of religion as being the cause for which 
anti-liberation groups fought in 1971 Pakistan.  
As Lindlof and Taylor put it, ‘the “facts” of research can never be isolated from 
its values. Research is not – and can never be – “innocent”’ (2011: 11). This extends to 
seemingly objective data as well, for as Adrian Holliday puts it, ‘the written study itself 
takes on an agency of its own’ (2007: 91), expressing a reality which distorts the social 
world from which the data is taken and that unlike culture and society, data can be 
manipulated. It is, however, not enough to leave data in its rawest possible state, argues 
Holliday, for example, in the form of quotes and interview transcripts, but that the 
researcher needs to appreciate the fact that the data is different from the social reality 
from which it was taken, and that it is the responsibility of the researcher to show, 
through the workings of the research, how the data has been constructed, and thirdly, 
when raw data is presented, it must carry with it the argument of the researcher in order 
to show its meaning and significance.  
With that being said, I believe that having worked for over a decade as a journalist 
and for half of that time also as an academic, I have been trained to look at all sides of 
any story and I am confident that I have been able to set aside my presuppositions and 
take an objective, professional approach towards my work. It is true that I had a more or 
less clear idea of what I was looking for – the use of religion-based discourse in the 
legitimisation of war. However, at the risk of being too thorough, the nearly 1,000 
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examples which I have found to support my hypothesis, many of which will be referred 
to in the empirical chapters that follow, show that it was not unfounded. As Holliday 
(2007) says, the presence of the researcher in the research is unavoidable and should 
rather be treated as a resource and that is what I attempt to do here, putting to use not 
only my academic knowledge and skills, but also my personal, social and cultural 
understanding of the subject and the society on which I write.  
I draw on Jorgensen and Phillips (2002) in their observation that the researcher 
always takes a position in relation to the field of study, that that position may influence 
what they view as results and that these same results may look different from another 
position for it cannot be determined ‘who is sufficiently liberated from the discursive 
construction of the world to make [the] distinction’ (2002: 22) between what is and is not 
ideological. However, I also draw confidence from their position that ‘it is the stringent 
application of theory and method that legitimises scientifically produced knowledge’ and 
that ‘it is by seeing the world through a particular theory that we can distance ourselves 
from some of our taken-for-granted understandings and subject our material to other 
questions than we would be able to do from an everyday perspective’ (ibid: 22-23).   
In the next four chapters I present the empirical findings and their analysis, 
showing how through the media’s discursive framing of religious ideology, the nation 
and nationalism were constructed and identities were formed in order to legitimise 
violence on the part of the “good Muslim Pakistani” against the “evil Hindu enemy”. 	
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CHAPTER 5 
SACRED NATION: 
THE RELIGION-BASED DISCOURSE OF PAKISTAN’S BIRTH, SURVIVAL AND 
UNITY 
The chameleon-like beauty of nationalism allows for the creation of a civic religion of the 
people and aspirations ‘to build Jerusalem’ in every kind of society, using the sacred 
legacies and ethnic traditions of their different pasts. –Anthony D. Smith 
 
[A person’s] greatest yearning is for an ideology for which he should be able to lay down 
his life. –Ayub Khan 
 
In 1762, French philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau introduced the term ‘civil 
religion’ in an attempt to understand ‘the role of religion within a framework of 
Enlightenment thinking’ (Hvithamar and Warburg 2009: 2). To Rousseau, civil religion 
meant ‘political religion’, and may be defined as a ‘deliberate justification of citizen’s 
solidarity with their state by referring to higher, unquestionable principles’ (ibid) and 
those who challenge and thus prove disloyal to the state may be punished through violent 
means, even death, ‘not because they are heretics to the religious tenets of Rousseau’s 
civil religion, but because they are subversive to the state’ (ibid). While this was never 
implemented in full historically, Hvithamar and Warburg use one of the first modern 
definitions of nation as given by Ernest Renan in 1882 – ‘a soul, a spiritual principle. 
Only two things, actually, constitute this soul, this spiritual principle. One is in the past, 
the other is in the present’ (Renan cited in Hvithamar and Warburg 2009: 6) – to point 
out the relationship between nation and religion. Not only are there parallels between the 
two, such as ‘the transcendence of the nation, the imagination of a community with a 
common past and future and the willingness of individuals to commit themselves to the 
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nation’ (Hvithamar and Warburg 2009: 6), but nationalism also borrows from religious 
symbols, myths and rituals. Thus it may be said that religion and nation have always run 
hand in hand, whether in incorporating the first into the second, or else in terms of 
refusing to do so.  
The concept of civil religion suggests a more deliberate, formal incorporation of 
religion into the idea of the imagined nation. As Cristi (2009) elaborates:  
Civil religion consists of a set of social and cultural principles, values and rituals oriented 
toward the civil and political order. The religious aspect might be derived from attempts 
to infuse the civil order with a transcendent purpose and legitimacy by using explicitly 
religious symbols, often rooted in the dominant religion of the nation. Conversely, the 
religious dimension might be based in mutually meaningful public rituals and symbols 
that come to be seen as sacred by members of the group. (2009: 48-49) 
 
Pakistan is a classic case of a nation intentionally using the concept of civil 
religion in its construction of nationhood. Furthermore, drawing on Anthony D. Smith’s 
categorisation of three principles of ‘sacred cultural community’ as discussed in Chapter 
3 – the hierarchical, the covenantal and the civic – Pakistan could be classified as a 
combination of the first two.  
Cristi (2009) elaborates on the power of civil religion ‘to mobilise political 
support on the grounds of faith’ in a number of ways: through leaders employing state 
machinery such as political speeches and solemn occasions and instruments of coercion 
such as legislation and education to compel people to be patriotic and support a particular 
course of action; the manipulation of symbols, rituals and principles of a civic faith to 
legitimise the political order and inspire loyalty; and the shaping of the understanding of 
civil religion by political leaders to advance their own agendas.  
It is worth mentioning here that, while it is an underlying theme, this study is not 
about “political Islam”. Political Islam has been described as a ‘modern phenomenon that 
seeks to use religion to shape the political system’ and that ‘its origins lie in the perceived 
failure of the secular ideologies of nationalism and socialism to deliver on their promises 
		 109	
of anti-imperialist prosperity’, providing ‘a conceptual alternative that was purportedly 
based on the teachings of faith’ (Akbarzadeh 2012: 1). Even though the specific term 
may not have been used to describe the situation during that time – rather, Pakistani 
politicians and the press seem to be focused on promoting a unique notion of “Islamic 
nationalism” as will be shown below – the political situation as reflected in the media 
studied here is in line with modern-day definitions of political Islam. This and the 
following chapters will demonstrate how the Pakistani ruling elite and East Pakistan’s 
anti-liberation forces attempted to integrate faith/Islam into all aspects of politics and 
society in Pakistan through the construction of discourse. It will show how Islam was 
used a tool of nation-building, in an attempt to unite the population, to strengthen 
nationalism and patritotism and to act as panacea to all the nation’s problems. Indeed, the 
rallying cry of “Islam is the solution” as described by Akbarzadeh (2012) as capturing the 
overall mood of political Islam is a key element of this discourse as will be shown below. 
This chapter will show how the concept or discourse of civil religion is reinforced 
by the media in Pakistan as reflected in the Dainik Sangram and Dainik Pakistan 
newspapers during Bangladesh’s war of liberation – not as a state ideology imposed from 
above where even coercion is legitimised as conceived by Rousseau, but as a 
‘spontaneous, non-coercive expression of popular self-identity’, ‘a consensual and 
cultural phenomenon’ (Cristi 2009: 51) as understood by Durkheim. Using two of Louis 
Althusser’s key ideological state apparatuses – religion and media, or as one in the form 
of religion in media, the chapter demonstrates how the state attempts to take hegemonic 
control over people’s belief in the power of their all-important Pakistani Muslim identity 
and their defence of the united Islamic state of Pakistan.   
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5.1 Pakistan, Nation and Religion 
Husain Haqqani in his book Pakistan: between mosque and military writes: 
‘Since the country’s inception, Pakistan’s leaders have played upon religious sentiment as 
an instrument of strengthening Pakistan’s identity. Under ostensibly pro-Western rulers, 
Islam has been the rallying cry against perceived Indian threats’ (2005: 2). Haqqani says 
the relationship between mosque and military in Pakistan was built over time, with the 
‘political commitment to an ideological state gradually evolv[ing] into a strategic 
commitment to jihadi ideology’ (ibid: 3).  
From as early on as the 1945-1946 elections, religious rhetoric played a major 
role, with the rural Muslim masses being made to feel that if a Muslim state was 
established, they would all become better Muslims (Haqqani 2005). Not only did 
Pakistan’s Father of the Nation Qaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah make use of 
religious symbols and slogans in his speeches, but use was also made of religious 
emotions by the ulema (Islamic scholars) and other religious figures and their supporters 
with a rather simple message: Muslims voted for the Muslim League and would go to 
heaven, kafirs (non-believers) voted against Muslim League and would go to hell (ibid). 
The ‘argument in favor of creating Pakistan [reduced] to a simple question of survival of 
Islam on the South Asian continent’ (ibid: 9) was carried on into 1971, where keeping 
East and West Pakistan united meant the same thing – the survival of Islam. On the eve 
of independence, Jinnah had reportedly called to keep religion out of politics, but his 
contradictory messages pre- and post-Partition apparently left his followers confused or 
divided and his successors chose to define Pakistani national identity through religious 
symbolism (ibid). ‘The fears of dilution of Muslim identity that had defined the demand 
for carving Pakistan out of India became the new nation-state’s identity, reinforced over 
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time through the education system and constant propaganda’ (ibid: 14) and this 
phenomenon was very much in play well into the war of 1971.   
As Haqqani notes in the context of 1971,  
The Pakistani military projected the conflict in East Pakistan as a counterinsurgency 
drive, and at home the troops were presented as mujahideen fighting the enemies of 
Islam. Propaganda emanating from West Pakistan also focused on the Hindu influence 
and the actions of anti-Muslim forces as responsible for the crisis in the eastern wing. 
(Haqqani 2005: 76)  
 
Interestingly, Haqqani argues that while throughout Pakistan’s history the greatest threats 
to its central authority came from groups seeking regional autonomy, ethnic rights, or 
political inclusion, ‘successive Pakistani governments linked these threats to either an 
Indian-inspired plan to weaken Pakistan or “communists”’ (2005: 16). As a result, ‘The 
civil-military complex adapted the ideology of Pakistan to mean demonization of India’s 
Brahmin Hinduism and a zealous hostility toward India. Domestic political groups 
demanding provincial autonomy or ethnic rights were invariably accused of advancing an 
Indian agenda to dismember or weaken Pakistan’ (ibid: 37). The media, for its part, as 
directed by the Information Ministry ‘mobilized a propaganda drive to create the spectre 
of Islam and Pakistan being in danger, polarizing the country between Islam Pasand 
(Islam loving) on the one hand and communists, socialists, and secularists on the other’ 
(Haqqani 2005: 55). 
 
5.2 Religion-based Discourse as a Nation-building Tool 
As discussed in detail in Chapter 2, the political rationale of the 1947 Partition of 
India was positioned around a discourse of religion, resulting in the creation of Hindu-
majority India and Muslim-majority Pakistan. But when Bengal/East Pakistan was 
neglected politically and economically, the focus of the movement shifted to culture. 
However, the resistance was given a religious spin. The central government of West 
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Pakistan claimed it was ‘anti-Islamic’ and that there was an Indian ‘conspiracy to 
disintegrate Pakistan’ afoot (Hossain and Khan 2006: 330, Murshid 1993).  
 
5.2a Honouring the past 
Broadly speaking, the anti-liberation discourse of the war of 1971 portrayed the 
war as one between Pakistan and India, that is, Muslims and Hindus. In order to reinforce 
this argument, not only was the Hindu-Muslim divide of 1971 emphasised but so was the 
clash of the two civilisations in general, from as far back as ancient history to as recently 
as the India-Pakistan wars of the 1960s. Most attention in the media discourses, however, 
was paid to the Partition of 1947, which gave birth to both India and Pakistan based on 
the two-nation (based on two religions) theory.  In 1971, the Pakistani media studied here 
made repeated references to the birth of Pakistan as an Islamic state based on Islamic 
ideology for Muslims and gained through the sacrifice of “lakhs [hundreds of thousands] 
of Muslims” (specifically 20 lakh, according to news published on August 11 and 14, 
1971 in the Dainik Sangram) in the 1940s and leading up to Partition. 
“We achieved this nation at the cost of the sacrifice of lakhs and lakhs of 
Muslims. In fact this is why we lost our rule over India. The sacrifice of lakhs and lakhs 
of souls cannot go in vain” (Dainik Sangram 6 April 1971, p. 1). Through this sacrifice 
Pakistan was gained as a “homeland for Muslims” (Dainik Sangram 30 April 1971, p. 2) 
and “falling prey to the deception” of Indian Bangalis is said to be “disrespectful” to the 
martyrs (Dainik Sangram 20 April 1971, p. 2). The repeated reference to large numbers 
amplifies the event, the word ‘sacrifice’ suggests what must be done, and statements such 
as not letting it go in vain or not falling prey to deception tells the reader how to deal with 
the situation. Gazi (1971), a columnist for the Dainik Sangram, in an impassioned op-ed 
piece, writes about the reason for the sacrifice of lakhs of Muslims – “for a Pakistan 
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where Islamic ideology would be the basis of justice and truth, where people wouldn’t 
exploit people, where there would be no torture, injustice and adultery, where Islam’s 
flag of victory would fly forever high” (Dainik Sangram 28 May 1971, p. 2). Using such 
descriptions, the media create an image of a perfect nation that was worth fighting for 
then and is thus still worth defending now. 
The image of the blood of “lakhs of innocent Muslims” that was shed (Dainik 
Sangram 19 June 1971, p. 2) is often invoked, portraying a (correct) image of a bloody 
war of Partition, but where only Muslims are deemed ‘innocent’. Not only blood but 
“honour” (of women) was also sacrificed (Dainik Sangram 18 July 1971, p. 2) making it 
seem even more imperative to uphold the values for which the sacrifices were made. 
According to a news published in the Dainik Sangram on August 7, sacrifices were made 
in order to implement an Islamic way of life in a time when humanity was in crisis 
(Dainik Sangram 7 August 1971, p. 3) and, according to another news published on 
August 14, the crores who made those sacrifices are willing to do so again in order “to 
uphold Pakistan’s ideology and unity” (Dainik Sangram 14 August 1971, p. 1). Yet 
another news item published on the same day, Pakistan’s independence day, quotes the 
Ameer of the Jamaat-i-Islami in East Pakistan Ghulam Azam talking about the immense 
sacrifices made in order to establish a state based on the Quran and Sunnah and that such 
sacrifices cannot go in vain (Dainik Sangram 14 August 1971, p. 1). A poem describes 
the sacrifice in terms of Muslims wanting to uphold God’s religion in their beloved holy 
land (Dainik Sangram 20 August 1971, p. 2) while another article talks about defending 
the freedom of Pakistan gained in exchange for the blood of lakhs of Muslims as a 
holy/sacred responsibility (Dainik Sangram 20 August 1971, p. 4). According to the 
media discourse then, defending the nation is not only a national or patriotic duty but a 
holy duty, for the ultimate goal is the establishment of an Islamic way of life. 
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Other news stories use references from the past in order to inspire the present:  
Lakhs of Muslims were martyred, handicapped, and separated from their homes and their 
relatives and loved ones. They answered to the call of Islamic brotherhood and rose 
above self-interest, narrow-mindedness and regionalism, sacrificing their lives and 
property and Pakistan was gained as a result of this. Remembering that Pakistan was not 
established due to geographical but ideological reasons, come let us look within 
ourselves, if we have been able to do what was right by lakhs of sacrifices. Those men 
and women made sacrifices in order to guarantee that Islamic way of life could be 
established here throughout the ages. Come, let’s re-devote ourselves to implementing 
Islamic ideology. Islam zinda hota hain har karbala ke baad. (Dainik Sangram 11 
September 1971, p. 1)  
 
The last line comes from an Urdu poem by renowned Urdu poet, philosopher and 
politician Allama M. Iqbal and means that Islam gains life after every Karbala. It is often 
cited in the newspapers studied, presumably to remind Muslims of the Battle of Karbala25 
often recounted in Shia Islamic literature in particular but also Muslim literature in 
general, and to imbibe in them a similar spirit of sacrifice and martyrdom, which will be 
the subject of Chapter 7. But through this repeated drawing on the past, from Karbala to 
Partition, links are made to the present suggesting that the current battle may also be 
viewed as a religious war, thereby justifying violence, sacrifice and martyrdom.  
As Islam (1971c), a columnist for the Dainik Sangram, writes in an op-ed piece in 
the Dainik Sangram with some finality and seeming logic: “After 200 years of struggle 
and in exchange for the warm blood of 20 lakh Muslims Pakistan was established, thus 
the people will not betray the blood of lakhs of martyrs and sell their independence to 
conspiring Brahmin India” (Dainik Sangram 27 October 1971). 
 
 
																																																						
25	Very	famous	early	battle	fought	in	an	area	South	West	of	Baghdad	between	the	tiny	army	of	supporters	
of	al-Husayn	b.	Ali	and	the	overwhelming	forces	of	the	Umayyads	commanded	by	‘Umar	b.	Sa	‘d,	in	680.	
Al-Husayn	and	his	few	companions	were	defeated	and	massacred.	The	circumstances	of	the	night	before	
the	battle,	and	the	battle	itself,	have	become	invested	with	much	legend.	The	battle	took	place	on	the	
tenth	day	of	the	Muslim	month	of	al-Muharram	and	this	day	each	year	is	held	to	be	particularly	sacred,	
especially	by	Shi’	ites	(Netton	1997).	
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5.2b Pakistan: A homeland for Muslims 
The Pakistani newspapers analysed here made clear the country was created for 
Muslims, belonged to them and was a homeland for Muslims, both Pakistani and from 
around the world, indeed, that it was the home of Islam. This was underlined in a news 
story in Dainik Sangram citing East Pakistan Jamaat-i-Islami Ameer Ghulam Azam as 
describing the sacrifice of crores of Indian Muslims for Pakistan in which he ends with a 
prayer to the Almighty to allow its people to always live as true Pakistanis and true 
Muslims and to keep Pakistan forever as the “home of Islam” (Dainik Sangram 14 April 
1971, p. 1) and as a “home of Islam for Muslims around the world” (Dainik Sangram 26 
September 1971, p. 1). In fact, Azam even defends East Pakistanis in a way by saying, 
“Nowhere in the world are there so many Muslims in one place and neither are there 
more pious Muslims. Thus it would be wrong to blame East Pakistani Muslims for the 
situation created by the last 23 years of misrule.” (Dainik Sangram 14 September 1971, 
p. 2). Through removing the blame from East Pakistanis, i.e., Muslims, he basically 
places it squarely on the shoulders of “the Other”, Indian Hindus.  
Khaleque (1971), a columnist for the Dainik Sangram, writes in an opinion piece 
about the Muslims of Pakistan fighting the “Hitlerish” Hindus to gain Pakistan, 
sacrificing their lives for freedom, and that Pakistan “belongs to Muslims and as long as 
there are Muslims here no evil intrigues will succeed” (Dainik Sangram 14 April 1971, p. 
2). Jamaat-i-Islami leader Farid Ahmed prays to Allah for the security of “the homeland 
of Islam, Pakistan” (Dainik Sangram 16 April 1971, p. 1). Another Jamaat-i-Islami leader 
Solaiman claims that “Pakistan was created as a separate homeland for Muslims in order 
to free them from Hindu exploitation and persecution” (Dainik Sangram 7 May 1971, p. 
1) while president of the Pakistan Democratic Party (PDP) Nurul Amin says “Pakistan 
was created as a safe and separate homeland for the Muslims of the subcontinent” 
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(Dainik Sangram 13 May 1971, p. 1). It is through this discourse propagated via key 
political leaders that religion and nation are made to seem as one.  
To enhance the point, Mujahid (1971a), a columnist for the Dainik Sangram, 
writes in an op-ed article that Pakistan was not born for the people of any particular 
language but for the Muslims of the subcontinent (Dainik Sangram, 17 July 1971, p. 2). 
Politician and educationist Abul Qashem says “Pakistan was created so that the Muslims 
being ruled by the Hindus of the subcontinent could have a separate homeland and so that 
they could form their lives and society according to Islamic rule” (Dainik Sangram 17 
August 1971, p. 5) while President of (Pakistan-controlled) Azad Kashmir Khan Abdul 
Quayyum argues along similar lines: “Pakistan was gained on the basis of two-nation 
theory, even the Muslims who remained in India voted for Pakistan. Thus if we take the 
path of socialism and secularism like India did, then there is no meaning in having our 
separate homeland.” (Dainik Sangram 28 July 1971, p. 3). In other articles, Pakistan is 
also referred to as ‘Darul Islam’ or the house of Islam and those who revolt against an 
Islamic state are labelled rebels against Islam. (Dainik Sangram 24 July 1971, p. 4). For 
example, in a news item published in the Dainik Pakistan, Commerce and Industries 
Minister Akhtar Uddin, in describing Pakistan as a homeland for Muslims says, “God 
forbid, if Pakistan is destroyed then Muslims will lose their separate characteristics and 
be locked in the chains of Hindu slavery” (Dainik Pakistan 27 September 1971, p. 6) and 
in another news around the time when the war was drawing to an end, it is stated rather 
forebodingly that “No sacrifice will be considered too great to defend Pakistan the 
homeland of Muslims” (Dainik Pakistan 8 December 1971, p. 2). 
Using religion-based discourse, the Dainik Pakistan and especially the Dainik 
Sangram, constructed Pakistan as a nation borne of the sacrifice of countless Muslims 
against evil Hindu oppression and as the homeland of Muslims in Pakistan and around 
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the world. This in turn justifies the defence of Pakistan not only as a nation but as a home 
of Islam, using whatever means may be necessary.  
 
5.2c Sanctifying the nation 
One of the interesting themes that came across in the analysis of the data is that 
not only is a strong link constructed between the nation and religion, Pakistan and Islam 
in the media under study, but the two are also made literally inseparable, so much so that 
the nation itself becomes sacred.  
In an article in the Dainik Sangram, the author writes that Islamic ideology and 
Muslim nationalism are said to be the basic foundations of Pakistan (Dainik Sangram 2 
July, 14 September 1971, p. 2), Pakistan is said to have been gained based on Islam 
(Dainik Sangram 14 August 1971, supplement p. 2), in the name of Islam (Dainik 
Sangram 16 September 1971, p. 3, Dainik Sangram 2 October 1971, p. 1), that it should 
be based on Islam (Dainik Sangram 24 August 1971, p. 1) and can only survive on Islam 
(Dainik Sangram 16 September 1971, p. 5). President Yahya Khan in his Eid speech 
prays for the country’s strength and solidarity “so that Pakistan can always serve Islam” 
(Dainik Pakistan 20 November 1971, p. 1).  
As such, protecting Pakistan is the same as protecting Islam, as Hamidi (1971), a 
columnist for the Dainik Sangram writes in an op-ed article and beseeches God, 
“Pakistan was created in your name, you protect it, save it from the clutches of the 
enemy, make it a pillar of light of Islam” (Dainik Sangram 3 November 1971, p. 2). In 
this way, there is no separating Islam from Pakistan, thus appealing to all Muslims to 
defend a united Pakistan as part of their duties as Muslims. As Syed Mohammad Afzal, a 
member of the Shanti Committee claims, Pakistan was created to protect Islam and 
“Muslims cannot even think of destroying this country and separating” (Dainik Sangram 
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26 July 1971, p. 3), implying that those who are pro-liberation are either non-Muslim or 
against Islam.  
Broadly speaking, the media discourse elevates Pakistan to a holy nation. The 
language used refers to Pakistan directly as “holy land” (Dainik Sangram 15 April 1971, 
p. 3, Dainik Sangram 2 July 1971, p. 10), “sacred land” (Dainik Sangram 11 October 
1971, p. 5, Dainik Pakistan 18 May, p. 2, 8 December, p. 4) and “holy motherland” (6 
September 1971, p. 1). Dainik Sangram declares “All areas of Islam’s durgo Pakistan… 
are sacred like a mosque… [which] every Muslim of Pakistan must be inspired to 
defend...” (Dainik Sangram 30 November 1971, p. 2). Pakistan is frequently labelled a 
“durgo” (citadel, fort, castle) of Islam (Dainik Sangram 19 August 1971, p. 1, 30 October 
1971, p. 6, Dainik Pakistan 8 December 1971, p. 4) and those trying to destroy it are 
branded the enemies of Islam (Dainik Sangram 17 September 1971, p. 1). The use of the 
word “durgo” conjures up an image of something not only big, strong and invincible but 
also something to be defended. The news article published in Dainik Sangram on October 
30, Badr Day26, again quotes Jamaat-i-Islami leader Ghulam Azam describing Pakistan as 
a fort for Islam being threatened by foreign and local enemies and that a fitting 
observance of the day will revive Islamic and jihadist spirit in people. On the occasion of 
Eid-e-Miladunnabi, the birthday of Prophet Muhammad, the President in his speech 
describes Pakistan as an ideological state and “a proud and indestructible column of 
Islam” (Dainik Sangram 8 May 1971, p. 1).  
																																																						
26	Badr	Day	was	an	observance	of	the	Battle	of	Badr	in	624,	the	first	military	victory	of	the	Muslim	
community	of	Medina	against	a	superior	force	of	Meccans	(Adamec	2009).	It	is	seen	as	the	Prophet	
Muhammad’s	first	major	victory	and	turning	point	in	his	career.	Various	Quranic	verses	are	associated	
with	Badr,	including	8:9-12,	in	which	God	promises	help	for	those	who	fight	in	His	cause,	the	battle	itself	
portrayed	as	a	sign	of	God’s	support	(Nanji	2008).	Badr	Day	was	celebrated	with	great	fervour	by	religious	
parties	in	Pakistan	and	frequent	reference	is	made	to	the	battle	as	an	inspiration	for	the	ongoing	war,	as	
another	war	between	Muslims	and	non-Muslims	where	the	former	will	again	be	victorious.	
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The idea of Pakistan being a gift from God or being a legacy of God given to 
Muslims is also frequently used in “sanctifying” the nation. This comes across in a 
transcript of a radio programme in the Dainik Sangram which states: “Pakistan was 
established as the greatest Muslim state in the world… This Pakistan is the world 
Muslims’ stronghold. This Pakistan is a gift from God to the whole Muslim world” 
(Dainik Sangram 8 September 1971, p. 3). On other occasions, Pakistan is often referred 
to as having been created by God’s wishes (Dainik Sangram 20 May 1971, p. 2) and as 
Allah’s sacred “amaanat” (Dainik Sangram 27 May 1971, p. 2, 18 July 1971, p. 2, 16 
September 1971, p. 2), something placed in the custody of someone, in this case, the 
Muslims of Pakistan. The paper uses phrases, such as, “The sacred land of divine rule 
Pakistan”, “Allah’s home” and that “ungodly cowards have attacked Allah’s sacred 
home” (Dainik Sangram 16 November 1971, p. 2).  
Slogans used at pro-Pakistan events such as rallies or in speeches by political 
leaders in 1971 also often employed religious terms. The slogan “la ilaha illallah” 
meaning “there is no deity but God/Allah” is often used as a nationalist slogan for 
Pakistan, claiming that Pakistan was founded based on this motto, that it is its origin or 
source (Dainik Sangram 1971, 5 May p. 1, 6 July p. 3, 13 August p. 1, 20 August 20 p. 2) 
while its ideology and foundation is said to be the kalima27 tayyiba (Dainik Sangram 13 
August 1971, p. 1, 17 August 1971, p. 2). The powerful cry of “narae taqbeer/Allahu 
akbar” or “Allah is great” (Aug 4, p. 4, Aug 20, p. 2) is also frequently used, and thus, 
repeatedly invokes religion in the defence of the nation. This makes the purpose and 
																																																						
27	The	kalima	is	the	affirmation	of	faith	in	Islam	that	“There	is	no	God	but	Allah	and	Muhammad	is	his	
Messenger.”	It	comprises	six	texts	containing	the	fundamentals	of	Islam,	memorised	and	recited	by	
Muslims	(Nanji	2008).	
		 120	
motivation of fighting for the nation even more significant and more powerful, which 
ultimately justifies any means necessary to do so, including the use of violence.  
In other instances, the paper suggests that Pakistan, being a sacred nation, means 
it has to be defended against un-Islamic elements. For example, an editorial terms 
Pakistan as the world’s greatest Muslim nation being conspired against by Christians 
(Dainik Sangram 15 March 1971, p. 2) and by Indian intrigues (Dainik Sangram 11 April 
1971, p. 2) while Jews are said to be “Muslim-haters trying to eliminate Muslims from 
East Pakistan and destroying the world’s largest Muslim state Pakistan which raises its 
voice against Israel” (Dainik Sangram 8 November 1971, p. 2). “Hyenas” are said to be 
trying to break up Pakistan into pieces and it must be saved at any cost as the future of 80 
crore Muslims of the world depends on it (Dainik Sangram 30 April 1971, p. 2). Because 
the world’s largest Muslim nation is about to lead the united Muslim world, conspiring 
Christians, Jews, Hindus and atheists are said to be trying to destroy it (Dainik Sangram 7 
July 1971, p. 2). The “world’s greatest Islamic state Pakistan is the fruit of countless 
sacrifices of Islamic scholars” (Dainik Sangram 29 September 1971, p. 2) and the 
Krishak-Sramik League Party’s president and a member of the Central Peace Committee, 
Solaiman, is quoted as saying “the Muslims of Bengal will make every sacrifice 
necessary to protect the world’s largest Muslim nation” (Dainik Sangram 7 May 1971, p. 
1). 
 
5.2d The ideology that is Pakistan 
From its very inception Pakistan was promoted as an ideological state, even an 
ideology in itself, and that ideology was Islam. Indeed, as Haqqani (2005) argues, Islam, 
hostility to India and the Urdu language were the cornerstones of this ideology. However, 
the media discourse in 1971, while hostile to India in general, was focused on Islamic 
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ideology as the mainstay of the nation. The analysis showed repeated references to this in 
the media of 1971 examined here: Jamaat-i-Islami leader Khan Sabur is quoted as saying, 
“Pakistan is an ideological state and its ideology is only Islam” (Dainik Sangram, 8 June 
1971, p. 4). Another political leader Khwaja Khairuddin is quoted as saying, “Pakistan 
was created on the basis of Islamic ideology and Islam is a complete life guideline. 
Pakistan’s nationality is not based on language and geography. If the ideological values 
on which Pakistan was gained are not implemented then there is no point in Pakistan 
surviving” (Dainik Sangram, 11 June 1971, p. 1).  
Repeated emphasis is placed on the fact that the creation of Pakistan did not 
centre around any language (indicating Bangla and Bangalis) but was based on Islamic 
ideology “as a separate Muslim homeland. Thus those who do not like Quran- and 
Sunnah-based rule should leave this country” (Dainik Sangram, 17 July 1971, p. 2). 
Education minister Abbas Ali Khan says, “Pakistan does not belong to any clan or 
community, rather, it is the result of consolidated efforts of the Muslims of the sub-
continent. When fighting for Pakistan against Hindus and the English, it was made clear 
that this country was not being gained for Bangali, Punjabi, Sindhi, Beluchi, Pathans, but 
for Islam” (Dainik Sangram, 10 November 1971, p. 1). Haq (1971) writes in an op-ed,  
Hindu India always tried to destroy Muslims. This is why under the leadership of Qaid e 
Azam, 10 crore Muslims struggled and sacrificed for the security of the honour and faith, 
wealth and life of Muslims and created Pakistan, the basis of which were separate 
elections, Muslim nationhood and Islamic ideology and brotherhood. (Dainik Sangram, 
25 July 1971, p. 2)  
 
Such media discourses leave no room for doubt that Pakistan was founded on and in 
Islamic ideology and that this is what keeps it together. A quote by Bangali politician 
Abul Hashim published in the Dainik Sangram runs thus:  
Islamic ideology brought together the Muslims of the Pak-India subcontinent to establish 
Pakistan and this is the life philosophy and spirit that have kept Pakistan’s unity and 
solidarity intact. The foundation of Pakistan’s national solidarity and the life force of its 
state identity is this ideological spirit. (Dainik Sangram, 2 July 1971, p. 9)  
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Sadek, a columnist for the Dainik Sangram, in a series of articles on the crisis of culture 
dedicates a whole article to the subject of ideology. According to him, ideological people 
do not believe in identifying themselves in terms of nation, language, race, which is a 
practice of nationalism and is sacrilege, but rather in their religion lies their ideological 
life system and philosophy. He says that the foundation of Pakistan is not Bangali 
nationalism but Islamic ideology and it is this ideology, religion, “force of faith” only 
which unites two parts of a country otherwise separated by language, geography, etc.     
In a country that was created on the basis of the two-nation theory, Islam as 
ideology is made to seem indispensable to the well-being of the nation. Jamaat-i-Islami 
leader Ghulam Azam is quoted as saying, “The two parts of Pakistan can only be kept 
united with the ideology with which Pakistan was born” (Dainik Sangram, 20 June 1971, 
p. 1). He writes that those who oppose this ideology are not friends of Pakistan and calls 
to the government to arm the people who believe in the country’s ideology and solidarity. 
This essentially means that those who believe in Islam, Muslims, should be armed to 
fight. Governor Rakhman Gul is quoted as saying, “Islamic ideology is an indispensable 
condition for the existence of the nation. Pakistan was established in exchange for many 
sacrifices and only Islamic consciousness can unite Muslims as one people” (Dainik 
Sangram, 2 August 1971, p. 3). 
Islamic ideology is represented as the foundation of Pakistan’s philosophy and 
culture. For example, Sadek, columnist for the Dainik Sangram, in an op-ed piece about 
Bangla language and the Bangali people of East Pakistan points out that this identity 
should not be confused with that of “idol-worshippers”, i.e., Hindus. Those who live in 
Pakistan are Pakistani and their identity and ideology should be reflected in their culture 
based on Islamic philosophy and ideology, he writes (Dainik Sangram, 4 July 1971, p. 4). 
Pakistan’s rulers made every effort to disregard differences of culture and ethnicity 
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among its citizens which could give rise to nationalism and focused on religion as the 
sole unifying factor of its population, promoting an “Islamic nationalism” instead.  
The state of Pakistan is glorified with qualities such as equality and brotherhood 
(Dainik Sangram, 6 July 1971, p. 3); where Islam and the Quran are the basis of 
Pakistan’s ideology (Dainik Sangram, 28 July 1971, p. 3) and socialism, capitalism, 
secularism and communism are presented as opposed to Pakistan’s basic ideology 
(Dainik Sangram, 8 October 1971, p. 3). In an article published on Pakistan’s 
Independence Day, Sifatullah (1971), columnist for the Dainik Sangram, writes,  
Allah’s endless mercy has saved the people from the hands of destruction and is testing 
the people about the establishment of its ideology. The success of this exam depends on 
the defence of the people’s unity and solidarity… Today every Pakistani must be vigilant 
in protecting their ideological foundation. Every citizen must be made aware of the 
ideology. The above has proven beyond doubt that Pakistan was gained only on the basis 
of Islam and only the implementation of Islamic ideology can keep it alive. (Dainik 
Sangram, 14 August 1971, supplement p. 3)  
 
Letters to the editor also carry the same theme, thus creating a sense of acceptance 
of ideological interpellation.28 For example, in a letter to the editor, Shahidul Islam 
Mollik writes that a non-religious education system has caused the youth to drift from 
Pakistan’s ideology and that “Indian Brahmin imperialist conspiracy will fail in the face 
of Islamic education, the ideology Pakistan was created upon will be reborn and the 
country will become strong and prosperous” (Dainik Sangram, 27 August 1971, p. 2). 
Pakistan’s ideology is not only the Father of the Nation Jinnah’s but also, more 
importantly, the Prophet Muhammad’s ideology (Dainik Sangram, 2 May 1971, p. 1), 
“the complete way of life of Islam as bestowed by Allah” (Dainik Sangram, 16 
September 1971, p. 2). Sadek (1971c) writes, “The main tenets of our ideology lie in 
Allah’s words, the Quran, and we have seen its practical reflection in the life of the 
																																																						
28	This	study	does	not	include	audience	research,	however,	thus	making	it	impossible	to	judge	effects	on	
the	audience.		
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Prophet” (Dainik Sangram, 11 July 1971, p. 4). As if references to Islam as the ideology 
of Pakistan are not enough, it is related directly to the life of the Prophet and the words of 
Allah, in an attempt to make the ideology and in turn the concept of Pakistan, 
unquestionable. 
In this respect, Pakistani army General Atiq is quoted as saying, “Pakistan will be 
destroyed if it is removed from its ideology. Its birth was based on ideology and it will 
survive on ideology” (Dainik Sangram, 29 September 1971, p. 3). The people’s survival, 
in turn, depends on the survival of Pakistan: “If Pakistan lives, we will live, we will be 
able to defend our existence as a people. Our faith, happiness, growth are all dependent 
on the existence of Pakistan” (Dainik Sangram, 19 October 1971, p. 3). As such, as the 
analysis shows, the discursive process is constructed such that, the people’s contentment, 
faith, even existence, depend on Pakistan, and Pakistan’s depends on the ideology of 
Islam, making religion and the nation, or a religious nation, seem indispensable for the 
people. 
 
5.2e Islam as panacea 
Whereas Pakistan’s prosperity is dependent on following the ideology on which it 
was founded, the nation’s troubles are seen as arising out of neglect of that ideology, the 
lack of Islamic policy in the country and to the apathy towards Islam as a whole, 
according to the media discourse studied here (Dainik Sangram 2 July 1971, p. 2, Dainik 
Pakistan 10 August 1971, p. 6). 
For example, in a commentary in the Dainik Sangram, Jamaat-i-Islami Ghulam 
Azam says,  
It was with the objective of living life according to the kalima tayyiba that Pakistan was 
created by dividing the subcontinent. But in the last 23 years we have disobeyed Allah 
and forgotten the leadership of the Prophet and this is why troubles and disaster have 
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befallen us and no one but Allah can bring us peace. (Dainik Sangram, 21 May 1971, p. 
1)  
 
In another news report, he is quoted as saying,  
It is because we have neglected the ideology on which Pakistan was established that such 
unfortunate incidents have arisen in East Pakistan. The subcontinent’s Muslims were not 
forced but wanted a separate homeland. But our leaders betrayed that ideology. (Dainik 
Sangram, 21 June 1971, p. 1)  
 
Essentially then, not following Islam in a separate homeland created for Muslims is said 
to be a betrayal of the ideology that is Pakistan and this betrayal is what has brought 
crisis upon the nation, suggesting that the only way to remedy the situation is by being 
true Muslims and defending this separate-from-others but united Muslim homeland. 
Jamaat-i-Islami leader Maulana Abdul Jabbar, cited in the Dainik Sangram, 
further claims that Pakistan’s current crisis is a punishment from Allah for forgetting the 
teachings of Islam, voting in leaders who do not believe in the country’s indivisibility and 
ideology and for failing to implement the Quran and Sunnah for which Pakistan was 
established as a nation. Once these are amended, he says, “normalcy” will return (Dainik 
Sangram, 26 August 1971, p. 5). President of Pakistan National League Ataur Rahman 
Khan goes so far as to describe the struggle for independence not only as a disaster but as 
the wrath of God: “All the disaster that has befallen us is because we have defied Allah 
Rabbul Al-amin and his Prophet Hazrat Muhammad's (swt) rules and regulations. This is 
why the wrath of God has been unleashed upon us” (Dainik Sangram, 19 September 
1971, p. 3). This rather terrifying conclusion seems enough to make the believing (and 
the weak of heart) think that the effects of war being felt in the country is a punishment 
for the Bangali resistance and that only by putting an end to it will there be any respite.  
Islam is constructed as providing the answer to all the nation’s problems. The 
Islamic ideology of Pakistan is said to be the “clear and correct solution to various 
complex situations and problems of the 20th century” (Dainik Sangram, 2 July 1971, p. 
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3). For example, president of Pakistan-controlled Azad Jammu and Kashmir Sarder 
Quayyum says,  
The Muslim world is facing a crisis – the only way to face this challenge is by devoting 
ourselves in our words, work and lives as true Muslims. Our national identity is at stake – 
if Islamic education is made mandatory, we can face our enemies. The ethical and 
physical structure of our society must be made in accordance with the Quran and Sunnah 
and this will bring peace and pride. (Dainik Sangram, 21 May 1971, p. 3) 
 
In another commentary, Jamiatul Ulama-e-Islam party member Mufti Mahmud 
advises Pakistanis to “think as Muslims”, adding:  
If anyone thinks there is any solution to the country’s crisis other than Islam, they are 
wrong. Islamic education and values are the base on which Pakistan’s solidarity and 
security can be defended. If Islam’s fundamental principles are weakened, Pakistan can 
never be made strong. If in the last 23 years we had followed the basic principles of Islam 
and Islamic brotherhood, we would not have had to witness these bad days now. It is 
because we have moved away from these fundamental principles that East Pakistan is 
facing such crisis today. (Dainik Sangram, 28 May 1971, p. 1)  
 
Not having followed Islamic principles is largely blamed on the dictatorships of the past 
but now is the time to remedy this – by uniting as Muslims to defend Pakistan. Maulana 
Atahar Ali, warning the people about the “enemies of Islam” and their hatred of Pakistan, 
Islam and Muslims, calls upon the government to end un-Islamic activities in the country 
and establish laws based on the Quran and Sunnah because “it is due to our apathy and 
neglect [of Islam] that we are facing this threat of disaster today” (Dainik Sangram, 7 
July 1971, p. 6).  
Islamic scholar and Ameer of the Jamaat-i-Islami Maulana Maududi says the 
crisis may be resolved as follows:  
People should ask God for forgiveness for their neglect and wrongdoings which have 
brought dangerous internal and external disaster upon the country today. Pakistanis 
should pledge to God to use all their might to foil all attempts of anti-Islam ideology in 
Pakistan. This is how God will help us with national compensation but also defend the 
country from future disaster. (Dainik Sangram, 16 August 1971, p. 1) 
 
Jamaat-i-Islami leader Mia Tofael Mohammad says, “Only an Islamic movement can 
rescue Bangali Muslims from downfall. Allah saved Pakistan from the enemy’s 
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conspiracy. Now it is the responsibility of Islamic movement activists to struggle 
tirelessly to establish an Islamic social system” (Dainik Sangram, 13 July 1971, p. 1).  
As such, the media discourse constructs an image of the Muslim world, and not 
only Pakistan, as in crisis. What is most significant about the situation in Pakistan is not 
in the turning to God and Prophet which any nation can do and many nations have done 
in times of crisis, but that the nation is made one with religion, the enemy of the nation as 
enemies of Islam, that only those on the side of a united Pakistan and thus Islam are 
regarded as the “true Muslims” and that the war itself is depicted as a battle of faith. 
 
5.3 The Discourse of Religious-national Unity 
Haqqani (2005) argues that the 1945-1946 election campaign was based almost 
entirely on Islamic rhetoric and the final result was an almost total identification of 
Pakistan with Islam. I would argue that this was just as true in the 1970 elections and the 
war which followed the year after. This identification comes across clearly in the media 
discourses during that period as this chapter will demonstrate.  
Effectively, the words “Pakistan” and “Islam” as well as “Pakistan, Islam and 
Muslims/Muslim brotherhood” are put together so that it becomes literally impossible to 
separate the two or think of them as two separate entities of nation and religion. This 
comes across in different ways in media language and headlines. Pakistan and Islam are 
what matter in life (Dainik Sangram 30 May 1971, p. 2) and no one should be allowed to 
rise against them (Dainik Sangram 30 May 1971, p. 3). The foundation of Pakistani 
nationalism is described in an op-ed piece as being “brought alive by Islamic 
thought/philosophy” (Morshed, Dainik Sangram, 22 June 1971, p. 2).  
A conference of Islamic scholars held in Dhaka in May 1971 suggested that 
“Islam is the cure for all diseases and people should follow the ideology of the Prophet 
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for the brightness/splendour of Islam and Pakistan” (Dainik Sangram, 20 May 1971, p. 2) 
and the youth must have “unwavering faith in Islam and Pakistan” (Dainik Sangram 31 
May 1971, p. 1). India can never want the good of Pakistan and Islam (Dainik Sangram 
29 July 1971, p. 6) and it is obviously a Hindu “conspiracy to erase all trace of Pakistan 
and Islam” (Dainik Sangram 11 May 1971, p. 1, p. 3) and a “conspiracy to destroy 
Pakistan and Islam” (Dainik Pakistan 3 September 1971, p. 1, p. 2).  
Media discourses also use the Quran to legitimise the twinning of Pakistan and 
Islam. For example, a commentary in the Dainik Sangram declares:  
The Muslims of Pakistan thought the coming of Pakistan on the night of the revelation of 
the Quran as significant. They thought by giving Pakistan on the same night as the Quran 
was revealed God was giving a sign that the Quran and Pakistan were being made 
inseparable like body and soul. Thus a Quran-less Pakistan would be putrid and buriable 
like a soul-less body. (Dainik Sangram 19 August 1971, p. 2) 
 
Only those allied with Islamic ideologies are able to defend Pakistan’s national 
integrity and sovereignty, says one news report (Dainik Sangram 10 June 1971, p. 3). In 
fact, those who profess anything other than Islamic ideology to rule Pakistan are labelled 
“open enemies of Islam and Pakistan” (Dainik Sangram 14 August 1971, supplement p. 
2). Islam and Pakistan are said to be inextricably linked (Dainik Sangram 23 September 
June 1971, p. 1, 31 October 1971, p. 2).  
Jamaat-i-Islami leader Ghulam Azam says, “Pakistan and Islam are intricately 
linked and only Islamic ideology can keep Pakistan alive” (Dainik Sangram 21 June 
1971, p. 1) and later on categorically states that for Jamaat-i-Islami, Pakistan and Islam 
are one and the same thing (Dainik Sangram 26 September 1971, p. 1). 
Thus, love for one means love for the other. Jamaat-i-Islami student leader Matiur 
Rahman Nizami claims that “only those who love Islam are those who love Pakistan” 
(Dainik Sangram 24 September 1971, p. 6). Nizami is also quoted as saying,  
If Pakistan survives the Muslims here will survive. Allah gave the responsibility of 
protecting his beloved land Pakistan to the faithful Muslims but when they failed to solve 
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the problem politically, Allah protected his beloved land through the army. (Dainik 
Sangram 5 August 1971, p. 4)  
 
Haqqani notes that, soon after assuming power in 1969, President Yahya Khan ‘extended 
the military’s role as the guardian of Pakistan’s “ideological frontier,” a notion that has 
prevailed ever since’ (2005: 51) and in this way, Nizami justifies the Pakistan army’s 
actions and violence against Bangalis as being the will of Allah.  
These ideas are repeated in poems on the page for children. For example, one of 
them declares that it was “Allah’s endless mercy that our fearless army destroyed the 
conspiracy of the adversaries of Pakistan and Islam and protected Pakistan and Islam” but 
that in the coming days, the readers/children must protect Pakistan and Islam (Dainik 
Sangram 23 July 1971, p. 4). 
“Defending Pakistan’s national integrity and protecting Islam” (Dainik Sangram 
14 September 1971, p. 3), in this case by the al Badr forces, are made out to be one and 
the same, as is “eliminating Islam and Muslims” with “destroying Pakistan” (Dainik 
Sangram 11 September 1971, p. 1).  
Jamaat-i-Islami Ameer Maulana Maududi, in a call for self-sacrifice in order to 
protect every inch of the nation, makes it one with religion:  
Pakistan’s security is the security of Islam in the whole world, Pakistan is Islam’s 
strongest citadel, if the enemies of Islam succeed in destroying this citadel then it will not 
be possible to save Islam and Muslims anywhere in the world. If God forbid, East 
Pakistan separates from West Pakistan, Islam and Muslims will be finished in East 
Pakistan. Thus defending East Pakistan means defending Islam. (Dainik Sangram 9 
October 1971, p. 1)  
 
In a call to the students of East Pakistan, Maududi again says: “If Pakistan is saved then 
Islam will be saved.” (Dainik Pakistan 9 October 1971, p. 6). According to Maududi 
then, Islam and Muslims live and die with Pakistan, making it seem imperative to defend 
the latter in order for the former to survive.  
Unity is constructed as bringing the nation together, and is given further 
legitimacy through references to Islam and citations from the Quran. For example, in an 
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op-ed article in the Dainik Sangram on national unity, the writer suggests that “unity is 
important, national unity is important, Islam stresses on the importance of unity – accept 
Allah’s bond of oneness, don’t be divided among yourselves, unity is strength, what one 
can’t do alone is easy to accomplish as a group” (Dainik Sangram 2 July 1971, p. 5).  
Islam is seen as the means to overcome differences of language and race, for 
example. As an editorial in the Dainik Sangram declares:  
Muslims are brothers irrespective of race, language, caste and their nationality is not 
limited to their geographical boundaries. The strong tie of Islamic ideology has bound the 
people of two territories as one people and state. Practically speaking, Pakistan is a 
smaller version of world states as planned in Islam. In a way Pakistan is a unique 
example in the Muslim world. Thus it not only proves the power of Islamic nationhood, 
but also inspires the Muslim world to unite in political/state structure according to 
Islamic nationality. (Dainik Sangram 27 July 1971, p. 2)  
 
At an Islamic conference, religious scholars and politicians talk about Muslims being one 
people regardless of language, race, caste, region, etc. According to various speakers, 
irrespective of differences in education, language, race, caste, region, Muslims are united 
by their kalima, the foundation of their faith, and by the same purpose (Dainik Sangram 
18 May 1971, p. 1).  
 
5.3a The denial of difference 
The analysis of the material showed there was a clear and repeated effort to 
undermine cultural differences and highlight the importance of religious similarities. For 
example, Maulana Maududi was quoted as saying that “one Muslim’s life and property 
has been declared sacred for another Muslim. Thus it is religious our duty to protect the 
life and property of our Bangali brothers. If Pakistani Muslims identify themselves as 
Bangali, Beluchi, Sindh and Punjabi, then our belief in Islam as a carrier of unity will be 
proven untrue” (Dainik Sangram 4 May 1971, p. 1). On another occasion he is quoted as 
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saying, “Under the umbrella of Islam, Muslims rise above race, language and other 
considerations and are considered brothers” (Dainik Sangram 8 July 1971, p. 1). 
Jamaat-i-Islami leader Chowdhury Rahmat Elahi says, “Eliminating language and 
community-based differences is very important right now as these are what have brought 
disaster upon Pakistan” (Dainik Sangram 5 June 1971, p. 1), while another political 
leader refers to how, 1,400 years ago the Prophet united the people of different languages 
on the basis of sacred monotheism, and how today too only Islam can end the feelings of 
Bangali, Sindhi, Beluchi, Pathan and bind the people (Dainik Sangram 25 September 
1971, p. 3).  
 Raihan (1971a) cites the ideal of 10 crore Indian Muslims who, “inspired by 
Islamic nationality, broke the ties of language, race and region and set a great example of 
unity” against India and created Pakistan. Dr. Mir Fakhruzzaman talks about forgetting 
“petty differences” and uniting on the basis of the main values of Islam (Dainik Sangram 
8 September 1971, p. 1). Maulana Thanvi says, “Islam is applicable to everyone 
irrespective of race, class and region. In our country where there are different cultures 
and languages, Islam is the greatest unifying tie” (Dainik Sangram 24 May 1971, p. 3). 
At a meeting of the Shanti Committee, it is philosophised, “In unity lies the freedom of 
Muslims and Pakistan can only survive if we rise above regionalism and unite as 
Muslims” (Dainik Sangram 27 May 1971, p. 3).  
Jamaat-i-Islami second-in-command Mia Tufail Muhammad seems a staunch 
believer in Islamic over regional nationalism, claiming that after Allah has saved Pakistan 
from the enemy’s conspiracy, only an Islamic movement can save Bangali Muslims from 
downfall and that “from an Islamic movement perspective, there is no difference between 
Bangali, Punjabi, Pathan and Beluchis” (Dainik Sangram 13 July 1971, p. 1). 
Importantly, he notes that it is Hindus who, after having failed to prevent the creation of 
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Pakistan, have been trying to destroy it since the day it was born by creating divides 
between East and West Pakistan by stressing on regional over Islamic nationalism. He 
also believes that “Education should create Islamic inspiration in students which will 
create national unity and save them from becoming victims of ideological conflict” 
(Dainik Sangram 31 May 1971, p. 1).   
In an effort to reinforce the argument of the Pakistani government and military for 
a united Pakistan based on religion, the media draws upon the nation’s political history 
and leadership during Partition. For example, it reprints a speech by Pakistan’s founder 
Qaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah that he gave after Partition in which he emphasised 
the idea of Pakistanis as Muslims. In the speech, Jinnah had said:  
There is no significance in saying we are Bangali, we are Sindhi, we are Pathan, or we 
are Punjabi. No, we are Muslim. This is what Islam has taught us. No matter where or 
how you are, remember you are Muslims, you are part of one nation. And you have 
gained a huge land. This is all yours, it does not belong to any Punjabi, Sindhi, Pathan or 
Bangali, remember, it is yours... Your country is Pakistan and you are Pakistanis. Free 
yourselves from the curse of provincialism... The language issue has been dragged in to 
create divide and disaster between Muslims. (Dainik Sangram 14 September 1971, p. 2)  
   
Matlib (1971), a Dainik Sangram contributor, summarises the recent situation in 
an op-ed article thus:  
Only Islam can save the unity of the country. No identity of Pakistan can be imagined 
other than Islam. Pakistan won’t survive without Islam either. For as long as this ideology 
is not fully implemented, peace and security will just be words. Defending the country 
means defending the country’s ideology which means defending Islam. Islam and 
Pakistan are inextricably linked. This is why in this time of crisis Islam-loving, idealist 
people are being killed, because this is the way to destroy the country. If Pakistan does 
not survive today it will be proof that establishing a country in order to implement 
Islamic life philosophy is stupidity and ungodly enemies will be active in eliminating 
Muslims from the world. (Dainik Sangram 31 October 1971, p. 2) 
 
An editorial published in the last weeks of the war states matter-of-factly: 
“Without Islam there is no logical reason to be joined to a territory 1,500 miles away. No 
other force in the world can keep this country united” (Dainik Sangram 28 November 
1971, p. 2). 
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5.3b Pan-Islamic Pakistan 
 The analysis showed that the media also appealed to all Muslims to unite in order 
to protect the Islamic homeland Pakistan, to save Islam and Muslims, and to help 
establish an Islamic way of life. As Haqqani notes, ‘pan-Islamism was more important 
for Pakistan’s efforts to consolidate its national identity than as the mainstay of its foreign 
policy’ (2005: 19). In 1971, it may be argued that it was used towards both ends, with the 
latter bringing in international Muslim support. The media, for example, used Jinnah’s 
speeches on July 2 to describe Pakistan as “a symbol of Muslim unity.”  
On this basis, several news stories were published to show the Muslim world’s 
concern for Pakistan, condemnation of the resistance, especially of India, and Pakistan’s 
appeal for international Muslim support. One news item specifically states that 
“Pakistan’s efforts are a part of the establishment of Islamic unity” and that “India tried 
to weaken a Muslim nation which is playing an important role in strengthening unity of 
Muslims and establishing world peace”. Especially after the Arab-Israeli War of 1967, 
Arab countries realised that India is not their friend while Pakistan “proved its sincerity 
and love towards the Muslim world” (Dainik Sangram 3 July 1971, p. 3). Thus Maulana 
Maududi declares, “Islamic brotherhood and international justice demands that Muslim 
states should fulfil their responsibility to save the largest Muslim nation from disunity” 
(Dainik Sangram 5 April 1971, p. 1), while President of Azad Kashmir (Pakistan-
controlled) Sardar Qayyum says, “God forbid, if one of the Muslim world’s states 
Pakistan is harmed, it will be an irreparable loss for all Muslim people” (Dainik Sangram 
14 June 1971, p. 1). 
Jamiatul Ulama-e-Islam Maulana Mufti Mahmud stresses unity of Islamic states 
to fight the allied enemies. According to him, all the problems of Muslim nations are 
caused by Western imperialism and in order to solve these problems and defeat the allied 
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enemy, it is important for Islamic states to be united (Dainik Sangram 21 August 1971, p. 
3). Justice SA Rahman says that the main objective of Islamic countries should be the 
utmost unity of the Muslim world (Dainik Sangram 16 October 1971, p. 3). Jamaat-i-
Islami leader Chowdhury Rahmat Ilahi points out that because Pakistan has always 
treated the world’s Muslims’ problems as its own and helped them, “All Muslims should 
dedicate themselves to establishing the victory of Islam. InshaAllah [God willing] 
Pakistan’s 12 crore Muslims will transform Pakistan into a true Islamic state” (Dainik 
Sangram 9 September 1971, p. 3). 
The main justification for the numerous appeals made to the Muslim world 
seeking support for Pakistan lies in the war being labelled “a conspiracy to weaken the 
Muslim world by breaking up Pakistan” (Dainik Sangram 19 April 1971, p. 4). Reference 
is made to anti-Islamic and Jewish forces conspiring against the Muslim world and the 
importance of unity and cooperation between Muslim states in this situation. In an 
editorial printed on May 10, reference is also made to the Prophet’s call to the people to 
forget their Arab or non-Arab identities and to identify themselves as Muslims, in relation 
to questions of Bangali and non-Bangali identities being raised with a call to follow the 
ways of the Prophet in personal, social, political and worldly matters. 
A poem published on July 2 titled ‘Be one, the world’s Muslims’, goes thus:  
All Muslims are brothers, no differences between Bangalis and Sindhis, Punjabis, 
Beluchis and Pathans, those who are faithful, those who are Muslims, have a place in the 
last Prophet’s umma, under one Allah’s sky, everyone has equal rights... In the troubled 
days of faith, why are brothers far from each other, those who believe in the kalima, be 
one... (Dainik Sangram 2 July 1971, p. 3) 
 
 
5.4 Media as Discursive Tools 
 The Pakistani media analysed here not only reported the events and discourse of 
the time by quoting political and religious leaders, but played a role in these discourses. 
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The analysis showed that the media chose to publish certain news stories over others and 
gave prominence to editorials and articles suggesting national unity based on religious 
unity. Indeed, as the analysis presented above shows, the media played a role of agents of 
order, or mobilisers of public opinion and manufacturers of consent and national 
consensus (Watson 2003). This was reflected in their attention to a consistent campaign 
underlining the importance of a religious state, which was not only apparent in the 
editorials and commentaries, but also in the news reports. Nationalism was constructed, 
encouraging religious over ethnic and cultural unity. Identities were formed, portraying 
the Pakistani Muslim as good and the Indian Hindu as bad, as will be shown in the next 
chapter. And, as Chapter 7 will show, direction for action was also given.  
As Sultana Kamal, a lawyer and human rights activist who participated in the 
Liberation War at the age of 21, pointed out in an interview29, “The political parties were 
not the only ones to be influenced by religion, regular citizens were too, especially the 
older generation which had lived through the Partition and were also initially wary of 
Hindus and India. But it was the political parties who actively fought against liberation. 
When the people saw the atrocities being committed by the Pakistani government, army 
and its collaborators, led by the Jamaat-i-Islami, and the spirit of the younger generation 
in fighting for liberation and even sacrificing their lives, they were swayed.”  
It was this use of the historical animosity between Muslims and Hindus, 
especially during the time of Partition, that was used during Bangladesh’s Liberation 
War, highlighting the war as one between Muslims and Hindus, Pakistan and India. This 
is why it was even more important to target the youth who had not experienced Partition 
and “Hindu oppression” with anti-Hindu/anti-Indian ideology. This was particularly so as 
																																																						
29	Sultana	Kamal,	advocate	and	human	rights	activist.	Personal	interview.	11	December	2014,	conducted	
in	her	office	in	Mohammadpur,	Dhaka.	
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those enlisting in the Mukti Bahini as freedom fighters were largely young Bangalis in 
their teens and twenties. This is why madrasa students specifically are called upon as a 
counterforce to unite “in this time of national conflict when Islamic scholars should be 
given the key to establish an Islamic society” (Dainik Sangram 29 August 1971, p. 1)30. 
At a programme of former madrasa students, editor of a leading Pakistani newspaper 
Urdu Digest Altaf Husein Qureishi stresses on Islamic education and the prompt 
establishment of an Islamic university in order to defend Pakistan’s unity and solidarity 
and is quoted as saying, “As long as there is any life in the bodies of madrasa students in 
East Pakistan, they will not let the flag of Pakistan be lowered” (Dainik Sangram 2 
October 1971, p. 1). 
As James Watson explains: ‘Hegemony works through ideological state 
apparatuses (education, religion, the arts, media) and operates best when those 
apparatuses are speaking in harmony with one another’ (2003: 18). In the case of 
Pakistan, we see the educational institutions, religious organisations and the media 
working in tandem to promote an ideology of a nation based on religion and to produce 
an image of a state which is better as an Islamic state and patriotic citizens who are better 
as “true Muslims”. Ideology ‘provides the conceptual “cement” that upholds the 
structures of the powerful, defends their interests and is instrumental in helping to 
																																																						
30	The	reliance	of	the	Pakistan	government	and	military	on	madrasa	teachers	and	students	as	a	major	ally	
in	 the	war	 against	 liberation	 is	 interesting,	 especially	where	 Sen	 (2006)	 argues	 that	 faith-based	 schools	
can	actually	have	the	effect	of	‘reducing	the	role	of	reasoning	which	children	may	have	the	opportunity	to	
cultivate	 and	 use’	 (2006:	 117).	 The	 push	 for	 increase	 in	 the	 establishment	 of	madrasas	 at	 the	 time	 as	
evidenced	 in	 several	 news	 items	 reporting	 the	 demand	 for	 establishment	 of	 madrasas	 and	 an	 Islamic	
university	 shows	 the	 authorities’	 inclination	 towards	 dogma-led	 rather	 than	 reason-based	 education,	
thought	and	action.	It	also	points	to	the	direct	recruitment	of	teachers	and	students	from	religion-based	
educational	institutions	onto	the	battlefield.	
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preserve the status quo – the way things are; the way they are ordered’ (Watson 2003: 
19).  
But, as Watson (2003) also points out, the Gramscian notion of hegemony works 
best in a society where there is a certain degree of social, economic, political and cultural 
security, which is probably why the ideological state apparatuses failed to succeed in a 
society characterised by a high level of social, economic, political and cultural discontent 
among the majority Bangali population, leading to the use of repressive state apparatuses 
and outright war between the rulers and the ruled. The ‘won consent’, as Watson puts it, 
never came to be. Gradually, the broader, more abstract, milder discourse of the virtues of 
a religious state and people which prevailed towards the beginning of the war, grew more 
specific, action-oriented and violent, calling for the taking up of arms against the enemy, 
promoting violence, sacrifice and martyrdom, in order to protect the holy land of 
Pakistan.  
The following chapter will show how not only the nation, but individual and 
collective identities – of the Muslim, Hindu, Pakistani, Bangali, and enemy – were 
constructed by the media during the war. It will demonstrate how this identity 
construction emphasised on difference and the Other, setting the stage for war between a 
divided people, the divisions created discursively through the framing of religion-based 
ideology. 
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Fig. 2: Discourse of “Islamic Nationalism”  
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Table 1: The construction of Pakistan and religious-national unity References	to	history	 • sacrifice	of	martyrs	during	Partition	
• blood	and	honour	of	martyrs	
• sacred	responsibility	to	protect	their	
sacrifice	
• battles	of	Karbala	and	Badr	Pakistan	as	homeland	for	Muslims	 • home	of	Islam	
• homeland	for	Muslims	of	the	
subcontinent		
• belongs	to	Muslims	
• Darul	Islam		Pakistan	as	sacred	 • birth	and	survival	based	on	Islam	
• pillar	of	light	of	Islam	
• holy	land	
• sacred	land	
• holy	motherland	
• durgo	(fort/citadel)	of	Islam	
• gift	from	God		
• Allah’s	amanat	(God	has	put	Pakistan	
in	the	custody	of	Muslim	Pakistanis)	
• Allah’s	home	
• slogans	of	la	ilaha	il	Allah	
• founded	on	the	kalima	
• nation	born	on	the	night	of	the	Quran’s	
revelation	
• world’s	largest	Muslim	nation	
• world’s	greatest	Islamic	state			
• those	who	love	Islam	love	Pakistan	Pakistan	as	ideology	 • ideological	state	based	on	ideology	of	
Islam	
• based	on	ideological	values,	not	
nationalism,	language	and	geography	
• two-nation	theory	
• Quran-	and	Sunnah-based	rule	
• Pakistan	for	Islam,	not	different	
ethnicities		
• Muslim	nationhood		
• Muslim	brotherhood	
• Islamic	nationalism	
• importance	of	Islamic	education	
• Prophet	Muhammad’s	ideology,	
ideology	based	on	the	words	of	Allah	
and	life	of	the	Prophet		
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Islam	as	panacea	 • neglect	of	Islamic	ideology,	lack	of	
Islamic	policy,	apathy	towards	Islam,	
betrayal	of	ideology	are	the	sources	of	
troubles	
• neglect	of	Islam	has	brought	about	
wrath	of	God	
• war	as	punishment	for	Bangali	
resistance	
• Islam	is	clear	and	correct	solution	
• system	must	be	in	line	with	Quran	and	
Sunnah	
• Islamic	education	and	values,	Islamic	
principles	and	brotherhood	
• Islamic	movement	can	save	the	nation		Defending	Pakistan	and	Islam	 • ideological	frontier	
• Pakistan	army	carrying	out	the	will	of	
Allah	
• protection	of	Pakistan	and	Islam	
• Pakistan’s	security	is	the	security	of	
Islam	in	the	world	
• defending	and	saving	Pakistan	means	
defending	and	saving	Islam		Islamic	unity	 • eliminate	differences	of	race,	language,	
caste,	nationality,	geographical	
boundaries	
• rise	above	regionalism	
• unity	based	on	Islamic	ideology	
• Islamic	nationality	and	nationhood	
• unity	based	on	the	kalima	
• in	unity	lies	freedom	of	Muslims	
• only	Islam	can	keep	Pakistan	united	Pan-Islamic	Pakistan	 • Pakistan	a	symbol	of	Muslim	unity	
• Pakistan’s	role	in	strengthening	unity	
of	Muslims	and	establishing	world	
peace	
• Pakistan	proved	its	sincerity	and	love	
towards	the	Muslim	world	(after	Arab-
Israeli	war)	
• harm	to	Pakistan	will	be	irreparable	
loss	to	the	Muslim	world	
• the	war	is	a	conspiracy	to	weaken	the	
Muslim	world	by	breaking	up	Pakistan	
• Islamic	states	must	unite	against	the	
Western	imperialist	enemy			
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CHAPTER 6 
IDENTITIES AT WAR:  
THE CONSTRUCTION OF HINDUS AND MUSLIMS IN ANTI-LIBERATION 
DISCOURSE 
We did away with our Hindu names and took Christian names because it was safer to be 
Christian than Hindu… So there was a total loss of identity for anyone who was not a 
Muslim. –Meghna Guhathakurta 
 
They wanted to make [us] ‘pukka Muslims’. –Sudhangshu Sekhar Roy  
 
The art of constructing hatred takes the form of invoking the magical power of some 
allegedly predominant identity that drowns other affiliations, and in a conveniently 
bellicose form can also overpower any human sympathy or natural kindness that we may 
normally have, the result can be homespun elemental violence, or globally artful violence 
and terrorism. –Amartya Sen 
 
In his book Identity and Violence (2006), Amartya Sen talks about his first 
exposure to murder as an 11-year-old when a Muslim man was attacked in the riots of the 
1940s and came stumbling through the gates of Sen’s family home seeking help and 
water. The young Amartya could not fathom how a person whom the attackers did not 
even know, let alone have been harmed by, could be killed on the basis of a single 
identity, that he was “the enemy”. In times of war, however, that becomes the 
predominant identity – the enemy we must fight. How the identity of the enemy is 
constructed – through the use of language, making of meaning, circulation of discourse 
and formation of truth based on ideology – and what identities it is set in contrast to 
through the same process, is the subject of this chapter.   
This chapter draws on discourse analysis of the newspapers Dainik Sangram and 
Dainik Pakistan published in East Pakistan in 1971 as well as some interviews to explore 
how specific identities were constructed through language and discourse based on 
religious ideology propagated by the Pakistani state and its affiliates. Whereas 
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Bangladeshis view the war as one between the Bangali majority population of East 
Pakistan and their rulers in the western wing, this chapter identifies the main actors in 
Bangladesh’s Liberation War according to the anti-liberation elements as evident in their 
media. In the discourse of anti-liberation, it was not a battle for freedom but a war of 
faith, jihad even, between the khati Pakistani and the Hindu-inclined Bangali, between 
the sachcha Musolman and the imperialist, infidel Hindu. It was a war between Muslims 
and Hindus who had apparently proven throughout the centuries that they were 
civilisations apart and could not coexist. It begins with a brief theoretical introduction in 
order to set the scene and make sense of the findings, followed by an analysis of the data 
gathered from the above newspapers divided into categories of how the Pakistani Muslim 
and Bangali Hindu were represented. 
 
6.1 Identity and Difference 
Elaborate definitions of “identity” are much too vast to broach in this work of 
which identity is only a part. However, the simplest definitions are often the best in terms 
of being easily understood. Thus, suffice it to say, identity ‘gives us an idea of who we 
are and of how we relate to others and to the world in which we live’ (Woodward 2002: 
1). Woodward states, crucially to this work, that often, ‘identity is most clearly marked 
by difference, that is by what it is not’ (ibid: 2). This marking of difference is achieved 
through symbolic systems of representation and through forms of exclusion, which are 
established through classification systems which ‘appl[y] a principle of difference to a 
population in such a way as to be able to divide them and all their characteristics into at 
least two, opposing groups – us/them (e.g. Serb/Croat); self/other’ (Woodward 2002: 29).  
As Sen notes: ‘With suitable instigation, a fostered sense of identity with one 
group of people can be made into a powerful weapon to brutalize another’ (2006: xv). 
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The less confrontational features of those in the opposition are minimised to the point of 
being made invisible, including the fact that they are, if nothing else, human beings. Sen 
does argue, however, that the choice lies with people to decide the importance of their 
different identities and affiliations, and they are not just naturally ‘discovered’ (Sen 2006: 
5) and forcibly imposed one fine day. Often, however, choice may be assumed to be 
absent and the use of reason replaced by ‘uncritical acceptance of conformist behaviour’ 
(ibid: 9). He also states that even though we may see ourselves in a certain way, other 
people may not perceive us in that same way.  
In his insightful book Pakistan: Between mosque and military, Husain Haqqani 
notes: ‘The experience of language riots by Bengalis in East Pakistan had pointed out the 
difficulty of subsuming ethnic identities into a new Pakistani identity. Religion was an 
easier tool of mobilization. Making Pakistani synonymous with being a good Muslim was 
considered the more attainable goal’ (2005: 19). Thus, while Hindus in East Pakistan may 
have considered themselves to also be Pakistani, Bangali, etc., those who opposed 
liberation on the basis of religion, saw them, and made every effort to make others see 
them, as Hindus only – similar to the categorisation of people as Hindus and Muslims 
only in 1940s India as described by Sen. In the Pakistani media of 1971 studied here, 
Hindus were postulated as Indian infiltrators, and every attempt made to erase all other 
identities, such as the fact that they were also South Asian, Pakistani, Bangali, and from 
similar classes, backgrounds, professions, etc., as were many of the people being 
addressed (in the media and elsewhere), not to mention that they were above all, living, 
breathing human beings. As such, an overall process of dehumanisation was underway.  
Such ‘charged attributions’, according to Sen, occur through two different but 
related distortions – ‘misdescription of people belonging to a targeted category, and an 
insistence that the misdescribed characteristics are the only relevant features of the 
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targeted person’s identity’ (Sen 2006: 7). In the case at hand then, the only important 
identity is the Hindu identity, and that is loaded with certain, mostly negative, 
characteristics. The “enemy” must be posited against someone – the friend, “us”, in this 
case, the Muslim, which again becomes the predominant identity and is attributed 
positive, even glorifying characteristics. And this ‘surgical implantation of a “real me”’ 
or organised attribution, warns Sen, ‘can prepare the ground for persecution and burial’ 
(ibid: 8).    
The identity divisions between Pakistan and Bangladesh in 1971 were strongly 
linked to language and culture and not to religious differences. As Sen writes: 
‘Bangladesh’s separation from Pakistan was not based on religion at all, since a Muslim 
identity was shared by the bulk of the population of the two wings of undivided Pakistan. 
The separatist issues related to language, literature, and politics’ (2006: 15). However, for 
the anti-liberation forces, religion was what they chose to focus on and construct 
accordingly in their media propaganda. Similar to the situation of the communal riots of 
the 1940s and the ultimate Partition of India of 1947 where Sen describes people as being 
‘made to think of themselves only as Hindus or only as Muslims (who must unleash 
vengeance on “the other community”) and as absolutely nothing else: not Indians, not 
sub-continentals, not Asians, not members of a shared human race’ (ibid: 172), the anti-
liberation groups of 1971 also drew the great divide between Hindu and Muslim, India 
and Pakistan, although the war was within Pakistan itself, between Pakistanis, the 
majority of them Muslims. It was represented as being about fighting ‘the enemies who 
kill us’ (ibid).  
Stuart Hall defines representation as ‘the production of meaning through 
language’ (2001: 16) and refers to two definitions from the Shorter Oxford English 
Dictionary where representation means to describe or depict something and also to 
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symbolise, stand for or substitute for something. The representation of the Hindu in 
Pakistan’s media in 1971 is such a dual representation, where the Hindu is no longer only 
a person belonging to a certain religion but who is described and depicted in such a way 
as to form a specific picture in the minds of the readers. For example, Hindus were 
represented as idol-worshippers, infidels and Indian infiltrators, in binary opposition to 
the monotheistic Muslim. As Hall notes, representation is a systematic process including 
mental representations translated into language. This involves organising, classifying, 
etc., and one of the ways to do this is by using the principles of similarity and difference. 
Our ‘mental representations’ are more easily categorised in terms of sameness and 
otherness, often in binary opposites, such as light and darkness, day and night, good and 
bad, happiness and sadness, and these are then cemented through the use of words 
assigned. In this way, the Hindu was also depicted as different from the Muslim, they 
were the Other, and in consequence, the enemy of the Muslim, Islam and Pakistan. Hall 
argues that meaning is not in the person or even in the word but that ‘it is we who fix the 
meaning so firmly that, after a while, it comes to seem natural and inevitable. The 
meaning is constructed by the system of representation… constructed and fixed by the 
code…’ (Hall 2001: 21, original italics). Meaning is a signifying practice that ‘makes 
things mean’ (ibid: 24, original italics). For him,  
it is not the material world which conveys meaning: it is the language system or whatever 
system we are using to represent our concepts. It is social actors who use the conceptual 
systems of their culture and the linguistic and other representational systems to construct 
meaning, to make the world meaningful and to communicate about that world 
meaningfully to others’. (Hall 2004: 25)  
 
Thus, meaning is never fixed, it can change over time and place, through history and 
culture, there is no ‘single, unchanging, universal “true meaning”’ (ibid: 32). 
Interestingly, whereas the “Razakar” who opposed the liberation war in defence of 
Pakistan and Islam was a hero in the anti-liberation discourse in 1971, in the pro-
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liberation discourse and to this day, the word has come to signify a traitor among 
Bangalis. Meaning is really what one makes of it.  
 
 6.1a Discursive identities 
The discursive formation of identities has been discussed in detail in Chapter 3. 
For example, Benedict Anderson conceives of the nation as ‘imagined’, arguing that it is 
only ‘in the minds of each [that] lives the image of their communion’ (Anderson 1997: 
44). Eric Hobsbawm (cited in Ozkirimli 2010: 94), too, sees nations and nationalism as 
products of ‘social engineering’, or as ‘invented traditions’, a strategy employed by the 
ruling elite of any society to counter the threat of ‘mass democracy’. In the face of social 
fragmentation and disintegration, the idea of ‘national community’ can bring social 
cohesion, argues Hobsbawm. This idea is developed and reinforced by primary 
education, public ceremonies and the mass production of public monuments. Thus, 
contrary to popular understanding, in Hobsbawm’s view, it is not the people who rise in 
nationalist fervour but states which create it (ibid: 95). In fact, Michael Billig (2001) 
argues that nationalism is ‘a way of thinking or an ideological consciousness’ (Billig 
2001: 10) instilled into citizens and that language, which is widely considered to be a key 
determinant of national identity, rather than creating nationalism is created by 
nationalism.  
Wodak et al, too, in their work on the discursive constructions of national identity, 
assume that national identities are formed discursively and that these discursive 
constructs ‘primarily emphasise national uniqueness and intra-national uniformity but 
largely ignore intra-national differences’ (2009: 4) – e.g., in this case study, the repeated 
focus on the common religion of Islam between the populations of East and West 
Pakistan while ignoring the major differences of language and culture. Wodak et al also 
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argue that there is no single national identity and that different identities are discursively 
constructed according to the context, making national identity ‘malleable, fragile and, 
frequently, ambivalent and diffuse’ (ibid). Similarly, characteristics and as a result, 
identities too, of East and West Pakistanis, Hindus and Muslims, etc., overlapped. 
However, the media discourse, as this chapter will show, focused on the differences 
between the groups, creating clear distinctions between Muslims and Hindus. 
The following section draws upon empirical findings in order to illustrate the 
discursive formation of identities during Bangladesh’s Liberation War. 
 
6.2 Identities at War 
 This section presents the empirical findings on identity construction in the 
Pakistani media of 1971 as reflected in the Dainik Sangram and Dainik Pakistan 
newspapers studied here. The four main identities were that of the khati or pure Pakistani, 
the “Hinduised” Bangali, the sachcha or true Musolman/Muslim and the Muslim-hating 
Hindu enemy. 
 
6.2a The khati Pakistani 
In the media under study, being Pakistani always comes with a qualifier, either 
“khati”, a Bangla word meaning pure, or with some variation of being Muslim, so much 
so, that Pakistani and Muslim become almost synonymous, similar to the twinning of 
nation and religion discussed in the previous chapter. In these articulations, the pure 
Pakistani has a number of qualities.  
First and foremost, s/he believes in a united Pakistan. Thus, a member of national 
assembly (MNA) who has left the banned Awami League, clarifies that he was not 
involved in the separatist movement and that he will serve the nation as a “khati 
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Pakistani”. He stresses that he is a MNA not only from East Pakistan but the whole 
nation and that he believes in the unity and solidarity of Pakistan and that no one can 
destroy these, just as this time “the almighty Allah has saved us [from India’s ill 
intentions to break up Pakistan]” (Dainik Sangram 11 June 1971, p. 3).  
The khati Pakistani is also a khati Muslim, who discards all ideas of regionalism 
and works for a better Pakistan based on Islamic ideals, for Pakistan and Islam are 
inseparable. This understanding is emphasised especially by leaders of the Jamaat-i-
Islami. For example, the party’s acting Ameer, Mia Tufail is quoted in a news report as 
saying, “We should forget issues of being local or not and be khati Muslim and khati 
Pakistani and create an environment of peace and friendship in society and unite in and 
strengthen our efforts for the Islamic movement” (Dainik Sangram 20 July 1971, p. 1). 
The following day, another Jamaat-i-Islami leader and member of the national assembly, 
Dr. Nazir Ahmed, is quoted as saying, “Forget differences of local and non-local and 
stand together as khati Muslim and khati Pakistani and work tirelessly to come out of this 
crisis” (Dainik Sangram 21 July 1971, p. 1). He also notes that, “The lack of Islamic way 
of life is the reason for the current crisis. Islam and Pakistan are inseparable. Pakistan’s 
unity, solidarity and progress are dependent on the success of the struggle for the 
implementation of Islamic way of life” (ibid). The head of East Pakistan Jamaat-i-Islami 
Ghulam Azam goes so far as to even say, “Those who identify themselves first as 
Bangalis then as Muslims are not Pakistanis” (Dainik Sangram 11 September 1971, p. 1).  
This character development of a khati Pakistani seems dependent on education 
and for this the education system requires reform to include and emphasise on Islamic 
ideals, as is evident from the media discourse. Ghulam Azam, in praising the proposed 
revisions to the textbook syllabus, is “sure that this syllabus would reflect national 
ideology and perspective which would help to form the character of future generations as 
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khati Musolman and khati Pakistanis” (Dainik Sangram 31 July 1971, p. 1). In a news 
report titled ‘Students must make themselves into khati Pakistani and Musolman’, the 
education minister Abbas Ali Khan says that “students should make themselves 
completely Pakistani, completely Muslim, and this should be their main goal. If they can 
develop themselves according to Islamic ideology, students will be able to make big 
sacrifices for the country and people” (Dainik Sangram 22 September 1971, p. 1). In 
another news item, the education minister, referring to a government handout which 
declared that Pakistan’s population should forget “so-called cultural and language-based 
obstacles” asks students to read the history of Islam and Pakistan and advises teachers to 
teach students “so that they may grow to become khati Islam-loving Pakistani citizens” 
(Dainik Sangram 15 October 1971, p. 1).  
Being Islam-loving, then, comes with being a true Pakistani – and not being so is 
the root of all problems, according to the media discourse. As revenue minister and 
Jamaat-i-Islami leader Maulana AKM Yusuf says,  
It is because the youth were not made aware of the main objective of the creation of 
Pakistan that today they are ashamed to identify themselves as Pakistani and Muslim. 
Islam and Pakistan are closely interlinked. Thus in order to save Pakistan the people must 
be revived/infused with new life in Islamic ideology... We are not one based on 
geographical nationalism but ideology... (Dainik Sangram 23 September 1971, p. 1) 
 
Even the army is advised to “think of their responsibilities as including being protectors 
of pro-Pakistani, Islam-loving people” (Dainik Sangram 30 August 1971, p. 3). 
In fact, an army major is quoted in the Sunday Times of 13 June 1971 as having 
told journalist Anthony Mascarenhas, that 
This is a war between the pure and the impure… The people here may have Muslim 
names and call themselves Muslims. But they are Hindu at heart… [W]e are now sorting 
[them] out… those who are left will be real Muslims. We will even teach them Urdu. 
(D’Costa 2011: 102) 
 
This emphasis on Islamic ideology for the khati Pakistani raises the issue of 
whether only Muslims can be pure Pakistanis and brings into question what it means to 
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be Hindu (between 13 and 17 percent of the population in 1971 Pakistan, D’Costa 2011) 
or belong to other non-Muslim populations of Pakistan at the time. It also causes one to 
question their safety and security when, for example, the governor AM Malek asks “khati 
Pakistanis who crossed the border to return to their homes” (Dainik Sangram 16 October 
1971, p. 1) and minister for commerce and industry Akhtaruddin Ahmed, in asking 
people to defend the national ideology and Islamic rule, says “khati Pakistanis have 
nothing to fear” (Dainik Sangram 21 October 1971, p. 4). By including only Muslims as 
real Pakistanis, the discourse excludes people of other faiths, particularly Hindus, from 
being Pakistani, which becomes an effective strategy in depicting them as Indian and 
spies and infiltrators of and from India.  
With the classification of the khati Pakistani also comes the opportunity to fortify 
this identity. In an article titled ‘Weapon against weapon – not logic’ reference is made to 
the government’s enlisting of khati Pakistani citizens in al Badr and Mujahid forces (the 
religious-historical connotations of the names of the forces themselves are suggestive), 
the auxiliary forces of the Pakistani military in East Pakistan, and that this is an 
invaluable opportunity for the country’s “khati Pakistani Islamponthi (Islamist) citizens 
to gain Allah’s satisfaction by proving their love for the country and Islam” (Mujahid 
1971b, Dainik Sangram 15 September, p. 3). This is further reinforced in the commentary 
titled ‘Respond to the call of jihad’, where the Sangram commentator calls to “the people 
of Pakistan” to be infused with new life by their jihadi inspiration and that “today, our 
only identity should be that we are Muslim and Pakistani” (Dainik Sangram 28 
November 1971, p. 1). Pakistani army General Niazi says, “Whether Muslims wear 
uniforms or civil dress, they are all mujahid31 and in their own way they will each play 
																																																						
31	Mujahid	in	Arabic	refers	to	a	fighter	in	a	holy	war	(jihad).	(Adamec	2009)	
		 151	
their role in defending Pakistan’s indivisibility and solidarity” (Dainik Sangram 17 
August 1971, p. 6). This language thus interpellates or hails the Pakistani Muslim 
readers, as if to motivate them to participate in the war in order to further reinforce their 
identity as good Muslims and achieve the ultimate reward, the satisfaction of Allah.    
 
6.2b “Hindu-ising” the Bangali 
While Bangalis from East Pakistan formed the majority of the population of the 
whole nation, being Bangali was very different from being the khati Pakistani as 
described above. Reference to Bangalis/East Pakistanis in Dainik Sangram is interesting 
in the sense that, in the context of nationality, Bangalis were positively referred to as 
“East Pakistanis” and, most often, as “East Pakistani Muslims”, presumably in an attempt 
to reinforce the fact that Pakistani and Muslim were in fact their main, if not only, 
identities [as was the case for (West) Pakistanis in general, as shown above]. News 
stories, editorials and columns are filled with references to “East Pakistani Muslims” or a 
variation on this, throughout the time of the war: imperialist India’s vile conspiracy to 
make “East Pakistani Muslims” into “slaves of Brahmin imperialism” (Dainik Sangram 6 
April 1971, p. 1); the “Muslims of East Pakistan” are called upon to “help the military to 
eliminate the advocates of so-called ‘Bangla-desh’” (Dainik Sangram 8 April 1971, p. 1); 
the biggest need of “Bangali Muslims” is to free themselves from the slavery of Hindus 
and live in a Muslim state (Rastbaj 1971a, Dainik Sangram 6 May, p. 2); “East Pakistan’s 
Islam-loving, patriotic people” should be given military training in order to be able to 
counter potential Indian attacks (Dainik Sangram 5 June 1971, p. 3);  “East Pakistani 
Muslims” would never want to separate from their West Pakistani brothers, they are 
Islam-loving and khati Pakistani for the sake of Islam (Dhumketu 1971b, Dainik 
Sangram 23 June, p. 2); “East Pakistan’s devout Muslims are bone tired of the so-called 
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Bangali sympathisers” (Dhumketu 1971a); the ferocious order to “Hindu 
hooligans/gangsters to kill East Pakistan’s innocent Muslims” (Dainik Sangram 1 
October 1971, p. 3), etc. The East Pakistani Muslim identity is focused upon rather than 
the ethnic Bangali simply through the use of a different combination of words.   
Being Bangali was frequently, and negatively, equated with Hindu and Indian. 
Rastbaj (1971c) writes in an op-ed piece that Hindus in India actually mean Hindu when 
they say “Bangali”, and so they are killing Muslims, not Bangalis, and the motto “all 
Muslims are brothers” has been replaced by “Bangalis are brothers” but which he 
interprets as actually meaning Hindus are all brothers as is also stated in an editorial 
(Dainik Sangram 22 October 1971, p. 2). 
The analysis of the material showed a clear attempt to differentiate between 
Bangali Muslims and Bangali Hindus, even in terms of language, literature, etc. Ikram 
(1971) in an article published in the Dainik Sangram (2 July, p. 5) argues that 
Bangla/Hindu literature is not a true reflection of Muslim Bengal, that the Bangla of 
Muslims is very different from Sanskrit traditions, containing many Arabic and Farsi 
words; essentially, that the Bangla of West Bengal is Hindu and the Bangla of East 
Pakistan or East Bengal is Pakistani, influenced by Muslim tradition. A columnist using 
the pseudonym Pothik (Dainik Sangram 26 August 1971, p. 2), in a piece on cultural 
invasion also in the Dainik Sangram, goes one step further and laments the 
Sanskritisation and de-Islamification of Bangla. This highlighting of difference between 
Bangali/Hindu/Indian and Muslim/Pakistani is a recurrent theme throughout, justifying 
the Othering of the former as/into the enemy and legitimising the state and military’s 
actions against them.  
Indeed, Bangla, Bangalis and (East) Bengal all seem to be at threat of severe 
‘Hindu-isation’ according to the media discourse. Rahman (1971), a columnist, writes in 
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the Dainik Sangram (18 October, p. 2) on how Bangali Muslim youth think of Hindu 
thought/philosophy as their own thought/philosophy or culture and as a result they think 
of themselves more as Bangali rather than Muslim. Bangali Hindu society is said to be 
influencing Pakistan’s Bangla-speaking Muslims towards Bangali nationalism, giving 
rise to fears of a Hindu state of Bangla desh (country), devoid of Muslims, being 
established (Raihan 1971b, Dainik Sangram 9 July, p. 2). In another article, the title of 
which literally means ‘From removing discrimination to the Hindu-isation movement’, 
columnist Rahee (1971b) writes of intrigues by Hindu leaders using the “Bangla desh” 
slogan to turn Muslims of the Pak-Bangla subcontinent into Hindus (Dainik Sangram 23 
May, p. 2). The slogan “Joy Bangla” (victory to Bengal) is said to have replaced 
“Pakistan zindabad” (long live Pakistan) and to actually mean “Jai Hind” (victory to 
India) in Rastbaj (1971b) (Dainik Sangram 24 June, p. 2). In the article ‘Mir Jafar32 
shomipe’, the “Joy Bangla” movement is said to have taken “Allahu akbar”’ (Allah is 
great) away from the mouths of God’s followers and replaced it with “Joy Mujibur” (in 
reference to leader of the Awami League Sheikh Mujibur Rahman); people are being 
taught to chant “Joy Bangla” instead of saying “Bismillah” and “narae taqbeer Allahu 
akbar” (say Allahu akbar, Allah is great); in the name of Bangali nationalism, mushrik33 
																																																						
32	Mir	Jafar	Ali	Khan	Bahadur	was	the	first	Nawab	of	Bengal	supported	by	the	British	East	India	Company	
who	betrayed	Nawab	Sirajuddowla	leading	to	his	defeat	in	the	Battle	of	Plassey	and	making	the	way	for	
British	rule	in	India.	Commonly	referred	to	as	the	Wretched	Traitor,	he	has	become	a	legendary	villain	in	
Bengal.	The	name	Mir	Jafar	has	come	to	mean	traitor,	thus	its	use	in	the	column	‘Mir	Jafar	Shomipe’	
published	in	the	Dainik	Sangram,	referring	to	Sheikh	Mujibur	Rahman	and	Bangalis	who	were	fighting	for	
liberation	as	traitors.	In	Bangladesh	today,	however,	the	term	razakar,	one	of	the	anti-liberation	groups	in	
1971,	carries	a	similar,	even	worse	connotation,	also	meaning	traitor.	Both	words	are	interesting	
examples	of	how	not	only	words	but	also	names	and	titles	make	meaning,	and	how	meanings	change	with	
context.	A	heroic	Nawab	and	a	force	fighting	for	the	faith	have	both	come	to	mean	traitor	in	a	negative	
sense	in	contemporary	Bangladesh.		
33	According	to	the	Dictionary	of	Spiritual	Terms	(online),	a	polytheist;	literally,	“one	who	falsely	associates	
(something)	with	God,”	considering	it	to	be	likewise	divine.	It	is	most	often	used	in	the	Qur’ān	to	refer	to	
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are being befriended and Muslims made into enemies; Muslims are being transformed 
into Hindus in the name of Bangali culture through various rituals such as the Bangali 
new year, the identity of Islam and Muslims is being washed away from the “Bangla 
desh” that is being dreamt about (Dainik Sangram 30 August 1971, p. 2). It is interesting 
to note here, however, that slogans about Bangali nationalism are meant to replace 
Islamic expressions where the two are not necessarily mutually exclusive except in the 
eyes of those opposing liberation to whom nation and religion are one and the same. Must 
a nation comprise people of one religion only, i.e., be religiously homogenous, and what 
about the others then? Similar ideas are expressed in an article reprinted from the 
previous year, which also says that people are being forced to say “Joy Bangla” instead of 
“Pakistan zindabad”, sing praises of Laxman Sen34 instead of Bakhtiar Khilji35, forget 
about East Pakistan and root for Bangla desh, forget Islamic culture and desire Bangali 
(Hindu) culture, in short, they are being imparted lessons in Bangali nationalism instead 
of Islamic nationalism (Dainik Sangram 30 August 1971, p. 2). Here the term “Islamic 
nationalism” is actually used and in opposition to Bangali nationalism, suggesting that 
Islam is not only a personal religion but a foundation of the nation around which people 
should rally as a form of nationalism.  
Where the pro-liberation Bangali population saw the struggle as one for freedom 
from the oppressive domination and political, economic, social and cultural 
discrimination of their Pakistani rulers, the anti-liberation elements portrayed the war as 
																																																																																																																																																																	
the	Meccans	and	other	Arabs	who	refused	to	accept	the	monotheistic	vision	of	Islam.	Polytheism	or	shirk	
is	a	sin	that	cannot	be	forgiven	(Adamec	2009). 
34	Laxman	Sen	was	a	Hindu	king	of	Bengal.	
35	Bakhtiar	Khalji	was	a	Turkic	military-general	who	conquered	Bengal,	marking	the	beginning	of	Muslim	
rule	in	the	region.	
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being between Hindu and Muslim, India and Pakistan, continuously and repetitively 
constructing difference between the two through language and discourse.  
 
6.2c The “sachcha Musolman” 
As Amartya Sen (2006) argues, whether seen and shown to be a militant or 
tolerant, Islam as a religion of violence or peace, it may neither be necessary nor useful or 
even possible to define the “true Muslim” or Islam. The anti-liberation media of 1971 
analysed here, however, found it rather important to construct and focus on this identity. 
Based on the analysis, some of the qualities of the “sachcha Musolman” or true Muslim 
are similar to those of the pure Pakistani. 
Muslims seek Pakistan, and so those who do not want Pakistan are not Muslims, a 
notion stated openly in a Dainik Sangram op-ed piece by a regular columnist going by 
the pseudonym of Dhumketu (1971a): “Those who want to turn Pakistan, a country for 
Muslims, into Hindus’ Hindustan and breathe freely can at most be Bangalis, we cannot 
believe they are Muslims” (Dainik Sangram 9 June, p. 2). Those who criticise Islam are 
murtad36, bringing on the destruction of Pakistan, and those who sacrifice in its name are 
mard-e-momin (the perfect man). “If we criticise Islam then not only will the state of 
Pakistan be destroyed but we will be murtad and if we forge ahead in self-sacrifice and 
forbearance then Allah may bestow upon us the status of mard e momin” (Dainik 
Sangram 2 July 1971, p. 4). Even a poem published in the children’s page depicts the 
“sachcha Musolman” as forging ahead with the prayer-inscribed flag. “Holy land will 
remain pure, we the people of this country are all sachcha Musolman, we will race 
																																																						
36	A	person	born	to	a	Muslim	parent	who	later	rejects	Islam	is	called	a	murtad	fitri,	and	a	person	who	
converted	to	Islam	and	later	rejects	the	religion	is	called	a	murtad	milli.	A	person	is	considered	apostate	if	
he	or	she	converts	from	Islam	to	another	religion.	(Wikipedia)	
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forward with the flag of the holy kalima…” (Dainik Sangram 16 July 1971, p. 4). The 
president of Pakistan is also labelled a true Muslim, described as a “sachcha Muslim, 
mujahid, khati Pakistani” (Dainik Sangram 29 June 1971, p. 1).  
Indeed, as mentioned above in the sub-section on the khati Pakistani, s/he is 
perhaps most importantly a khati, true/pure Muslim, dispensing of issues of race and 
ethnicity, strong and united in their efforts towards an Islamic movement and to establish 
an Islamic way of life, who can make sacrifices for the nation and whose main goal is to 
gain the satisfaction of Allah. Only those who believe in an Islamic way of life should be 
allowed to join the Rezakar forces (Dainik Sangram 23 August 1971, p. 2) and Governor 
AM Malek, while reminding the Rezakars about their responsibility, asks them to follow 
tradition like a sachcha Musolman in fulfilling their great duty (Dainik Sangram 14 
November 1971, p. 1). 
While Amartya Sen (2006) stresses the importance of seeing (in the post-9/11 
world) Muslims as a diverse people with varied contributions to society in the context of 
their rich history as having been scholars, scientists, philosophers, painters, musicians 
and more who have contributed to the development of Muslim people and global 
heritage, the advocates of Pakistan in 1971 repeatedly narrowed identity down only to 
Muslim identity. For example, the education minister Abbas Ali Khan was quoted as 
saying the education system should be such that “along with becoming scientists, 
philosophers, engineers, doctors, economists, they [the students] become khati 
Musolman” (Dainik Sangram 23 September 1971, p. 1) and that he would try to introduce 
such an education system which would create true Muslims and Pakistanis (Dainik 
Sangram 26 September 1971, p. 1). He also says that Pakistan is an ideological state and 
that its ideology is Islamic ideology. “The foundation of Islamic nationalism is kalima 
tayyiba, not the limits of language, region, geography. We are not just Bangali, we are 
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Bangla-speaking Muslims... Pakistan is going through a major crisis and every Pakistani 
citizen must think like a true Pakistani and Musolman” (Dainik Sangram 25 September 
1971, p. 1). Thinking like and being a true Muslim is what qualifies one as being a true 
Pakistani in the media discourse. Religion and nationality are integrated in order to 
legitimise the actions of the state basing them on religion for the cause of the nation.  
In order to be made into khati Musolman, the youth must be reformed (Dainik 
Sangram 26 August 1971, p. 5). Pakistani soldiers must be given ideological along with 
military training for only if they win over death as khati Musloman will Allah help to end 
the national crisis. They must fight to establish dominion not over a region but for the 
supremacy of the kalima (Dainik Sangram 8 September 1971, p. 1). Jamaat-i-Islami 
student leader Matiur Rahman Nizami was quoted as saying that the government should 
train them as “khati soldiers” and that “We should all be identified as Muslim soldiers of 
an Islamic state... we must finish off those who are involved in armed conspiracy against 
Pakistan and Islam” (Dainik Sangram 15 September 1971, p. 3). He also says that those 
who love Islam are those who love Pakistan and that Pakistan cannot survive without 
Islam (Dainik Sangram 24 September 1971, p. 6). Here, thinking, feeling and acting like 
a true Muslim is what makes a Pakistani and those who do not love the religion cannot 
love the country. 
In a front-page commentary of the Dainik Sangram, the writer addresses his 
readers by reminding them of their identity:  
Today our only identity should be that we are Muslims and Pakistanis. In order to 
increase the status of Islam and Pakistan we must move forward to cut the chest of the 
enemy like a restless sword. Our ‘narae taqbeer Allahu akbar’ will be the enemy’s death 
knell. Soldiers should be shoulder to shoulder to bring God's wrath upon the enemy. The 
fire of faithful inspiration is ablaze in this flow of blood. This blood has been left in our 
custody by our history, it is our legacy. (Dainik Sangram 28 November 1971, p. 1)  
 
With this powerful imagery created through language, the faithful and the patriotic are 
merged, and the battle for nation is portrayed as a battle for faith.   
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In several interviews conducted for this research, there was a consensus that 
Pakistan not only sought to discursively construct Muslim and Hindu identities but that it 
also attempted to transform Hindus into “pukka” Muslims through a number of 
procedures and strategies. Sudhangshu Shekhar Roy37, a Hindu teenager in 1971 whose 
father was picked up by the Pakistani army towards the beginning of the war, calls it 
“enforced Islamisation”. These strategies are not peculiar to the 1971 war38, but Roy 
explained his experience of the process. “First, Hindus were killed, then their houses 
occupied, the women picked up, so that they would be forced to flee. But how many 
people could they kill, how many houses could they occupy? When this means did not 
work, they adopted a new strategy which was to make the Hindus who remained in 
Pakistan into Muslims. There was a process of enforced Islamisation…They wanted to 
change the behaviours, rituals and lifestyles of Hindus and make them into pukka 
Muslims. For example, they ordered the tulsi39 plant to be removed from our homes. 
They did not allow our women to wear sakha-sindoor40. Men gave up wearing dhoti41 so 
																																																						
37	Sudhangshu	Shekhar	Roy,	Professor,	University	of	Dhaka.	Personal	interview.	November	3,	2014,	
conducted	at	University	of	Dhaka.	
38	Gerlach	(2010)	elaborates	on	the	persecution	of	Hindus	in	1971	Pakistan,	claiming	that	it	was	not	new	
and	had	happened	before	not	only	during	the	Partition	but	in	the	1950s	and	1960s	as	well.	With	regards	
to	1971,	he	quotes	several	members	of	the	Pakistan	army	who	gave	or	had	orders	to	specifically	target	
Hindus	and	writes	about	razakars	who	made	it	easier	to	identify	Hindus	by	marking	their	houses	with	a	big	
“H”.	Hindu	men	were	also	identified	because	they	were	not	circumcised.	Gerlach	also	writes	about	the	
allegedly	millions	of	forced	conversions	to	Islam	in	1971,	‘some	in	reaction	to	Pakistani	army	attacks,	
others	involved	an	ultimatum	by	local	Muslim	leaders,	or	beatings	and	robberies	by	razakars’	(Gerlach	
2010:	146).	
39	Tulsi	or	Holy	basil	is	a	sacred	plant	in	Hindu	belief.	Hindus	regard	it	as	an	earthly	manifestation	of	the	
goddess	Tulsi,	a	consort	of	the	god	Vishnu.	The	offering	of	its	leaves	is	mandatory	in	ritualistic	worship	of	
Vishnu	and	his	forms	like	Krishna	and	Vithoba.	Many	Hindus	have	tulsi	plants	growing	in	front	of	or	near	
their	home,	often	in	special	pots	or	special	small	masonry	structures.	Traditionally,	Tulsi	is	planted	in	the	
center	of	the	central	courtyard	of	Hindu	houses.	The	plant	is	cultivated	for	religious	and	medicinal	
purposes,	and	for	its	essential	oil.	(Wikipedia)	
40	Bangles	and	vermilion	worn	by	married	Hindu	women.	
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that they would not be identified as Hindu. I saw one of my teachers, Hiren Chakraborty, 
who had worn nothing but a loose shirt on top and dhoti below all his life, wearing a 
pyjama at that time. It was a step-by-step process in an effort to make Hindus into 
Muslims.”  
He continues, “They would go to Hindu homes and when offered refreshments 
they would ask for a big plate and ask the hosts to eat with them in ‘jamaat’42. This was a 
form of social transformation, Hindus eating from the same plate as Muslims.” 
“In the last week of November and first week of December, Hindus were made 
into Muslims. They were made to recite prayers and their names were changed to Muslim 
names. My father’s name was changed from Hiralal Roy to Helaluddin Khan, my 
mother’s from Hemangini Roy to Hamida Begum. They were issued identity cards with 
their new names. The new Hindus-turned-Muslims were forced to pray. They couldn’t 
monitor women inside their homes but they kept track of the men going to pray at 
mosques. Hindus did not know how to pray, but they went to the mosques and did what 
the Muslims did, followed their recitations and imitated their actions.” Such accounts 
show that what the media, in the form of Althusser’s ideological state apparatus, was 
doing discursively, the state and its other apparatuses were also carrying out on the 
ground repressively, effectively imposing new identities on people.   
 “Even after this, when they thought the Hindus weren’t becoming pukka Muslims 
and strategised about how to make them so, they took a decision. The following Friday, 
the day of Jumma, after Jumma prayers, the Hindus were to be invited to a great 
																																																																																																																																																																	
41	The	dhoti	is	a	rectangular	piece	of	unstitched	cloth,	usually	around	4.5	metres	(15	ft)	long,	wrapped	
around	the	waist	and	the	legs	and	knotted	at	the	waist,	resembling	a	long	skirt.	(Wikipedia)	It	was	worn	
more	commonly	by	Bangali	Hindus,	as	opposed	to	the	punjabi-pyjama	worn	by	Bangali	Muslims	and	West	
Pakistanis.	
42	The	Arabic	term	refers	to	a	congregation	or	gathering.	
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luncheon, and the main dish at the great luncheon would be beef. They had occupied the 
main Kalibari [temple of the goddess Kali] in Tangail town and this is where the feast 
was arranged. And when this was announced, the psychological trauma to the Hindu 
society was unimaginable. That day would be a supreme test for them. Recently things 
have changed a bit,” explains Roy, “like in terms of eating habits, some Hindus eat beef, 
but in 1971 the situation was such that 99 per cent of Hindus did not eat, even touch, 
beef, they used to religiously hate it, they could not eat it. Any Hindu who ate beef would 
be made an outcast in Hindu society and this is probably what the organisers of the 
luncheon wanted. And so when the feast was announced, it caused psychological trauma 
to the Hindu community. I think some people would have converted just from shock after 
the event took place. The feast was arranged for the following Friday, which was 17th 
December. Fortunately, the country was liberated on 16th December. Tangail was freed 
on the 11th or 12th which was Sunday or Monday. That Friday never came. Otherwise the 
situation would have been dire.”  
Meghna Guhathakurta43, also a teenager during the war who lost her father44, a 
Hindu professor of Dhaka University at the beginning of the war, describes the 
“conflation” of identities: “Hindus were supposed to be Indian infiltrators. It was religion 
conflated with nationality. We were called Indian infiltrators who could not stay loyal to 
Pakistan. ‘Sachcha Musolmans’ would support Pakistan. Those who were not ‘sachcha 
Musolman’, they were Awami League or pro-liberation forces who wanted 
independence.” 
																																																						
43	Meghna	Guhathakurta,	former	faculty	member,	University	of	Dhaka,	Executive	Director,	Research	
Initiatives	Bangladesh.	Personal	interview.	27	October	2014,	conducted	at	her	office	in	Banani,	Dhaka.	
44	Jyotirmoy	Guhathakurta,	educator	and	humanist,	Reader	in	English	at	Dhaka	University,	was	one	of	the	
Bangali	intellectuals	killed	by	the	Pakistan	Army	during	the	Dhaka	University	massacre	on	the	night	of	25	
March	1971.	
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In such a context, it was unsafe to be Hindu, says Guhathakurta. “We did away 
with our Hindu names and took Christian names because it was safer to be Christian than 
Hindu. I used to study at Holy Cross School, the sisters there told my mother not to send 
me to school, they [the Pakistani army] were going through the college register for names 
of Hindu girls. Out of nine months I didn’t go to school for eight months. Later, when 
they told me it was safe to go, I went. Maa and I took shelter at a Christian orphanage 
once and I was there under the name of Monica Rosario. Maa took a Christian name and 
took shelter at the Holy Family hospital. We had nowhere to stay, because my father was 
executed the first night. We didn’t leave Dhaka but we stayed at friends’ places. It was 
even difficult to stay there. The first place we stayed at was a Muslim family’s and in 
their photo albums where they had pictures of my family with captions with my parents’ 
names, they had to cut out the [Hindu] names of Jyotirmoy Guhathakurta and Bashonti 
Guhathakurta. So there was a total loss of identity for anyone who was not a Muslim.” 
Dr. M.A. Hasan45, a researcher and former member of the Pakistan army who 
later joined the pro-liberation forces and worked as a coordinator with the law 
enforcement agencies, relates an even more drastic account of the desecration of 
identities through rape and forced impregnation. He claims that, along with rape being 
perpetrated to break the Bangali morale, it was also used for the purpose of creating “true 
Pakistanis” through the forced impregnation of Bangali women. This is discussed in 
greater detail in Chapter 8, but suffice it to say, in Dr. Hasan’s opinion, Pakistanis who 
thought themselves racially superior wished to create Pakistanis in Bangali wombs, 
thereby changing their religion and identity, their genetic makeup. These were not 
																																																						
45	M.	A.	Hasan.	Personal	interview.	19	October	2014	conducted	at	his	medical	chamber	in	Mirpur,	Dhaka.	
A	former	member	of	the	Pakistan	Army,	Dr.	M.A.	Hasan,	a	doctor	by	profession,	worked	as	a	coordinator	
with	the	law	enforcement	agencies	after	the	war	rescuing	women	victims	of	sexual	violence.	
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isolated incidents, claims Dr. Hasan, but were widely practised in the Pakistani army. “In 
the Pakistani army, soldiers are told that they are each equal to 10 kafirs/Hindus,” he 
says, claiming that this was done even prior to, during and also after the India-Pakistan 
wars of 1965 and 1971. This is also why members of the al-Badr forces were chosen 
from religious backgrounds in order to more easily preach Islamic ideals to them and sell 
the matter of Muslim identity, says Hasan. 
Amartya Sen, in arguing against fixed identities and civilisational partitioning in 
order to avoid vilifying Muslims and Islam in the post-September 11 world, makes the 
important distinction between being Muslim and ‘the various affiliations and loyalties a 
person who happens to be Muslim has’ and a person’s ‘Islamic identity’ (2006: 61), 
pointing out that being Muslim does not determine everything about a person. Muslims 
can be very different from each other, depending on the idea of ijtehad or religious 
interpretation which, as Sen says, ‘allows considerable latitude within Islam itself, but 
also because an individual Muslim has much freedom to determine what other values and 
priorities he or she would choose without compromising a basic Islamic faith’ (Sen 2006: 
65). Where the Indian emperors Ashoka and Akbar, the latter a Muslim, were known to 
be champions of religious and other forms of tolerance (Sen 2006), Akbar’s Din-e-ilahi – 
a syncretic religion intended to minimise the divide between and merge the best of the 
religions of the empire – is actually mocked in the Dainik Sangram of 1971. Space for 
interpretation was clearly rejected in Pakistan’s anti-liberation discourse, which 
constructed very rigid categories of who was or was not a “sachcha Musolman” and the 
ways in which one should prove it. As a poem published on the occasion of Pakistan’s 
Independence Day says, Muslims on a path lighted by faith and with the Quran on their 
chest, can overcome anything (Dainik Sangram 14 August 1971, p. 2 of supplement). 
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Being a true Muslim seemed to mean doing anything for the faith, inspired by the faith, 
including committing acts of violence.  
 
6.2d Hindus, those Muslim-hating Indians 
In arguing against Samuel Huntington’s thesis of the clash of civilisations and the 
classification of India as a “Hindu civilization” in particular (as is also often done in the 
Pakistani media of 1971), Amartya Sen (2006) points out that while 80 per cent of the 
population of India happens to be Hindu, the country also has a larger Muslim population 
than any other country in the world except for Indonesia and Pakistan, and a diverse 
nature and wide range of art, literature, music, film, food, etc., contributed to by both 
Hindus and Muslims.  
Furthermore, Sen argues that ‘violence is fomented by the imposition of singular 
and belligerent identities on gullible people, championed by proficient artisans of terror’ 
(Sen 2006: 3). This ‘singular affiliation’ assumes that a person belongs primarily to one 
collectivity only, e.g., as a member of the Hindu religion, devoid of all other political, 
cultural, social and human affiliations, and, according to Sen is a popular weapon of 
sectarian activists who do not wish to have any other links or references taming the 
loyalty of their targeted groups. Construction of the singular identity which serves a 
violent purpose is quite easily achieved by removing all other associations and affiliations 
and through selective emphasis and incitement, doing away with the freedom to think and 
reason and through the use of fragmentary logic (ibid). By this he means that the ‘specific 
identity that is separated out for special action’ is actually a genuine identity in most 
cases – that is, a Hindu is, in fact, a Hindu – and the demands of this ‘“sole” identity’ are 
then redefined ‘in a particularly belligerent form’ (Sen 2006: 176). However, in the case 
of 1971, as this research will show, the anti-liberation groups in order to serve their 
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purpose labelled those Bangalis who prioritised their ethnic/cultural identity over their 
Muslim identity, as Hindus.  
People belonging to the Hindu religion were vilified in a number of ways in the 
East Pakistani media of 1971 analysed here – as historical oppressors and present 
infiltrators, as imperialist in ambition and Muslim-hating in nature and, perhaps most 
commonly, as the “enemy Other” – at polar opposites to Muslims and forever trying to 
destroy them. Hindu is synonymous with Indian, implicitly suggesting that Hindus are 
not true Pakistanis and, whereas Pakistan is a homeland for Muslims, “Hindu India” is 
“Hindustan”, a place for Hindus. The collocation “Brahmin Bharat” or “Hindu India” can 
be found at least 20 times in just the first two months of the issues of Dainik Sangram 
analysed for this research as well as several times in the Dainik Pakistan, presumably to 
ensure that readers make an association between the two. Often there are other adjectives 
added, such as “evil schemers of Brahmin India” (Dainik Sangram 27 October 1971, p. 
2). 
The word “imperialist”, too, is so often used with Brahmin and Hindu that 
imperialism becomes the characterising nature of those belonging to the religion and 
caste. This comes at a time when the wounds of British colonial rule over undivided India 
are still raw in the minds of Indians and Pakistanis and which the latter use to identify 
India as the neo-imperialists, who served British colonial interests in the past and are 
working towards strengthening their own in the present landscape. This ostensibly also 
necessitates and justifies violent resistance against India and Hindus as it once did against 
the British. Imperialist India’s historical as well as recent conspiracy to destroy Pakistan, 
especially its eastern wing, and make Pakistani Muslims into the slaves of Hindus/Indians 
is an oft-recurring theme (Dainik Sangram 10 April 1971, p. 2, 16 April 1971, p. 1, 17 
April 1971, p. 2). Better still, Muslims can be eliminated altogether and this is “the main 
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objective of Hindustan” (Dainik Sangram 9 April 1971, p. 2). It is interesting to note that, 
whereas India is referred to as “Bharat” in most news pieces, in editorials and op-ed 
pieces, possibly because of the availability of space as well as opinion, it is referred to as 
Hindustan, stressing on it as a “Hindu-sthaan” or Hindu place.    
 
6.2d(i) Historical subservience 
Several articles in the Dainik Sangram and Dainik Pakistan rehashed the 
historical differences between Hindus and Muslims, Hindu domination of Muslims and 
Muslim subservience to Hindus, ranging from the Partition of Bengal of 1905 to the 
Partition of India in 1947. For example, a news story published in the Dainik Pakistan 
explains the recent crisis as “a new expression of old Brahmin policy”, claiming that 
Hindu mythology is full of examples of powerful Hindu gods repressing people of other 
faiths and that this is true not only of the Hindu religion but of everyday Hindu society, 
highly divided and isolated, where one class deprives the others (Dainik Pakistan 8 
December 1971, p. 2).  
Editorials also expressed fears about Bangali Muslims who, “uneasy about 
Kolkata’s babu” (Hindu gentlemen), gave their blood to free Pakistan (Dainik Sangram 3 
March 1971, p. 4) and about “footsteps of Muslims in mosques [becoming] faint 
compared to the crowds at churches and the sound of bells at Hindu temples” (Dainik 
Sangram 8 March 1971, p. 2). Taher (1971), in a Dainik Sangram op-ed piece, ‘Pakistan 
amader (Pakistan is ours)’ talks about how the history of repression by Hindus makes it 
obvious that Muslim religion, culture and life is not safe in the hands of Hindu rulers. 
Hindus never wanted Muslims to be educated and Bangali Muslims do not want to be the 
“peons of Hindu babu” again (Dainik Sangram 15 April 1971, p. 3). These articles play 
on Muslim fears of Hindu oppression as was historically experienced by them. In another 
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article on the historical oppression of Muslims by Hindus and the struggle to be freed 
from it, Dainik Sangram columnist Mujahid (1971a) suggests that “those who today are 
supporting free Bengal are clear munafiq in the language of the Quran (Sura Nisa 138, 
139, 144, 145 ayat) because they are helping the Hindu government of the kafir46 and 
(the enemy) India to conspire to go to war against Muslim Pakistan (Dainik Sangram 17 
July 1971, p. 2). In this sense, Hindus are referred to as kafir or disbelievers, and those 
who support them, as munafiq47. In various articles, references are also made to wars 
between Hindus and Muslims in which Muslims were the victors, inspiring them for the 
battle in the offing. 
 
6.2d(ii) Difference 
As Kathryn Woodward argues, identity is marked out by difference. Referring to 
the Yugoslav war, she writes that, ‘to be a Serb is to be “not a Croat”’ (Woodward 2002: 
9). Also, ‘difference is underpinned by exclusion: if you are a Serb, you cannot be a 
Croat, and vice versa’ (ibid). Similarly, in 1971 Pakistan, being Muslim and Pakistani 
was constructed in opposition to being Hindu and Indian in the media, as the analysis of 
the material shows.  
The articulation of difference between Muslims and Hindus and the “Othering” of 
Hindus, the enemy, is common in the media. Shafiullah (Dainik Sangram 18 May 1971, 
p. 2), in an op-ed piece, writes that Indira Gandhi should not try to bring Hindus and 
Muslims together because of the historical differences between them. Dainik Sangram 
																																																						
46	“Coverer”.	One	who	hides,	or	covers	up	the	truth.	An	unbeliever,	polytheist,	and	idol	worshiper,	who	is	
condemned	to	eternal	hellfire.	(Adamec	2009)	
47	Derived	from	the	Arabic	word	munafiqun,	or	hypocrites,	referring	to	opportunists	who	did	not	become	
Muslims	by	conviction.	(Adamec	2009)	
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contributor Islam (1971b), too, writes that Hindus never wanted Pakistan, never accepted 
Muslims’ identity/existence and nurtured dreams of a “Ramrajyo” (kingdom of the Hindu 
god Ram) (Dainik Sangram 26 October 1971, p. 2). He claims that it has been proven 
that Hindus and Muslims are two different peoples who cannot coexist which is why 
India and Pakistan were made into two separate countries. In the same newspaper, 
Khademun Nabi describes in a letter to the editor (Dainik Sangram 26 October 1971, p. 
2) the ancient battle between Hinduism and Islam, Hindus and Muslims, India and 
Pakistan, stressing that there can never be compromise between extremist Hinduism with 
its militant leaders and Islam, and that Pakistan should prepare for the fourth battle of 
Panipat48, underlining what Sen (2006) called a false clash of civilization thesis, which 
firstly presumes that relations between human beings can be seen as relations between 
different civilisations and that this then leads to their inevitable clash. 
Jamaat-i-Islami leader Ghulam Azam, in an op-ed piece in the Dainik Sangram, 
makes a categorical distinction between Hindus and Muslims:  
The long 800-year history of rule in India has proven that idol-worshipping Hindus and 
monotheistic49 Muslims can never become one people. Bangali Muslims never wanted to 
be one with Bangali Hindus, that’s why the contribution of Bangali Muslims to the 
Pakistan movement is the most. The dada of West Bengal are conspiring using the 
pretext of ‘Bangali jati’ [Bangali race] to confuse Bangali Muslims (Dainik Sangram 18 
August 1971 p. 2).  
 
																																																						
48	Battles	in	India	in	which	the	Mughal	and	Muslim	empires	emerged	victors	
49	The	original	word	used	here	is	the	Arabic	tawhidi.	Habeck	(2006)	describes	‘Abd	al-Wahhab’s	
interpretation	of	the	doctrine	of	tawhid	in	Islam	–	the	belief	in	one	God	–	breaking	it	up	into	three	
aspects:	God’s	lordship,	whereby	God	has	no	associates,	only	He	can	make	rules	and	laws,	no	human	
being	can	alter	the	shari’a	and	anyone	who	tries	is	a	heretic	who	can	have	jihad	declared	against	them;	
God’s	worship,	making	anyone	who	appeals	to	any	other	object	or	being	unbelievers	who	can	be	fought	
and	killed;	and	the	oneness	of	religion,	whereby	jihadists	claim	that	Islam	is	the	only	acceptable	form	of	
worship	and	all	other	forms	are	evil.	Habeck,	however,	points	out	problems	with	the	third	based	on	fiqh	
(Islamic	jurisprudence),	shari’a	(Islamic	law)	and	the	Prophet	Muhammad’s	known	tolerance	for	other	
religions. 
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Difference is drawn between idol- and multiple-god-worshipping Hindus – an 
unforgivable sin in monotheistic Islam and between the Bangali Muslim and West 
Bengal’s dada (a term of reference for brother more common among Bangali Hindus). 
In a letter to the editor published on 12 April 1971 in the Dainik Sangram, a 
reader named Abdul Kalam writes about the Shaheed Minar (a monument erected in 
tribute to the martyrs of the Language Movement of 1952) as being a symbol of 
Hinduism and activities surrounding it as Hindu rituals. He states that the language 
martyrs were Muslims and did not give their lives to spread Hindu culture, and that in 
order to honour them one should engage in Islamic activities such as reading the Quran or 
establishing mosques and madrasas.  
Here again we see the claim of Hindu-isation of Bangali culture and a call for 
Islamisation instead. The Language Movement was and continues to be a proud event for 
the Bangali people who fought for Bangla (as opposed to Urdu only) to be made a state 
language of Pakistan in which several people gave their lives. Religion was not at all an 
issue here except for, as discussed in Chapter 2, the Pakistani authorities trying to portray 
Urdu as a Muslim language similar to Arabic, and Bangla, because it is derived from 
Sanskrit, as a Hindu language, thereby imposing as the state language the language of the 
minority Punjabi ruling elite. 
In different ways, Hindus are portrayed as the enemy Other. This is starkly 
evident in an editorial on “The barbarism of Hindustani soldiers”, where these soldiers 
are reported to drink (alcohol) in the trenches, pick up and torture women, loot and take 
supplies back to India and Hindus are said to want to victimise innocent, unarmed 
Muslims (Dainik Sangram 2 May 1971, p. 2). Drinking alcohol is haram or forbidden for 
Muslims and so this is a way of showing difference with Hindus. Another news report 
describes how Pakistan and Bangali Muslims were “saved from the clutches of the 
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Hindus” and would never destroy Pakistan to re-establish Hindu rule (Dainik Sangram 23 
June 1971, p. 1). Hindus never accepted Pakistan and are still trying to form “Hindumata 
Bharat” (India, mother of Hindus) (Dainik Sangram 8 May 1971, p. 2). India’s Brahmins 
are even compared to the devil who showed sympathy and confused the first human with 
sweet words, saying that the sympathy of Brahmins is worse than that of the devil 
(Ahmed, Dainik Sangram 31 August 1971, p. 2). 
Furthermore, various derogatory terms are used to identify and describe Hindus 
and Indians (or Hindus as Indians) in news, editorials and op-ed pieces of the Dainik 
Sangram in 1971. Hindus are shown as violent, criminal and faithless. For example, a 
poem published in the supplement commemorating Pakistan’s independence day on 14 
August 1971 describes Hindus as “ferocious tigers of the tulsi forest” (the tulsi plant 
being sacred to Hindus) who, “after getting what they want, slaughter Muslims” (Dainik 
Sangram 14 August 1971, supplement p. 4). Hindus are often labelled “goonda” or 
hooligans/gangsters who violate the honour of Muslim women (Dainik Sangram 27, 28 
August, 9, 15 September, 1, 19 October, 8, 20 November 1971). In another news report 
published on 13 April that same year, Hindus are described as “terrorists” and “agents” 
and on 30 April, “Hindustani infiltrators and spies” as “naa-paak” or unclean/impure and 
as “beimaan dosyu” meaning faithless bandits on 1 October. Derogatory references are 
made such as to “lengtiwala” (person wearing a lengti which is a tiny piece of cloth 
covering the private parts) who hate Muslims (Dainik Sangram 30 August 1971, p. 3) and 
to “tikidhari” (person having a tiki or tufts of uncut hair kept on the head by Hindus) 
India (Dainik Sangram 26 November 1971, p. 2), possibly indicating Hindu priests who 
tend to have the latter. In a letter to the editor titled ‘Hushiyar Musolman (Beware, 
Muslims)’, Hindus are also described as having tortured and killed Muslims (Dainik 
Sangram 17 May 1971, p. 2) and in an editorial published on 8 August, Hindus are 
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referred to as “bloodsuckers”. An editorial even says that the blood of Muslims is said to 
be the best ingredient for worship by Hindu “kapalik” (ascetic worshippers of the 
goddess Kali) and hints that in the guise of democracy and humanity, Indian prime 
minister Indira Gandhi’s government may be offering 100,000 children at the feet of 
Bharat Mata (Mother India) to quench the thirst of the “kapalik” (Dainik Sangram 22 
August 1971, p. 2).  
The analysis showed that Hindus/Indians are represented as the enemies of Islam, 
trying to turn Pakistan into Hindustan which means Pakistani Muslims must unite in the 
cause of Islam and Pakistan. The language is also used by officials. For example, Raisi 
Begum50 is quoted as saying that Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, along with the enemies of 
Islam, is trying to transform the East Pakistan of 7 crore Muslims into  
Biswanath, Kali and Durga temples and to remove forever Islam’s universal culture from 
the holy land of Pakistan. He replaced the cry of ‘Allahu akbar’ with the pagan cry of 
‘Joy Bangla’. May Allah give our military the strength to destroy devilish forces... I hope 
you have not forgotten the persecution of the Hindus against you Muslims... In the name 
of Allah, be united in your obedience to Islam and Pakistan. (Dainik Sangram 3 May 
1971, p. 1)  
 
Again, what is simply Bangali or Bangla, such as the slogan “Joy Bangla” which literally 
means victory to Bengal, is depicted in opposition to the Muslim call of “Allahu akbar” 
meaning Allah is great, whereas the two are not mutually exclusive. 
Different parts of a song titled “Moushumi gaan” published in the Dainik 
Sangram on several days throughout the months under study make references to Hindus 
that show them as being inferior to Pakistanis. For example, the common Bangla proverb 
																																																						
50	Raisi	Begum	was	the	only	female	politician	quoted	in	the	media	under	study.	She	was	president	of	the	
Pakistan	Jamiatus-silm	party	but,	perhaps	more	importantly	–	and	this	was	highlighted	in	the	news	items	
which	quoted	her	–	she	was	the	daughter	of	AK	Fazlul	Haque,	who,	prior	to	his	death	was	a	prominent	
and	popular	Pakistani	politician.	Haque	served	as	the	Prime	Minister	of	Bengal	under	British	Indian	rule	as	
well	as	Chief	Minister	and	Governor	of	East	Pakistan.	He	was	a	lifelong	Bangla	nationalist,	but	was	also	the	
first	to	advocate	for	the	Lahore	Resolution	in	1940	which	called	for	the	creation	of	sovereign	Muslim-
majority	states	in	eastern	and	northwestern	British	India.	
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“mashir dorod maayer cheye beshi” literally meaning that an aunt’s love is greater than a 
mother’s and implying that this cannot be so, is used to suggest that India is pretending to 
have greater love for Pakistani Muslims than Pakistan itself. India is referred to as the 
“mashi” (Bangla term for aunt used more commonly among Bangali Hindus) and called a 
liar, fraud and cheat, her love is fatal and she will put a noose around your neck if she 
doesn’t get what she wants. The mashi makes laws to kill Muslims and using the poison 
of Hinduism crushes all name and trace of Muslims. The song also talks sarcastically 
about the activities of “Bamunbad” (slang for Brahminism) and its plots being exposed, 
playing holi (Hindu festival of colours) with the blood of Muslims, etc. (Dainik Sangram 
9 June 1971, p. 2).  
 
6.2d(iii) Hatred  
Hatred comes across as a key frame used to describe Hindus’ behaviour and 
attitude towards Muslims and Muslims’ attitude towards Hindus. Thus the transcription 
of a radio show in the Dainik Sangram explains how this hatred came to be:  
Behind the veil of secularism, our neighbour is actually a hateful nurturer of Hindu 
imperialism. In order to live as directed by the father of the nation [Governor General 
Muhammad Ali Jinnah] and to be freed from the then Hindu web of intrigue that was 
growing, this country’s Muslims tore down the noose51 of imperialism and formed a 
separate homeland. This is what created hatred in their minds for Pakistanis and Indian 
Muslims. (Dainik Sangram 26 July 1971, p. 3)  
 
Other articles describe what they call the hateful deeds committed by Hindus. For 
example, a satirical column by Apon Bhola (a pseudonym) called ‘Nijere harae khuji’ 
narrates from a Indian/Hindu perspective the train of thought of then Indian prime 
minister Indira Gandhi, fantasising about ridding India and Pakistan of Muslims and 
																																																						
51	The	Bangla	word	used	is	naagpaash,	meaning	a	magical	noose	used	in	battles	in	mythology.	
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praying to the Hindu God Shiva about the dream of establishing the reign of the Hindu 
god Ram or a “Ramrajya” (Dainik Sangram 8 April 1971, p. 2). 
This hatred is not limited to Hindu/Indian politicians but often comes across as 
describing the people and culture as a whole. Several articles on “the Hindu mindset” talk 
about Hindus not being able to tolerate the good and development of Muslims and always 
wishing to harm them. Thus: “It is clear that the Hindus of West Bengal hate Muslims the 
most…” (Dainik Sangram 10 April 1971, p. 2) and the writings of Bankim Chandra 
Chatyapadhyay, known as the father of Bangla prose, are said to contain “glaring 
examples of how terrible and low the Hindu mentality against Muslims” is. In a long 
piece titled ‘Us in the eyes of Hindu writers – an investigation’, reference is made to 
other writers about their “hatred and enmity towards Muslims” where they reportedly 
write about Hindus viewing Muslims as enemies and being apathetic towards them, 
describing Muslim peasants as lower-caste Hindus and domesticated animals (Dainik 
Sangram 11 April 1971, p. 4). Jamaat-i-Islami student wing member Ali Ahsan 
Muhammad Mujahid actually calls for a ban on books by Hindu authors and “those 
advocating for Hindus” and calls to “those who believe in the existence of Pakistan… to 
take a Quran on their chest and forge ahead like mujahid” and burn and destroy any such 
books (Dainik Pakistan 8 November 1971, p. 1).  
One editorial describes how Hindus ruled Muslims and exploited and sucked their 
blood and tried to evict them from their lands, but “it is our belief that the Muslims of this 
country, spiritual descendants of Bakhtiar Khilji, Mahmud Ghaznavi, Ahmed Shah 
Abdali and Shaheed Titumir52, will teach the descendants of Shivaji, Laxman Sen and 
																																																						
52	More	commonly	known	as	Mahmud	of	Ghazna,	Mahmud	Ghaznavi,	son	of	the	founder	of	the	dynasty,	
Sebuktegin,	invaded	India	and	extended	his	rule	there.	His	successors	established	Lahore	in	northern	india	
(now	Pakistan)	as	their	capital,	making	it	a	major	political	and	cultural	centre	of	Muslim	life.	(Dictionary	of	
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Prithviraj53 a lesson” (Dainik Sangram 31 October 1971, p. 2). Another editorial actually 
states that Indians think bathing in the blood of Muslims is as holy as bathing in the 
Ganges (Dainik Sangram 6 April 1971, p. 2) and a news report says that both before and 
after Partition, “Hindus have played with the blood of Muslims” (Dainik Sangram 17 
April 1971, p. 4). 
Hindus are also labelled outright as “Muslim-hating”, further increasing the 
hatred. Kismati, a columnist for the Dainik Sangram, writes in an op-ed piece:  
Muslim-hating India (friends with Israel, the enemy of the Arabs) is trying to destroy the 
world’s largest Islamic state, Pakistan. Hindustani agents and infiltrators have mercilessly 
killed ulamas [religious scholars], pirs [spiritual guide in the Sufi tradition] and thousands 
of Islam-loving people and have caused great economic losses to the Muslims of Islamic 
state Pakistan. (Dainik Sangram 23 May 1971, p. 2)    
 
Rahee (1971a, Dainik Sangram 10 October, p. 2) another columnist in an op-ed piece 
writes about the Muslim-hating Brahmin character and how “the blood of Muslims drips 
from the mouth of Hindustan.” 
Dainik Sangram contributor Ali in an op-ed article (Dainik Sangram 31 July 
1971, p. 2), warns Pakistani Muslims against becoming friends with “kafirs, who will try 
to make you [Muslims] one with them” and that “mushrik” or idol-worshippers and Jews 
are the “biggest Muslim-haters”. Columnist Nesarabadi also writes that Allah said Jews 
and mushrik are the main enemies of Islam and the way they have harmed Muslims – 
Jewish Israel in the Middle East and Hindu India against Pakistan – is incomparable to 
anything else in history and that “it is our [the Pakistani Muslims’] duty to fight the 
attackers of Islam”. 
																																																																																																																																																																	
Islam)	Ahmed	Shah	Abdali	or	Ahmed	Shah	Durrani	is	regarded	as	the	founder	of	the	modern	state	of	
Afghanistan.	Titumir	was	a	Bengali	rebel	who	fought	zamindars	and	British	colonialists	in	British	India.		
53	Prithviraj	Chauhan	was	a	Rajput	king	of	the	Chauhan	dynasty	defeated	and	executed	by	a	Muslim	ruler.	
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Hatred against Hindus is reflected in the reporting of the mistreatment of Indian 
Muslims as well as Pakistani Muslims at refugee camps in India where East Pakistanis 
took shelter during the 1971 war, for example, the allegation that “Brahmin Indian 
bandits” are shaving off the beards of Muslims and killing them if they refuse and that 
they are not allowed to pray but are rather asked to call “Bhagavan” (Hindu Lord or God) 
in their minds (Dainik Sangram 19 June 1971, p. 2). According to a news report 
published on 30 July, Muslim refugees are said to be forced to take military training and 
starved if they refuse. Hindus get the big rooms and are comfortable in the “Congress 
building” while Muslims rot away in the “college tila (small hill)” and are given leftovers 
once the Hindus have finished eating (Dainik Sangram 30 July 1971, p. 1). A number of 
news reports as well as columns report on alleged oppression of Muslims in India as well, 
including mistreatment, looting of property, rape of women, violence and killing – 
presumably to stoke the flames of grievance and hatred against Hindus/Indians.  
 
6.2d(iv) The inhuman enemy  
Generally speaking, Hindus and India are categorically referred to as “the 
enemy”. The cycle of enmity is based on Hindu identity. Hindus are Indians and thus the 
enemy, but India is the enemy because it is a Hindu(-majority) nation. The Hindu-
Muslim differences and divide is what gave birth to the two nations of India and Pakistan 
and also what made and makes them enemies historically and in the present. A leader 
published on 23 July in the Dainik Sangram says, “Every East Pakistani must remember 
that Hindustan is the enemy of Muslims. The blood of their Muslim minority is always 
dripping from their lips” suggesting that not only is Hindustan the enemy of Muslims in 
general but also Indian Muslims themselves. 
Another editorial states:  
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Those who have been killing Indian Muslims at a wholesale rate but their thirst has still 
not been quenched, and those who are killing Pakistani Muslims today can be called 
anything but human. The fact that our so-called East Pakistani sympathisers the banned 
Awami leaders are trying to make us slaves of the savage Hindu Indians is now as clear 
as day. It is as if East Pakistanis will be gratified if they can offer themselves at the feet 
of Indian Brahmins and it is the banned Awami League that is arranging for this self-
sacrificing service to Hindus. The brutal killing of Pakistani Muslims that Hindu India is 
carrying out through their hold on the leaders of the banned Awami League is truly 
unforgivable. (Dainik Sangram 12 June 1971, p. 2)  
 
This is one of the ways in which the pro-liberation political party Awami League is 
linked to India and throughout the war made to seem like a party comprised of Hindus, 
either born Hindu or influenced by India’s Hindus. 
Jamaat-i-Islami leader Ghulam Azam is unequivocal: “There is no document to 
support that Hindus are friends of Muslims. They have always been enemies to Muslims 
and even after Partition, killing of Muslims is an everyday event” (Dainik Sangram 19 
July 1971, p. 3). Azam is quoted blaming the Hindus for creating divides between 
Muslims by raising questions of “Bangali non-Bangali” and appealing to the people to 
discard the “Bangali non-Bangali” mindset. The discourse suggests that for anti-
liberation elements, it was the Bangali identity that united Hindus and Muslims, which is 
why they repeatedly stressed on Muslim identity over Bangali and often equated Bangali 
with Hindu. A transcribed radio programme, published in the newspaper, declares that 
Hindus and Jews are “malaun54and perpetual enemies of Islam”. Also “enemies of Islam 
and the Muslim qawm” are “the cursed who wanted to separate East Pakistan and hand it 
to Hindu India” and they cannot be spared (Dainik Sangram 8 September 1971, p. 3). The 
basic argument seems to be that India is trying to eliminate Muslims from Pakistan and 
establish a “Ramrajyo” (Dainik Sangram 15 September 1971, p. 2). As columnist 
Durmukh (1971b) writes, it is the conspiracy of the “jaatshotru” (born enemy) (Dainik 
Sangram 16 September 1971, p. 2, 20 November 1971, p. 2) and “chiroshotru” (perpetual 
																																																						
54		The	literal	meaning	is	cursed,	excommunicated,	accused,	but	is	commonly	used	to	refer	to	Hindus,	so	
much	so	that	it	has	become	derogatorily	synonymous	with	Hindu	in	Bangla	usage.			
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enemy) (Dainik Sangram 10, 28 November 1971, p. 2) of Muslims, the Hindus and Jews, 
to make East Pakistani Muslims into Hindus. But Muslims cannot do that, they “cannot 
replace Allah with Hindu gods and the cow-mother”. There is a repetitive emphasis on 
Hindu India (and Jewish Israel) being the enemy of Islam and trying to conquer Muslim 
Pakistan, the stress on the enmity between the religions, highlighted with the major 
differences of monotheistic Islam and polytheistic Hinduism, as if to rally support against 
liberation.   
In his articulation about identity, Stuart Hall uses the term identification as ‘a 
construction, a process that is never completed’ and ‘constantly in the process of change 
and transformation’ and notes that identity is never unified but rather ‘fragmented and 
fractured, never singular, multiply[ing] constructed across after different, often 
intersecting and antagonistic, discourses, practices and positions’ (1996: 2-3). Resources 
of history, language and culture are used in discursive formations and practices by 
specific enunciated strategies (ibid). Similarly, Hindus and Muslims had multiple 
identities beyond their religious identities, but using the history of Hindu domination of 
Muslims from ancient times to the more recent India-Pakistan wars of the 1960s, the 
Hindu was represented as the oppressive enemy during the war of 1971 as well. Ferguson 
(2003), too, states that local cultural identities are not fixed but ‘socially and historically 
constructed’ and ‘manipulated for political advantage’ (2003: 30). While identities are 
most often referred to as being common between people who share it, Hall points out that 
emerging within the specific modalities of power, they are ‘more the product of the 
marking of difference and exclusion’ (1996: 4) and that it is in relation to the Other, to 
what something is not, what it lacks, that identity can be constructed (1996: 5). This is 
precisely the case as the analysis of the material shows and where the discourse of the 
media constructs the Hindu as the Other.  
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This Othering is clear in a report about the freedom fighters or Mukti Bahini – the 
Bangali civilians who underwent training and joined the war – who are referred to as a 
“Hindu Bahini” or a Hindu brigade, as forces led by and comprised mainly of Hindus – 
“90 per cent”, according to a news report published in Dainik Sangram (13 October 1971, 
p. 3) – and thus not Pakistani. This implies that (East) Pakistanis do not want 
independence. Indeed, it is clearly stated, that “Muslims are not interested to join the anti-
Pakistan forces formed by India” (Dainik Sangram 10 October 1971, p. 2). In fact, as a 
strongly-worded editorial states, the  
Hindu Mukti Bahini wants to free us [Pakistani Muslims] from our 
Musolmani/Muslimness. Free us from mosques and imams. Even free us from being 
musolli [Muslim worshippers] and Muslim. That is why today the Muslims of Pak-
Bangla must think irrespective of party affiliation, do we want to be freed of our 
Musolmani by this Hindu bahini? (Dainik Sangram 30 October 1971, p. 2)  
 
Repeatedly, the discourse reiterates the argument that India is trying to take over Pakistan 
and, perhaps more importantly, with the goal of eliminating “Muslimness”, Muslims and 
Islam. 
Bruce Lincoln describes the process of Othering in specific relation to religion, 
arguing that social groups constitute their identity in religious terms, viewing themselves 
as a sacred collectivity and of the faithful, God’s chosen people, and their rivals as 
infidels, evil. ‘Under such circumstances,’ contends Lincoln, ‘the pursuit of self-
interest…can be experienced as a holy cause, in support of which any violence is 
justified’ (2003: 94). Using this argument and the analysis, it can be argued that 
Bangladesh’s war of liberation too is depicted as one between infidel Hindus and pious, 
God-loving Muslims, Hindu India and Muslim Pakistan. The issue of the majority of the 
Pakistani population, the Bangalis/East Pakistanis demanding independence, is brushed 
aside on the pretext of a war of religions. All other identities of nationality, ethnicity, etc., 
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are ignored by the anti-liberation groups and only the religious identities of being Hindu 
and being Muslim are emphasised. As Amartya Sen notes,  
The illusion of unique identity is much more divisive than the universe of plural and 
diverse classifications that characterize the world in which we actually live. The 
descriptive weakness of choiceless singularity has the effect of momentously 
impoverishing the power and reach of our social and political reasoning. (Sen 2006: 17) 
 
Multiple identities are bound to bring up similarities, such as being Bangali, Pakistani, 
etc., regardless of whether one is Hindu or Muslim, but focusing only on the overarching 
Hindu/Muslim identity can only mean difference, especially if it is only the differences in 
the two religions – such as their history, manner of worship, nature and position in the 
war –  which are repeatedly pointed out.55  
 
6.3 The (Re)making of Identities 
Central to both the pro- and anti-liberation discourse of Bangladesh’s 
independence struggle was the issue of identity. While pro-liberation elements stressed 
on ethno-cultural, i.e., Bangali identity, anti-liberation elements emphasised religious, 
i.e., Muslim identity.  
Castells’ (2004) concept of legitimising identity – organisations, institutions and 
social actors introduced by the dominant institutions of society to reproduce, extend and 
rationalise their domination – is particularly applicable to anti-liberation discourse and 
the identity “truths” which were circulated by the Pakistani authorities and media, while 
his idea of resistance identity – constructed by those devalued by the logic of domination 
who go on to form communities of the excluded which exclude the excluders can be 
related to the resisting Bangali population. Identities are constructed from ‘history, 
geography, biology, productive and reproductive institutions, collective memory, 
																																																						
55	See	Fig.	3	below.	
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personal fantasies, power apparatuses and religious revelations’ (Castells 2004: 7). 
Legitimising identity, then, functions similar to ideology. 
As John Fiske says, ‘communication is a social process and must therefore be 
ideological’ (Fiske 1990: 176). Fiske draws on Raymond Williams’ three broad 
definitions of ideology as being ‘a system of beliefs’, ‘a system of illusory beliefs’ and 
‘the general process of the production of meanings and ideas’ (1990: 165) to elaborate on 
the concept through the use of Marx’s key idea of false consciousness.  
The circulation in 1971 of a set of meanings about Hindus and Muslims is 
intended to produce commonsensical responses. Through the framing of a religious 
ideology drawing upon history, religion and culture, categories of differences between 
Muslims and Hindus are created. As such, what it means to be Hindu becomes 
naturalised as an idol-worshipping, imperialist oppressor and what it means to be Muslim 
as a believer in and fighter for Allah, Islam and Pakistan. Even the Mukti Bahini or 
freedom brigade as a whole is categorically described as Hindu and being made up of 
“East Pakistani separatists, Hindu youth, Indian agents, escaped prisoners and other anti-
social elements such as thieves, robbers and murderers” (Dainik Sangram 13 November 
1971, p. 2).  
These meanings are not simply imposed from the top down by the state but spread 
through an all-pervasive discursive use of language through the media and other forms of 
communication. In this process, identity construction becomes central to the wider 
struggles of power, which, as Michel Foucault has pointed out, extend beyond the limits 
of the state. For one, the state cannot control all power relations, and secondly, it operates 
on the basis of existing power relations. Relations of power, as Foucault suggests,  
permeate, characterise and constitute the social body, and these relations of power cannot 
themselves be established, consolidated nor implemented without the production, 
accumulation, circulation and functioning of a discourse… We are subjected to the 
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production of truth through power and we cannot exercise power except through the 
production of truth. (Foucault 1980: 93)  
 
As he argues, power does not come only from the top down and through grand 
strategies, power is everywhere, working top down, bottom up, in fact, in a cycle, making 
use of all sorts of strategies and channels or the ‘microphysics’ of power (cited in Hall 
2001).  
Analysis of the above findings has shown how the media produced discursive 
knowledge about identities of the good Pakistani Muslim, the Bangali and the Hindu 
enemy. The interviews also demonstrate how this was carried out on the ground, 
intimidating the Hindu population to the point of forcing them to give up their identities 
as Hindus. Both categories of empirical data show that in order to remain in Pakistan and 
be considered Pakistani, one must be Muslim as defined by the hegemonic discourse, and 
a large part of that meant being everything that a Hindu was not. Muslim identity was all-
important and all-encompassing. 
 
6.4 Identity, Subjectivity and Discourse 
As several scholars have argued, power, truth, discourse, meaning and language 
are all interlinked, with language helping to construct meaning and discourse which all 
combine to produce a particular regime of truth and facilitate power. As the empirical 
findings from the two newspapers studied here have shown, the media played a role in 
producing a particular regime of truth that was meant to legitimise violence against 
Bangalis. However, the question is whether there is a single, absolute, fixed “truth” about 
Bangalis, about Pakistanis, about the country Pakistan and about Muslims? Or was there 
more than one kind of truth about “Bangali-ness”, “Pakistani-ness”, “Muslim-ness” 
depending on by whom and how it was represented?   
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Foucault has argued that there is no absolute or eternal truth which remains 
constant over time, place and context, but rather that there are discursive formations 
which sustain regimes of truth (Hall 2001). ‘The concept of discourse is not about 
whether things exist but about where meaning comes from’ (ibid: 45). Thus it was not 
about being Bangali or Pakistani or Hindu or Muslim but what people thought – as a 
consequence of being made to think – it was to be so. There is no inherent “khati 
Pakistani” who is a “sachcha Musolman” or a Bangali who is more inclined towards 
Hindus – it was the discourse of that time and place that produced this knowledge-
translated-into-power-and-put-into-practice through discursive violence followed by 
physical violence by the so-called Muslim Pakistani against the Hindu and/or Bangali. 
Just as, according to Foucault, knowledge/power regulate social conduct of the body, the 
entire knowledge opposing liberation dictated to its followers, i.e., the anti-liberation 
elements, what to think, how to think and what to do about it. And so, pure Pakistanis 
were true Muslims and anyone who fought for independence from Pakistan were not 
Muslims, they were Hindus, making the violence against them in the name of Pakistan 
and Islam justified.  
As Hall (2001) notes, language is a signifying practice which can do a number of 
things: it can reflect meanings which already exist; it can express what is intended by the 
communicator; or it can construct a meaning. Meaning and culture are interlinked to 
‘give us a sense of our identity, of who we are and with whom we “belong”’ (Hall 2001: 
3) by maintaining identity within and difference between groups. Fiske points out that 
meaning is not located in the text but ‘produced in the interactions between text and 
audience’ (1990: 164). Woodward (2002) also cites Emile Durkheim’s idea that 
organising things into classificatory systems is what produces meaning. Durkheim in fact 
used religion as an example of symbolic process to show that  
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social relations are produced and reproduced through ritual and symbol which classify 
things as sacred and profane. There is nothing inherently or essentially “sacred” about 
things. Artefacts and ideas are only sacred because they are symbolized and represented 
as such. (Woodward 2002: 29-30) 
 
The process of meaning-making into discourse-knowledge/truth-power is a multi-
faceted process depending on history as well as the present, on the carriers as well as 
receivers of discourse, if they can be called that. Discourse is often strongly grounded in 
history. Woodward (2002) refers to the ‘reproduction of the past’ in the context of the 
Yugoslavian war and the construction of Serbian identity, where history and its heroes 
are elaborately evoked. In 1971, the Pakistan media studied here, too, repeatedly reminds 
its audience of the Hindu-Muslim wars in the past and glorifies Muslim rulers and 
warriors. However, as Woodward suggests,  
What appears to be a point about the past and a restatement of a historical truth may tell 
us more about the new subject-position… trying to defend and assert the separateness and 
distinctiveness of his national identity in the present. So this recovery of the past is part 
of the process of constructing identity which is taking place at this moment in time and 
which, it appears, is characterized by conflict, contestation and possible crisis. 
(Woodward 2002: 11)  
 
During Bangladesh’s Liberation War, the anti-liberation groups continued to evoke their 
Muslim roots and history but in the pro-liberation camp, Bangalis both Muslim and 
Hindu placed greater importance on their cultural identity and similarities rather than 
their religion-based differences.   
The Partition of India of 1947 was based on the divide between Hindu and 
Muslim with Muslims claiming to gain freedom from Hindu oppression. With this being 
the situation at the time, Bangali Hindus and Bangali Muslims too became divided. 
However, in 1971, though the anti-liberation forces continued to focus on the Hindu-
Muslim divide, Bangalis of both religions came together to demand freedom from their 
Pakistani rulers. And from the 1980s to the present day, conflict continues among 
Bangalis and ethnic minority groups fighting for their rights in independent Bangladesh. 
But even at the same time and place in history, discourses can be in competition. For 
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example, whereas in 1971 the anti-liberation elements produced a discourse according to 
which Hindus were oppressors and Bangali Muslims had to fight against them for 
Pakistan and Islam in order to be free, the pro-liberation discourse centred on the 
oppression of the Pakistani government and military which were repressing Bangalis. 
While the anti-liberation forces focused on religion as the issue around which the war 
was centred, the pro-liberation forces fought for their culture and ethnicity. 
Not only is discourse not fixed but it is also selective – it includes as well as 
excludes what is or is not talked about, written about, expressed. And so, for example, the 
Hindu is described only as an oppressor, Indian infiltrator, infidel, and not as also being 
oppressed in Pakistan, as being Pakistani, as having their own faith system which is not 
evil but only different from that of the Muslim.  
The bearers of discourse are also crucial to the process of truth and power. As 
Bourdieu articulates, ‘authority comes to language from outside… Language at most 
represents this authority, manifests and symbolizes it’ (Bourdieu 1992: 109). During the 
Liberation War of Bangladesh, anti-liberation discourse was spread through a variety of 
means, the media being a major medium. But “the media” is not some abstract space, it 
was very much populated by weighty names. Thus we have the president of Pakistan’s 
speeches transcribed in full; we have ministers and other leading politicians of West 
Pakistan and high officials of the army making statements at various events and to the 
press. Perhaps equally importantly, we have East Pakistan’s local collaborators. They 
were as, if not more, important for at least two reasons: Firstly, they were local, i.e., East 
Pakistani, and, most significantly, they were Bangali, a part of the ethnic population 
demanding independence but suggesting that not all Bangalis did want to be liberated. 
And secondly, they had a strong religious foundation. Top-ranking leaders of the Jamaat-
i-Islami, such as Sayyid Abul A’la Maududi and Ghulam Azam were renowned religious 
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personalities, and student leaders like Matiur Rahman Nizami and Ali Ahsan Mujahid 
were rising in the ranks. These were the names quoted in news reports, they were the 
authors of articles in the op-ed pages, they were also the leaders and members of the 
Pakistan army’s auxiliary forces on the ground. Thus not only did they have the authority 
to promote their chosen discourse, but their identities were meant to legitimise the 
discourse. 
Ideology, as Althusser has suggested, hails its subjects as subjects of discourse. 
The process of interpellation, or hailing, is, as Fiske states, ‘one of the most ubiquitous 
and insidious ideological practices’ (Fiske 1990: 175) and is also very much in play in the 
Pakistani media of 1971 analysed here. ‘Ideology “acts” or “functions” in such a way that 
it “recruits” subjects among the individuals (it recruits them all), or “transforms” the 
individuals into subjects (it transforms them all)’ (Althusser 1971: 162-163) by 
interpellation or hailing. Ideology addresses people as subjects, thereby making them feel 
that they are subjects of the said ideology or discourse, moulding their actions and 
contributing to the construction of identities.   
The anti-liberation discourse of 1971 Pakistan was produced in a particular 
historical context. However, it was not defined solely by the 1971 war, and references in 
the media studied here go back to two previous India-Pakistan wars in the 1960s, to the 
1947 Partition of India and the Bengal Partition of 1905. Using this vast history, “truths” 
were constructed by people in positions of political, social and religious authority about 
differences between Muslims and Hindus. By positing the two religions as binary 
opposites and ignoring the similarities between Bangalis of both religions, the case is 
made for their inability to coexist, Hindu oppression of Muslims and an inherent hatred 
and inevitable conflict between the two communities, calling to the Muslims of Pakistan 
to fight for Muslim Pakistan and ultimately, Islam.  
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Analysis of the findings as presented above shows how the media discourse 
produced subjectivities. It created distinct categories of Muslim and Hindu identity. The 
“true Pakistani Muslim” believed in one Allah and His Prophet and it was his duty to 
fight, kill and even die for Islam by fighting for the Muslim nation of Pakistan. The 
“enemy Hindu Other” was everything a Muslim was not – idol-worshipping, infidel, 
archenemy of the Muslim, who in the past oppressed them and at present is trying to 
conquer Muslim lands and eliminate Islam. The discourse disregards issues of ethnicity, 
race, culture and focuses only on differences of religion, thereby normalising and 
legitimising conflict between the two groups.   
The following chapter demonstrates, based on empirical findings, how media 
discourse was used to promote jihad against the Hindu Indian enemy, and glorify 
sacrifice and martyrdom of oneself among anti-liberation elements. The anti-liberation 
discourse made jihad seem mandatory, sacrifice glorious and martyrdom desirable for 
true Pakistani Muslims who wished to appease God by fighting for their faith and nation. 
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Table 2: Common words and phrases used to describe the Pakistani Muslim, Bangali and 
Hindu in the Dainik Sangram and Dainik Pakistan newspapers in 1971 
 
 	The	khati	(pure)	Pakistani		 • believes	in	the	unity	of	Pakistan	• true,	pure	Muslim,	acts	upon	Islamic	
ideals	
• no	regionalism	
• first	and	foremost	Muslim	identity	
• character	formation	through	Islamic	
education	and	ideology	The	Bangali	as	East	Pakistani	Muslim	 • Islam-loving,	patriotic	The	Hindu-ised	Bangali	 • Bangla	is	a	Sanskrit-influenced	Hindu	
language	
• Bangali	culture	and	philosophy	
influenced	by	Hinduism		
• replacing	slogan	of	“Allahu	
Akbar/Bismillah”	with	“Joy	Bangla”	
• Bangali	nationalism	taking	the	place	of	
Islamic	nationalism	The	sachcha	Musolman	(true	Muslim)	 • those	who	sacrifice	for	Islam	are	mard-
e-momin	
• mujahid	
• pure	Pakistani	
• believe	in	Islamic	way	of	life	
• education	system	must	create	true	
Muslims	
• ideological	training	(as	well	as	military)	
• Islamic	nationalism	based	on	kalima	
tayyiba	
• Muslim	soldiers	of	an	Islamic	state	
• those	who	love	Islam	love	Pakistan	Hindus	 • oppressor	
• infiltrator	
• imperialist	
• Muslim-hating	
• belong	in	Hindu/Brahmin	India	
• evil	
• goal	to	eliminate	Islam	and	Muslims	
• munafiq	
• kafir		
• aim	to	establish	“Ramrajyo”		
• extremist,	militant	
• idol-worshipping	
• barbaric	
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• drunkards	
• torturers	
• looters	
• rapists	
• goonda	
• terrorists	
• agents	
• naa-paak	(unclean,	impure)	
• references	to	tulsi,	lengti,	tiki	
• bloodthirsty/bloodsuckers	
• hateful	and	hated	
• the	enemy,	jaatshotru	(born	enemy),	
chiroshotru	(perpetual	enemy)	
• malaun		
• worshippers	of	cow-mother	
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Table 3: “Us versus Them” – The marking of difference between Hindus and Muslims as 
binary opposites using classificatory systems in the anti-liberation discourse of Dainik 
Sangram and Dainik Pakistan of 1971 
 
 
Hindus	 Muslims	
Polytheistic	 Monotheistic	
Gods	 have	 forms	 (e.g.	
“cow-mother”)	
God	has	no	form	
Idol-worshippers	 Worship	only	Allah	
Kafir,	mushrik,	munafiq	 Believers	
Oppressors	 Oppressed	
Imperialists	 Slaves	 (what	 Hindus	
want	to	make	them)	
Unclean/impure	 Clean/pure	(“paak”)	
Violent	 Peaceful	 (but	 will	
respond	 to	 violence	
with	violence)	
Bloodsuckers	 Victims	
“Joy	Bangla”	slogan	 “Allahu	akbar”	slogan	
Prioritise	 ethnic	
identities	 (e.g.,	
Bangali)	
Prioritise	 Muslim	
identity	
Indian	infiltrators	 True	Pakistanis	
Friends	 of	 Israel	 and	
Jews	
Enemy	 of	 Israel	 and	
Jews	
Want	 to	 eliminate	
Muslims	 from	Pakistan	
and	India	
Want	 to	 save	Muslims	
in	Pakistan	and	India	
Want	 independence	
from	Pakistan	
Want	 to	 remain	 with	
Pakistan		
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CHAPTER 7 
VIOLENCE IN GOD’S NAME: 
THE DISCOURSE OF JIHAD, SACRIFICE AND MARTYRDOM ‘IN THE 
PATH OF ALLAH’ 
Men never do evil so completely and cheerfully as when they do it from religious 
conviction. –Blaise Pascal 
 
David E. Apter (1997) distinguishes between violence and political violence: 
‘Political violence disorders explicitly for a designated and reordering purpose: to 
overthrow a tyrannical regime, to redefine and realize justice and equity, to achieve 
independence or territorial autonomy, to impose one’s religious or doctrinal beliefs’ 
(1997: 5). Importantly, he points out that political violence ‘feeds on divisions, makes 
them into fundamentals and elevates even trivia to the level of loyalties. It polarizes 
affiliationally and doctrinally. It feeds on intolerance by making race, ethnicity, religion, 
language, class, doctrine, nationality, etc., decisive in “re-ordering”… It is the original sin 
of politics’ (ibid). This chapter will investigate the relationship between the media, 
religion and political violence in relation to the Pakistani newspapers studied in this 
research, Dainik Sangram and Dainik Pakistan as well as advertisements in the West 
Pakistani daily, Dawn. Using discourse analysis of texts and images, it will demonstrate 
how religious ideology was framed to produce a discourse which would legitimise 
violence by the Pakistani government, army and its auxiliary forces in the eastern wing 
and to mobilise violence against ‘the enemy’, the Hindus and the Bangali Muslims of 
East Pakistan. 
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7.1 The Violent Imaginary 
Violence does not just happen, it is a process, it happens in stages, and a key stage 
in this process is its justification, which occurs largely through the discourse surrounding 
it. Schröder and Schmidt (2003) outline a four-stage model of the anthropology of 
violence – conflict, confrontation, legitimation and war, where, significant for the study 
at hand, legitimation is defined as ‘the official sanctioning of violence as the legitimate 
course of action through the imagining of violent scenarios from the past and their social 
representation’ (2003:19), when questions of direction, timing and framing of violent acts 
are decided. In the introduction to their edited book Anthropology of Violence and 
Conflict, they contend that the motivation for violence ‘follows a specific cultural 
grammar that defines the value and relative importance of material and social benefits 
(honour, prestige)’ (2003: 5). In fact, most of their book relies on the cognitive approach 
to explain violence as ‘culturally constructed, as a representation of cultural values – a 
fact that accounts for its efficacy on both the discursive and the practical level’ (ibid: 17). 
Citing Julie Peteet’s 1994 research on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, they demonstrate 
that victims and perpetrators may frame their experiences of violence differently, where 
the ‘victims can take the opportunity to subvert the dominant group’s intention to 
intimidate them through the use of violence by attaching a cultural meaning of their own 
to the suffering… a meaning that allows them to reclaim agency and political identity’ 
(2003: 6). As Apter quoted above, Schröder and Schmidt (2003) also argue that violence 
is not accidental and needs to be imagined in order to be carried out. 
In this chapter, I address how, based on religious ideology, violence was framed 
in the media to justify the violence perpetrated in the anti-liberation war in Bangladesh. 
One of the key strategies was reference to history. As shown in previous chapters, the 
newspapers under study managed to make a link between the present and the long history 
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of violence between Hindus and Muslims, especially during the Partition, drawing clear 
lines of identity and difference between the two groups. Indeed, as Schröder and Schmidt 
(2003) note: 
War is framed in a code of legitimation that declares the assertion of interests to be 
related to moral imperatives. The most important code of the legitimation of war is its 
historicity. The symbolic meaning of prior wars is re-enacted and reinterpreted in the 
present, and present violence generates symbolic value to be employed in future 
confrontations. Wars are fought from memory, and they are often fought over memory, 
over the power to establish one group’s view of the past as the legitimate one. From this 
perspective violence is not only a resource for solving conflicts over material issues, but 
also a resource in world making, to assert one group’s claim to truth and history against 
rival claims, with all the social and economic consequences this entails. The important 
question is: how does the discursive link between past violence and present-day violence 
work? By what means is the legitimacy of violence impressed upon those who are to 
march into battle and those who are to cheer them on? (Schröder and Schmidt 2003: 9)  
    
In their argument, the authors state that violent imaginaries are represented 
through narratives which ‘keep the memory of former conflicts and past violence alive in 
stories, either by glorifying one’s own group’s achievements and benefits or by the 
perceived injustices, losses or suffering incurred by one’s own group’; performances or 
‘performative representations of violent confrontations [as] public rituals in which 
antagonistic relationships are staged and prototypical images of violence enacted’, for 
example, war ceremonies and public appearances of leaders in wartime; and inscriptions 
in the ‘cultural landscape as images displayed on banners and murals’, in television 
images, etc. Such violent imaginaries, according to Schröder and Schmidt, create a 
‘strictly polarised structure of “we:they” leaving no room for ambiguity, are characterised 
by a principle of totality, form an identification of “our” side of which ‘the struggle is of 
vital importance for the life of the group and the lives of each of its members’ and where 
‘the moral superiority of “our” cause is not affected by the outcome of the struggle’ and 
where ‘post-war society is portrayed in dire terms: there can only be complete victory or 
total defeat’ (2003: 10-11). As discussed in earlier chapters, Bangladesh’s war of 
liberation was constructed as a war between Muslims and Hindus, where Muslims were 
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said to be fighting not only for a moral but a religious cause on which depended their 
identity and existence, and where losing the war would mean the elimination of Islam and 
Pakistan and the domination of the Hindu enemy. As Schröder and Schmidt point out,  
Elements of history are decontextualized and reinterpreted as part of a communal legend 
of confrontation, creating an imaginary of internal solidarity and outside hostility. 
Antagonistic discourses are not invented or discontinuous with history, but fragments of 
memory are shifted in order to constitute new definitions of collective identity. (2003: 11)  
 
The analysis of the news stories shows the use of repeated references to historical 
domination of Muslims by Hindus in general and the violent memories of the Partition in 
particular. As Schröder and Schmidt (2003) note, in late modernity, ‘the most common 
currency of violent imaginaries are nationalism and/or ethnicity’ (ibid), and this is 
apparent in contemporary conflicts around the world, including the former Soviet Union 
and Yugoslavia. Both ethnicity and nationalism were major markers in 1971 Pakistan as 
well, with the Bangalis fighting for the right to practise their language and culture, but the 
anti-liberation discourse used religious ideology to frame it as a war of faith. 
Paul Hollander (2008), in his study of political violence and its legitimation 
mainly with reference to Soviet repression under communist rule, refers to political 
violence in other contexts, for example, the Rwandan genocide and the rise of Islamic 
fundamentalism. In his discussion, Hollander addresses the ‘actual presence of 
ideological motivation and fervor spurring on political conflicts’ as well as ‘the 
emergence of political propaganda and the mass media of communications that 
disseminates it’ (2008: 7) and outlines a number of factors which legitimise such 
violence. One is the propagation of the notion of victimhood and self-defence as ‘a self-
evidently acceptable motive’ (ibid: 8). For him, ‘the technology of mass communication 
… made it possible to learn about such violence and to disseminate images of violent 
behaviour and its consequences.’ As such, while media have helped end conflict in some 
cases, such as the Vietnam War, it has also caused desensitisation and “compassion 
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fatigue” in others. All these factors are essentially rooted in ideologies, and Hollander 
argues that ‘ideologies, beliefs and their attempted realisation’, whether ‘political, 
religious, or secular-religious, [are] capable of providing the necessary legitimation for 
the acts of violence involved’ (ibid: 16).  
Hollander notes the distinction between killing in combat and killing civilians in 
the gas chamber, mass shootings or bombings, with the latter demanding ‘unshakeable 
motivation and persuasive legitimation’ (ibid) and argues: ‘Elaborate, self-conscious 
legitimation is always a necessity when the violent actions to be performed may create 
moral conflicts or qualms in those performing them, or in those ordering, encouraging, or 
witnessing them’ (ibid), underlining the need to justify the violence anyone is 
perpetrating against the other. As such, it is necessary to have a clearly identified enemy 
or ‘elaborate conceptions of the evil adversary’ (ibid) in the process.  
In the case study, the media, along with informal social communication networks 
as discussed in previous chapters, helped the dissemination of an ideology rooted in 
religion by the state, military and civilian groups opposed to the liberation of Bangladesh. 
This chapter addresses how this discourse legitimised or justified political violence 
through the use of the frame of jihad as a religious duty, and through the glorification of 
sacrifice and martyrdom.   
 
7.2 The Discursive Legitimisation of Violence in 1971 Pakistan  
For Apter (2007), an important aspect of political violence is its legitimisation 
through discourse, which, as he notes, constructs ‘fictive and logical reconstructions of 
reality’, where ‘each inversionary movement generates its own discourse by means of 
which it defines its principles, goals, and establishes boundaries which give rise to 
outrage when violated or penetrated’ (1997: 6). Discourse serves as a basis for ‘more 
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reasoned interpretation’, employing a ‘paradigm or example (exemplars), syntagm or 
propositions, doctrine, systematic organized treatises, myth and theory, magic (or 
fantasy) and logic, metaphor and metonymy, narrative and text, retrieval and projection’ 
– and makes initially spontaneous violence self-sustaining. ‘Fictive truths’ derived from 
the narrative construction of reality ‘become the basis for redemptive and 
transformational projective solutions, a logic is provided’ (Apter, 1997: 12). Using 
discourse, past history is brought alive in the present, argues Apter, and history is 
converted into purpose, ‘purpose into truths, and truths as logic’ (1997: 14), which he 
claims are the main elements of a discourse theory of political violence. Atef Alshaer’s 
work on the Arab and Islamic worlds also demonstrates the importance of language and 
culture as important tools for power and political mobilisation used to impose particular 
worldviews. Cultures of communication, as he argues, drawing upon religious, historical, 
literary and mythological references are used as mechanisms of control to validate the 
practices of those in power. ‘Political groups with specific agendas, cultural 
underpinnings and outlook, mobilize communicative channels and modes to publicize 
and reinforce their ideologies’ (Alshaer 2008: 102).   
In the war of 1971, the prevailing social discourse as reflected in the media 
studied here, was that Hindu India, constructed as the perpetual enemy of Muslim 
Pakistan, wanted to kill monotheistic Muslims, conquer Pakistan and make it a Hindu 
(often referred to as idol-worshipping) homeland. This was evident in many of the 
editorials in the Dainik Sangram. For example, an editorial published on October 14, 
1971 states: “Pakistan’s tawhidi population prefer death to giving up their identity and 
independence to foreigners. Today it is clear to the people that Hindustan slowly wants to 
rid East Pakistan of Muslims and make it a Hindubhumi (land).” General Niazi of the 
Pakistan army and last governor and martial law administrator of East Pakistan, in a 
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meeting with madrasa teachers, was quoted as saying that “the future of Islam in the 
subcontinent is closely related to the future of Pakistan” while the madrasa teachers 
responded by declaring themselves “ready to aid the army in increasing the security of 
Pakistan and pride of Islam” (Dainik Sangram 28 September 1971, p. 1). In another news 
report, Niazi called for unity to evict “the enemies of Islam and Pakistan” (Dainik 
Sangram and Dainik Pakistan 9 September 1971, p. 1).  
Calling for eviction of the enemy implies anything from driving them out to 
killing them, they being Hindus and/or Indians, the eternal enemy of Pakistan and Islam. 
Niazi is also quoted as saying that an independent state for the Muslims of this 
subcontinent is a gift from God and we must all “defend it at all cost” (Dainik Sangram 8 
October 1971, p. 1). 
Jamaat-i-Islami student leader Matiur Rahman Nizami is even more direct when 
he proclaims that “we must finish off those who are involved in armed conspiracy against 
Pakistan and Islam” (Dainik Sangram 15 September 1971, p. 3). Fighting the pro-
liberation forces in 1971 Pakistan was not just about defending a united Pakistan but the 
religion of Islam itself, and it is imaani shokti or “the power of faith” (Dainik Sangram 
23 November 1971, p. 1) in the people and the army which is their strength. To justify 
these actions, the papers used different frames, including jihad, sacrifice and martyrdom, 
frames made to seem important for good Muslims as defined in the previous chapter. 
 
7.2a Jihad: a test of faith 
Definitions, interpretations and uses of the concept of jihad vary, from a spiritual 
inner struggle to armed struggle. While Bonney (2004) in his comprehensive study of the 
meaning, context, ideology and distortion of jihad ‘from Quran to bin Laden’ argues that 
the term may mean ‘a peaceful struggle by persuasion and preaching’ as referred to in the 
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Quran, Donohue and Esposito (2007) note that, in recent times, the word has been used to 
‘legitimate or attempt to justify acts of resistance and liberation as well as extremism and 
global violence’ (2007: 393). Sherman Jackson further distinguishes between “defensive 
jihad” and “aggressive jihad”, and defines the latter, in the context of 7th century Arabia, 
as a means to ‘provide for the security of and freedom of the Muslims in a world that kept 
them under constant threat’ (Jackson 2007: 401). Bonney (2004) refers to scholars who 
argue that jihad is equivalent to the Western concept of “just war”. However, others, such 
as the Muslim Brotherhood scholar Sayyid Qutb56, Muhammad Abdel Salam al-Farag57, 
and Palestinian scholar and mujahid Abdullah al-Azzam, while acknowledging that Islam 
does not force its belief on people, suggest that Islam permits, even commands jihad 
against aggressors and polytheists. Qutb (2007), for example, states the following reasons 
as being ‘sufficient’ for the proclamation of jihad: the establishment of God’s authority, 
the arrangement of human society as per God’s guidance, the abolishing of all evil or 
“Satanic” forces, and the ending of domination or “lordship” of a person or group over 
others as everyone is equal in Islam’ (2007: 416). This interpretation was used by Osama 
bin Laden in his interpretation of an ‘offensive, transnational, or even global jihad “in 
order to establish truth and abolish falsehood”’ (Bonney 2004: 14). Bonney cites scholars 
in this regard who believe that bin Laden’s interpretation is not an updated version of the 
definition but actually a departure from its traditional meaning. In the contemporary 
world, jihad for IS, for example, has been described as:  
																																																						
56	Activist	and	leader	of	the	Muslim	Brotherhood	in	Egypt.	He	was	deeply	committed	to	the	eradication	of	
tendencies	in	Egypt	that	he	regarded	as	bringing	secular	and	Western	influences	into	Muslim	society	and	
a	severe	critic	of	Muslim	societies,	which	in	his	view	had	lapsed	into	a	state	of	ignorance	similar	to	pre-
Islamic	times,	and	believed	it	was	legitimate	to	overthrow	them.	He	was	a	strong	defender	of	
traditionalist	Islam	and	is	regarded	by	many	scholars	as	being	the	ideologue	of	fundamentalism,	many	of	
his	writings	and	views	being	identified	with	Islamist	ideas	(Nanji	2008).	
57	An	ideologue	of	Egypt’s	Islamic	Jihad	and	a	former	member	of	the	Muslim	Brotherhood.	
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a fundamental means for change, implementing Allah’s command, {And fight them until 
there is no fitnah and [until] the religion, all of it, is for Allah} [Al-Anfal: 39]. Its jihad 
would be based upon hijrah [migration], bay’ah [allegiance], sam’ (listening), ta’ah 
(obedience), and i’dad (training), leading to ribat and qital (fighting), then Khilafah or 
shahadah [martyrdom]. (Dabiq, Issue 1, July 2014 p. 35)  
 
The word “jihad” is used in the Pakistani media in 1971 studied here frequently, 
particularly in relation to the nine-month war – it is described as a religious duty, as a 
means of defence as well as of revenge against the enemy and as the road to salvation. 
The term jihad was first used as early as April 1971, soon after the war began, though at 
this time it referred to the Partition of 1947, where Indian and Pakistani Muslims are said 
to have fought a jihad in order to establish Pakistan based on the two-nation theory 
(Dainik Sangram 11 April 1971, p. 2). While this is not a direct reference to the current 
war as jihad, it laid the foundation for it. By the middle of April, a direct call for jihad 
was made by a religious leader as reported in a news story in the Dainik Sangram, to 
“imbibe the spirit of jihad in people” in order for them to fight the Indian threat to 
Pakistan’s solidarity and national integrity, while the chairman of Pakistan’s 
Parliamentary Party Maulana Nurani is quoted in the Dainik Pakistan as saying that it is 
the religious clergy’s carefully considered opinion that jihad should be declared against 
India (Dainik Pakistan 12 April 1971, p. 2). In other news stories, religious leaders claim 
that Pakistan’s madrasa students think of the country as a holy mosque and will defend it 
as mujahid and they call upon religious scholars to “declare jihad against India’s 
imperialist activities” (Dainik Sangram 17 April 1971, p. 2).  
By May, audiences were asked to prepare for “unprecedented unity, sacrifice and 
jihad” in order to counter Indian attacks (Dainik Sangram 5 May 1971, p. 3) and, 
interestingly, listening to the Indian radio station Akashbani – “our archenemy, the 
Hindus’ propaganda medium” – is also defined as a religious duty and a part of jihad in 
order to be “alert to the intrigues of the enemy” (Dainik Sangram 1 June 1971, p. 2). In 
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June, the call to jihad gained further momentum, with religious scholars claiming that, 
“according to Islamic teachings, if the homeland of Muslims is ever attacked, then it is 
farz58 for everyone above the age of 15 to embark on jihad. We are calling to our 
country’s conscious Muslim brothers to prepare for jihad” (Dainik Sangram 5 June 1971, 
p. 3). They also advise that in times of national crisis, it is the government’s duty to train 
the people as mujahid.  
The use of the frame of jihad was intended to legitimise the use of violence by the 
Pakistani government and military as well as its auxiliary forces, as jihad was constructed 
as a duty for all Muslims. For example, an editorial published on 13 June 1971 in the 
Dainik Sangram, talks about the duties and responsibilities of the Shanti Committee59, 
including inspiring the spirit of jihad among the people:  
Jihad must be fought against those using force to create obstacles in the way of justice 
and peace... Allah has said to Muslims in the Holy Quran: do not forfeit jihad and push 
yourself towards destruction. Thus, even if the miscreants do kill one or two people, we 
should consider it as martyrdom in the path of Allah and work with full force. The Shanti 
Committee should work to create jihadi feelings to defend Islam, Muslims and the 
country. If this feeling is enforced in everyone, the miscreants will be eliminated and 
peace will be established.  
 
In other words, the discourse is exhorting the Shanti Committee to mobilise people 
against others while using martyrdom as a possible consequence, which will be discussed 
below. 
																																																						
58	Fard/h,	in	Arabic,	or	farz	as	used	in	Persian	and	Urdu,	refers	to	a	religious	duty	enjoined	in	the	Quran,	
the	performance	of	which	is	incumbent	on	all	Muslims.	Fulfilment	of	such	a	duty	is	rewarded	and	neglect	
is	punished.	In	the	Hanafi	school,	a	distinction	is	made	between	fardh	as	a	“duty	on	the	basis	of	cogent	
arguments”	and	wajib,	necessity,	on	the	grounds	of	probability.	(Adamec	2009)	
59	Several	right-wing	politicians,	many	of	them	belonging	to	the	religion-based	political	party	Jamaat-i-
Islami59,	formed	the	Citizen’s	Peace	Committee,	later	renamed	the	East	Pakistan	Central	Peace	Committee	
and	commonly	known	as	Shanti	(peace)	Committee,	in	order	to	‘bring	back	normal	conditions	to	the	
country	and	to	eliminate	irrational	fears	from	the	minds	of	the	people’	(Sharif	et.	al.,	1988:	39)	but	who	in	
fact	prepared	lists	of	patriotic	Bangalis	to	be	killed	and	assisted	in	their	killing	along	with	looting	and	rape	
(ibid).	The	committee	organised	paramilitary	forces	called	the	Razakars,	Al-Badr	and	Al-Shams	which	
functioned	as	their	extensions	across	the	country,	acting	as	‘death	squads	and	providers	of	
counterinsurgency	intelligence’	(van	Schendel	2009).	
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Similarly, an op-ed article by columnist Durmukh (1971b) in the Dainik Sangram 
states that it is not enough for religious scholars to lead prayers and provide guidance and 
teach about jihad, but that they must join the battle, for jihad is a “test of faith” and those 
who do not engage in it are munafiq60. He writes:  
Today we should rise against Hindustan and its agents in the belief that ‘Those who are 
killed in the path of Allah, do not call them dead but martyrs’. We must also remember 
Allah’s words – ‘The death you all are running away from you must embrace.’ In order to 
counter the operation of Hindus to finish Islam in this country, it is not enough to look to 
the army, after taking the necessary permission from the military authorities, people 
themselves must choose their path and the path of Islam.” (Dainik Sangram 13 October 
1971, p. 2)  
 
The call to jihad, as seen here, is not simply reference to a concept or belief but an action. 
Jihad is constructed as a “holy duty”, which is apparent in an op-ed piece by contributing 
writer Md. Tajammul Hossein in the Dainik Sangram: “Today we have to be faithful and 
not only by reading the tazbeeh61 in mosques. If needed we must take up swords to fight 
those against Islam. Those who want to destroy Pakistan in order to trample on Islamic 
brotherhood as taught in the Quran-Sunnah, those who want to ruin divine life, it is our 
holy duty to fight jihad against them...” (Dainik Sangram 19 June 1971, p. 2). This is a 
resounding call to violence, with explicit reference to taking up swords to fight the 
enemy. 
References to “jihadi inspiration” and the role of jihad become more evident as 
the war progresses. In fact, president of Pakistan-controlled Jammu and Kashmir Sardar 
Quayyum actually says that his government will amend the current education syllabus to 
be in accordance with Islam, emphasising on creating jihadi inspiration in students 
(Dainik Sangram 18 September 1971, p. 2). Jihadi inspiration is said to come from 
martyrs in past wars who gave their lives smilingly for the cause of Islam (Dainik 
																																																						
60	The	Arabic	word	munafiq	refers	to	hypocrites	who	outwardly	practise	Islam	but	conceal	their	inner	
disbelief.	
61	Islamic	prayer	beads.	
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Sangram 18 August 1971, p. 1) and a news headline quotes a Jamaat-i-Islami leader 
saying, jihadi inspiration must be awakened for the sake of defending the country’s 
existence (Dainik Sangram 17 August 1971, p. 5). Jihadi inspiration is the key to 
“breaking the poisonous fangs of Brahminism” (Dainik Sangram 27 November 1971, p. 
1), the only defence against the “barbaric attacks of imperialist Indian invaders” (Dainik 
Sangram 28 November 1971, p. 3) and the “eternal enemy of Muslims, India” (ibid). The 
jihadi inspiration based on which the Rezakars are fighting the war will be written down 
in golden letters in history, claims an editorial published on November 8. 
In fact, one of the main purposes of the observance of Badr Day is “to create 
jihadi inspiration to destroy the Hindu-Jewish conspiracy to break up Pakistan” for 
“every Muslim must gain jihadi inspiration in order to stand against those evil forces” 
(Dainik Sangram 6 November 1971, p. 1). The al-Badr forces led by the Prophet in 
Islamic history are often used as an example: “People must forget their differences of 
opinion and disunity and stand together united as Muslims, and with endless patience and 
complete faith devote themselves to jihad” (Dainik Sangram 8 November 1971, p. 1). 
Jamaat-i-Islami student leader Matiur Rahman Nizami argues in an op-ed piece that “the 
national broadcast media intentionally covered up the programmes which in this time of 
national crisis could have inspired the tawhidi population towards jihad, could have 
created a warlike mindset against internal and external enemies of the Muslim millat 
(faith/nation)” (Dainik Sangram 14 November 1971, p. 2). He compares the situation to 
the al-Badr war and draws inspiration from it for the ongoing war.  
In the newspaper discourse, jihad is also constructed as the necessary action to 
achieve Pakistan’s solidarity and national integrity, and as a war to “defend Islam, 
Pakistan and Muslims against Hindu-Jewish agents” (Dainik Sangram 11 October 1971, 
p. 2). For example, columnist Nesarabadi (1971) in an op-ed article writes about the 
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“duty” to “fight the attackers of Islam, Muslims and the Islamic state according to the 
ideology of the Prophet and sahabis” and to train to “fight force with force” (Dainik 
Sangram 2 August 1971, p. 2). According to him, Allah will not listen to prayers not 
accompanied by action, and this action is jihad, for “Allah said, fight jihad with your life 
and property in the path of Allah” (ibid). Jihad is invoked as a direct command from God 
or Allah and thus made beyond question and by September, it is claimed that “people in 
both wings of Pakistan have had jihadi inspiration awakened in them” (Dainik Sangram 
10 September 1971, p. 1). Without jihad, the “practical, ethical and religious 
responsibilities of the people will remain unfulfilled”, claims an editorial published in the 
Dainik Sangram on October 7.  
Religion, as such, is constructed as a weapon of war. An editorial entitled 
“Pakistan will survive” describes the war as a “fight for identity as well as a test of faith 
through jihad as described in the holy Quran” (Dainik Sangram 3 August 1971, p. 2). It 
claims that the Pakistani Muslims’ “weapon is ‘la ilaha illallah’”, that those who possess 
this weapon have no death and that their victory is guaranteed. According to the editorial, 
Muslims consider it their good fortune to be able to give their lives for Islam and that the 
Pakistani army too comprises mujahid inspired by jihad and thus can defeat forces five 
times stronger than itself. Jamaat-i-Islami leader Maulana Abdur Rahim specifies that 
“Only strong believers in Islam and Pakistan’s ideology and those who have jihadi mind-
set should be recruited in the mujahid forces” (Dainik Sangram 30 August 1971, p. 3). 
Religion here is invoked as a very powerful tool, where faith is not only the reason for 
which people fight, but the weapon with which they do so, a weapon which gives them 
strength and which makes them immortal. Even the army is not simply a military force 
but associated with the religious, i.e., mujahid or warriors for Islam, with the president of 
Pakistan Yahya Khan referring to the army’s “jihadi strength” in the defence of the 
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nation’s survival (Dainik Sangram 20 November 1971, p. 1). Portraying the battle as one 
not simply for the nation but also for one’s faith makes the battle seem more worth 
fighting for and even giving up one’s life for. 
In this way, the discourse of war changes from a discourse of a war of 
secession/liberation of the Bangalis to one that tests the faith of Muslims. Contributing 
writer Maulana Mufti Amimul Islam (Dainik Sangram 9 August 1971, p. 2) writes in an 
op-ed piece in the Dainik Sangram entitled “Jihad in the path of Allah” that pre-emptive 
jihad, before a Muslim state is actually attacked, is “farz e kifaya”62 for those who are 
able, but when a Muslim state is attacked by the enemy, it becomes “farz e ain” for every 
Muslim to fight back. He writes: It is wajib63, and that the Prophet has said that Allah 
rewards those who fight jihad in the path of Allah – either with sawab64 and ganimat65 (if 
they survive), or with unconditional entry into heaven if they are martyred, with all their 
sins forgiven. He writes: “Fear Allah and fight jihad for his din66, try everything, even 
give your life if necessary” and concludes that the Muslims’ test of faith will be through 
jihad in the path of Allah. As such, jihad is constructed as mandatory, and even offered as 
																																																						
62	Fardh	al-ayn	is	an	individual	duty,	binding	on	all	adult	Muslims,	such	as	prayer	and	fasting.	Fardh	al-
kifaya	is	a	communal	duty,	binding	on	the	Muslims	as	a	group,	which	is	fulfilled	if	a	sufficient	number	
perform	it,	for	example,	making	a	pilgrimage,	visiting	the	sick,	returning	a	greeting.	(Adamec	2009)		
	
63	Obligatory	or	necessary,	on	the	grounds	of	probability.	(Adamec	2009) 
64	Thawab/sawab	refers	to	spiritual	merit	or	reward	that	accrues	from	the	performance	of	good	deeds	
and	piety.	
65	The	Urdu	word	ganimat	is	derived	from	the	Arabic	word	ghanima	meaning	“booty”	in	the	early	wars	of	
conquest,	which	consisted	of	movable	property.	When	an	area,	or	city,	surrendered	peacefully,	no	
plunder	was	permitted,	and	the	new	subjects	paid	only	their	taxes	but,	if	an	enemy	resisted	until	defeat,	
leaving	the	decision	to	God,	even	the	population	could	become	ghanima.		
66	Arabic	term	used	in	the	Quran	which	has	come	to	signify	an	encompassing	notion	of	‘religion’	as	the	
combination	of	a	divinely	ordained	direction	and	obligations	fulfilled	by	human	beings,	as	part	of	shared	
commitments	expressed	through	a	faith	community	(Nanji	2008).	Muslim	theologians	distinguish	
between	religious	belief	(iman)	and	acts	of	worship	and	religious	duties	(‘ibadat),	all	of	which	are	included	
in	the	term	din.	
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an inducement to fight by saying that the jihadist will be rewarded in life and, if killed on 
the battlefield, then in the hereafter. In this way, the media helped transform a human 
war, which may or may not result in the break-up of a nation, to an otherworldly battle in 
which the fighters for the din will be the victors either way and accordingly rewarded.  
Following the death (repeatedly referred to as martyrdom) of a religious leader by 
the name of Maulana Madani said to be a descendent of the Prophet Muhammad, Ghulam 
Azam declares that his death must be avenged by Muslim Pakistanis and that “Those who 
have even a bit of love for Allah and his Prophet, it is farz for all of them to pledge jihad 
against those inspired by the death of Awlad-e Rasul [children of the Prophet] and to 
defend Pakistan and Islam against the enemy” (Dainik Sangram 12 August 1971, p. 1). 
An editorial published in the Dainik Sangram the following day reiterates the same 
sentiment, glorifying martyrdom in jihad and calling upon every Muslim to vow to 
avenge the blood of Shaheed Madani and establish Pakistan and Islam based on it (Dainik 
Sangram 13 August 1971, p. 2). Jihad is also seen as a form of revenge in the way 
Jamaat-i-Islami leader Maulana Ashraf Ali calls to the people to “plunge themselves into 
jihad to fight Indian conspiracy and defend the freedom and indivisibility of Pakistan… 
and to unite with other Muslim brothers against the Congress rulers and avenge the 
deaths of lakhs of Muslims in India” (Dainik Sangram 24 August 1971, p. 1), while 
Jamaat-i-Islami leader Mia Tufail Mohammad calls to the people to “vow to go to jihad 
against all kinds of destructive, narrow and language-based inclinations” (Dainik 
Sangram 12 September 1971, p. 3).  
Dainik Sangram contributor Kadduri in an op-ed piece (30 September 1971, p. 2) 
outlines why jihad is needed, saying that Islam has brought jihad within the purview of 
both religion and the law. Columnist Mujahid (1971b), also in an op-ed article in the 
Dainik Sangram (15 September, p. 2), claims that Allah and the Prophet have 
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commanded jihad against and the killing of anyone defying Allah and taking up arms 
against Islam and Muslims. He says that the mumin Muslims who do this, who kill the 
enemy and are themselves martyred, are guaranteed a place in heaven without any 
questions about their past sins while regular columnist Durmukh (1971c) says that in the 
Prophet’s time, those who prayed, fasted and submitted themselves to Allah but hesitated 
to go to jihad were labelled munafiq by Allah in the Holy Quran (Dainik Sangram 19 
October 1971, p. 2). In this way, the piece seems to suggest not only does jihad bring 
rewards but failing to wage it may result in punishment. 
Dainik Sangram contributor Huq (1971) writes in an article published in a special 
supplement on September 6 about how, in Islam, not only are people permitted, but 
actually inspired to go to war. He writes, “Battle for Allah should be every Muslim’s 
life’s prime accomplishment. Jihad/war is allowed to: spread and establish Allah’s din on 
Allah’s land; to help the world’s persecuted and oppressed Muslims; protect regions of 
Islamic states from enemy attacks.”   
Direct and indirect references from the Quran on jihad abound in the Pakistani 
media under study. An editorial published in the Dainik Sangram is literally a command 
to wage jihad in the name of God. The title itself is “War is the only solution” and the 
piece expresses the need for jihad as the only “guarantee of freedom and peace for the 
world’s oppressed humanity” (Dainik Sangram 5 October 1971, p. 2). Often, references 
are made to battles in Islamic history led by the Prophet Muhammad, drawing parallels to 
the ongoing war and the duty of Muslims to fight for their faith. Another editorial states 
ominously: “We must descend into jihad to defend Islam and Pakistan with the plan of 
either evicting the miscreants or being martyred like true mumin. If not, and if as a 
consequence any harm comes to Islam and Pakistan, then everyone will have to answer to 
Allah and His Prophet” (Dainik Sangram 15 October 1971, p. 2). Even a letter to the 
		 205	
editor on saving the honour of Muslim women prompts readers to engage in jihad against 
Hindu “goons”. (Dainik Sangram 19 October 1971, p. 2). By November, politicians 
declare that “India has begun attacks on Pakistan’s sacred land thus jihad should be 
declared” (Dainik Sangram 13 November 1971, p. 1).    
Towards the end of the war, Ameer of the Jamaat-i-Islami Maulana Maududi 
(1971a) writes an op-ed piece in the Dainik Sangram (29 November, p. 2) entitled “If 
attacked, jihad will become farz”. In the piece, Maududi talks about war becoming farz 
upon Muslims if their land or people are attacked; about jihad being a “yardstick by 
which the true faith of Muslims is measured”; how their practice of religion becomes 
meaningless for those who avoid jihad and they are labelled munafiq in the Quran; and 
that those who go to jihad to protect the Muslim people and nation are not alone, Allah is 
with them, and if they happen to die in war then there is no greater death than in 
martyrdom. He also says that the strength of Muslims lies not in their numbers but in 
their faith, which disbelievers do not have. In the second instalment of the article 
published the next day, Maududi (1971b) reiterates that jihad could become farz if the 
country “sacred like a mosque, the fort of Islam, dar-ul-Islam Pakistan” is attacked, and 
points out that the battlefield is only one of the fronts of jihad and that Allah in the Quran 
has asked the people to wage jihad with both life and wealth/property. 
News stories published in the Dainik Pakistan a week before Bangladesh’s 
liberation reports on a public meeting held the previous day, in which all Pakistanis and 
particularly those in the eastern wing, are called upon to “eliminate the attackers and 
defend Pakistan’s holy land. People should be inspired by jihad to defend Islam’s largest 
stronghold. With the grace of Allah, the soldiers of Islam will gain victory against the 
forces of the devil” (Dainik Pakistan 8 December 1971, p. 4). 
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A survey of several advertisements (Appendix) published in December 1971 in 
the West Pakistani English-language newspaper Dawn also illustrate the prevalence of 
the discourse of jihad in the media. Advertisements for everything from products such as 
soap to services such as banks extol the virtues of jihad. Quotes from founder of Pakistan 
Muhammad Ali Jinnah to the then president Yahya Khan are used to describe the glory of 
Muslims and encourage the audience to “strike at the enemy to the rallying cry of Allah-
o-Akbar”. People are called upon to donate generously to the defence fund for the cause 
of jihad, in order for the “warriors of Islam” to be able to “give a crushing defeat to the 
coward enemy”. Even women are told to “rush to join jehad” by donating woollen jersies 
to the mujahid. In this way, jihad was made to seem all-encompassing, with people being 
asked to participate in any way they could.    
 
7.2a(i) Poetic jihad  
Jihad is also invoked in poetry. In a special supplement published on July 2, the 
poem “Amra ansar chirodin” talks about Pakistani Muslims as being bearers of flags of 
peace, on the battlefield of jihad. Another poem published on the same day entitled 
“Mujahider gaan” meaning “the song of the mujahid”, talks about “this life of jihad”, no 
gain without jihad, life and death on the battlefield, and those who are “asleep” i.e., not 
engaged in battle as committing haram, while the “true soldiers of religion” are at war. It 
concludes: “In this jihad of truth and lies, the sinners will be caught and die in their own 
traps, truth will find its place.” Here, jihad is portrayed as not simply a battle of nations, a 
battle for land or even of faith only, but of very basic right and wrong, of “truth and lies”, 
compelling people to question their very basic humanity and where Muslim Pakistanis 
will prevail as they stand for the truth, whereas the (Hindu/Indian) sinners will be 
punished. 
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Another poem, roughly translated, runs thus:  
We gave our blood to bring this beloved country Pakistan, made our home with 
lakhs of homes, we Musolmans, to keep God’s din, to make our beloved holy land…  
They want to break our tawhidi spirit, our soul’s right imaan, we won’t accept 
anything [else] as long as we have God’s Quran...  
We will say loudly the azaan Allahu akbar, this jihad of Islam is Pakistan’s 
unity...  
We Pakistanis are brothers, we sing songs of Pakistan, even if we have to give 
blood we will keep the honour of Pakistan. (Dainik Sangram 20 August 1971, p. 4) 
 
Reflected in this poem is the entire religion-based discourse of Pakistan – the 
Muslim’s sacrifice to create it in order to establish God’s din or religion; the reference to 
tawhid or monotheism, faith and the all-powerful Quran; the call of Allahu akbar or 
Allah is great, jihad for Islam and unity; and Pakistani brotherhood and the repeating of 
sacrifice in order to uphold the honour of Pakistan and Islam.  
Another powerful poem titled “Call for a New Jihad” compares the war to the 
Battle of Karbala, refers to the enemy as monsters and atheists and paints an overall 
bloody picture of the battle in the offing: 
Oh, Muslim, don’t sleep anymore, listen to the call for a new jihad.  
Destruction is coming, death is calling,  
a trap to start another Karbala,  
monsters are revolting against Allah,  
atheists are sharpening their claws,  
You’re still sleeping, don’t you know the news,  
Where is the blood of your heart, where is your faith-inspired spirit?  
Have you forgotten the message of the Quran or the Hadith, oh you unconscious,  
Can’t you hear the commander-in-chief give the prayer call for jihad?...  
Let’s rise today in the spirit of unity 
There is still time, still the sun, there is Allah’s holy Quran,  
There is jihadi blood in the chest, wake up, world’s Musolmans,  
Draw the name of God with the red blood in your hearts,  
According to His rules, spread His message in the world. (Dainik Sangram 3 
September 1971, p. 4) 
 
A poem titled “Today’s song” by a renowned writer and published in a special 
supplement, making reference to jihad, sacrifice and martyrdom, runs as follows: 
We are all soldiers, vigilant mujahid, we raise flags in the name of Allah…  
We will keep this flag of jihad raised forever,  
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Forever mujahid, soldiers, we will remain tirelessly awake and watchful at 
night…  
In this destructive violent tempest, with martyrs’ blood we will paint pictures of 
freedom…  
We are thousands of jihadi soldiers  
We will be sacrificed in the path of Allah... (Dainik Sangram 3 September 1971, 
supplement p. 1) 
 
Atef Alshaer (2014) has argued that poetry is a form of political communication. 
In his analysis of the poetry of the Lebanese party Hezbollah, he shows how poetry 
played an important part of the socio-political fabric of the Arab world, ‘fused into 
gatherings, televised speeches, invitations, social meetings and exchanges and public 
readings’ and how it is a ‘historical and authentic form of expression’ (Alshaer 2014: 
122). This is also the case in South Asia, where Urdu poetry is widely read, recited and 
referred to not only in Pakistan but Bangladesh and India as well. Bangla poetry since the 
nineteenth century has also made a significant place for itself in Bangla literature. 
Though much of it is romantic, very political67 and contemporary political movements 
such as the Language Movement, the Liberation War and other national protests have 
also given rise to classic and important poems. In the newspapers analysed here, 
references to the classic poetry of Urdu poet Allama Iqbal are very common, while 
renowned Bangali poets such as Farrukh Ahmed are also often featured. Even more so, 
jihadi poetry in the children’s pages was an ingenious way of drawing in young readers to 
such grave concepts as jihad, sacrifice and martyrdom in the appealing form of rhyme.   
 
7.2b Sacrifice  
Michael Billig (2001) has used the concept of ‘banal nationalism’ to describe 
what he calls the ‘flagging’ by the state aided by the media through which an ideological 
																																																						
67	For	more	on	Bangla	poetry,	its	politics	and	its	role	in	‘the	making	of	a	modern	cultural	sphere’,	see	
Rosinka	Chaudhuri’s	The	Literary	Thing.	
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consciousness of nationhood is naturalised, made to seem commonsensical. For Billig, 
who believes that national identity does not create nationalism but that nationalism is in 
fact what forms national identity, it is the media which routinely addresses its audience as 
members of a nation, readying them for times of crisis when they may be called upon to 
sacrifice themselves for the cause of nationhood.  As Amilcar Antonio Barreto argues in 
his book Nationalism and its Logical Foundations, ‘Sacrificing one’s life for the chosen 
creed is one way to appease divine forces and provide a role model for current and future 
adherents. It is an example based on articulating faith through action and not just belief or 
mere words’ (Barreto 2009: 120). 
The act of sacrifice is frequently used in the media analysed in this research, not 
to help the construction of an imagined nation, but in the service of religion. Sacrifice is 
mentioned in reference to the Partition of India of 1947 where ‘lakhs [hundreds of 
thousands] of Muslims sacrificed their lives to create Pakistan’, and as the need of the 
current hour, using, among other things, this history as a justification: “Bengal’s Muslims 
made a huge sacrifice and they will make every sacrifice necessary to protect the world’s 
largest Muslim nation” (Dainik Sangram 7 May 1971, p. 1).  
The great sacrifice during the Partition is termed a “Muslim renaissance, with the 
main basis of Pakistan being the establishment of Islamic values” and the president of the 
East Pakistan Islamic Students’ Organisation says that the organisation “will not hesitate 
to give its last drop of blood to keep Pakistan’s identity and ideology intact” (Dainik 
Sangram 31 July 1971, p. 3) while at a council meeting of the Jamaat-i-Islami, the people 
are called upon to “be conscious of the current conflict and to bring back to life the 
sacrifices that Muslims have made in various countries over the ages” (Dainik Sangram 
20 August 1971, p. 1). President Yahya Khan asks the people to look within themselves 
and see whether they are doing right by the sacrifices that were made, by the men and 
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women who made sacrifices in order to guarantee that Islamic way of life could be 
established” and asks them to devote themselves again to implementing Islamic ideology 
(Dainik Sangram 11 September 1971, p. 1). A poem, published on 14 August, talks about 
the lakhs of martyrs of Pakistan and the “crores [tens of millions] more who will give 
their lives to uphold its honour” (Dainik Sangram 14 August 1971, supplement p. 3) 
while another poem claims that the sacrifice of 20 lakh Muslims is unheard of and as 
their “capable descendants we will keep the respect of their blood, we are Muslims” 
(Dainik Sangram 14 August 1971, supplement p. 4).         
Sacrifice is linked to Islam. Thus Jamaat-i-Islami Ameer Maulana Maududi 
declares that: “The followers of the great Prophet are completely prepared to defend our 
regional unity and this homeland of Muslims. If needed, they won’t hesitate to sacrifice 
their lives” (Dainik Sangram 30 June 1971, p. 1). Maududi is also reported as being 
satisfied with the role of Islamic Students’ Organisation activists in “inspiring youth at 
various educational institutions to sacrifice for Islam” (Dainik Sangram 29 August 1971, 
p. 1). Sacrifice is not for the sake of the people or the nation, but is constructed as being 
for religion, Islam. At a discussion on the sacrifice and martyrdom of religious leader 
Mustafa Al Madani, the speakers “vow not to forgive the killers of Shaheed Madani or 
their ideology, we will all be ready to sacrifice ourselves” as he “sacrificed his life in the 
path of Allah” (Dainik Sangram 23 August 1971, p. 1). Jamaat-i-Islami leader Ghulam 
Azam says that for the same “reason that Shaheed Madani gave his life, in order to 
protect Islam and Muslims in the holy land of Pakistan, we are prepared to sacrifice 
everything” (Dainik Sangram 11 September 1971, p. 1). Anyone who has made such a 
glorious sacrifice is heroised and set as an example for the rest of the nation to follow. In 
a speech given on the newly established ‘Madani Day’, member of the Mohokuma 
Nezamul Islam party Maulana Manzurul Haque says,  
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Madani did not hesitate to give his all, even sacrifice his life in order to establish Allah’s 
din in the world. If we follow in his footsteps then we will also succeed. In order to save 
Pakistan from disaster and make it a true Islamic state, we will need to make more 
sacrifices and Al Madani’s martyrdom is such a sign from Allah. Thus the main 
significance of observing Madani Day should be to take a vow to make any sacrifice in 
exchange for making Pakistan a genuine Islamic state. (Dainik Sangram 14 September 
1971, p. 5)     
 
Any act of sacrifice is glorified in the media and is used to encourage people to 
make more such sacrifices. An editorial entitled “We are proud” pays tribute to a pilot 
who gave his life in the war on the side of Pakistan whose sacrifice, “it is hoped, will 
inspire the rest of the people towards service and sacrifice” (Dainik Sangram 31 August 
1971, p. 2). The following day, a news story is published with excerpts from the pilot’s 
diary in which he reportedly wrote, “People’s lives are momentary so why not give your 
life for the country? People die only once, but when a life is sacrificed for the country, 
that is the greatest death” (Dainik Sangram 1 September 1971, p. 4).   
The poem “Today’s song” discussed above also talks about sacrifice: “We are 
thousands of jihadi soldiers/We will be sacrificed in the path of Allah...” (Dainik 
Sangram 6 September 1971, supplement p. 1), where the people are shown as strong, 
united, inspired by their faith to fight, kill and even die “in the path of Allah”.   
In a council meeting of the Jamaat-i-Islami, Ghulam Azam calls for people to 
“sacrifice their utmost to defend sacred ideology-based homeland Pakistan. Saving 
oneself, the country and ideology are the same thing. We must come forward to defend 
Pakistan, this is our dini duty, if God forbid, we fail in the duty to defend our nation, then 
we will not be able to save ourselves and our ideology” (Dainik Sangram 4 October 
1971, p. 1). Frequent references are made by religious leaders and scholars in the media, 
to the Quran, Hadith and the life and battles of the Prophet, as a way to authenticate the 
call to violence. This not only normalises for the good Muslim violence against others 
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and sacrifice of oneself, but actually demands it of them. The notion of martyrdom is 
discussed in the following section. 
 
7.2c Martyrdom  
The concept of martyrdom is not restricted to religious discourses. It can very 
well refer to a person’s ‘sacrificial offering of his/her body to proclaim the justice of a 
cause’ (Pettigrew 1997: ix). As Barreto argues, while traditionally martyrdom has been 
associated more often with religious causes than with nationalism, the two are not 
mutually exclusive, with many ‘ethnic entrepreneurs’ also using religious markers to 
distinguish between ‘us, the faithful and them, the heathens’ (Barreto 2009: 18). In fact, 
Barreto goes as far as to say there is no such thing as religious versus linguistic or any 
other characteristic of nationalism but that what differentiates distinct nationalist 
movements are the ‘cultural features ethnic elites have selected as group boundary 
markers and manipulated in order to distinguish us from them’ (ibid). Similarly, it is 
these elites who ‘promise their volunteers short-term benefits in this life and 
immeasurable long-term benefits in the afterlife’ (ibid). It is also these elites who 
determine whether such self-sacrifice meets requirements. As Barreto puts it, ‘An 
individual can die, only a community can make a martyr’ (ibid: 119).  
In modern history, martyrs have been produced by everything from the French 
Revolution to the Irish “Troubles”. Today, due to the enormity of the long-lasting conflict 
in the Middle East characterised by suicide bombings and martyrdom, however, the term 
is most often related to Islam and Islamist violence.   
As Asma Afsaruddin (2014) in a book chapter on martyrdom in Islamic thought 
and praxis argues, the Arabic term “shahid” or martyr, while today is used largely to refer 
to military martyrs, was not so in the Quran. The word was used in the Quran to refer to 
		 213	
‘a legal or eyewitness’, whereas military martyrs were referred to as man qutila fi sabil 
allah/alladhina qutilu fi sabil allah or “those who are slain in the path of God” 
(Afsaruddin 2014: 41). Referring to the works of various exegetes, Afsaruddin 
demonstrates that there is even debate regarding whether one has to be slain on the 
battlefield in order to attain martyrdom or whether the pious who die of natural causes 
can also do so. Examples from the Quran, various Hadith and exegesis show the 
ambiguity in defining martyrdom, which can be ‘expansively construed as death resulting 
from any kind of suffering and pain endured by the faithful during their earthly existence’ 
(Afsaruddin 2014: 49) and that even the promised rewards may be the same in the case of 
both military and non-military martyrdom. Throughout centuries of war, interpretation 
and re-interpretation of religious texts, however, have caused a ‘progressively higher 
moral evaluation of the military martyr over the non-military’, she notes (ibid: 51).  
Islamist leaders such as Hasan al-Banna of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, for 
example, have underlined that the ‘greatest of martyrdoms and of rewards for the 
mujahidin are reserved for the one who “kills or is killed in the way of God”’ (ibid: 56), a 
discourse that is also evident in the anti-liberation discourses of the Pakistani Jamaat-i-
Islami which was led by Abu al-A ‘la Maududi, who was influenced by al-Banna.  
It is perhaps important for promoters of sacrifice and martyrdom in the path of 
Allah to distinguish these from suicide for personal reasons. Suicide in itself is a sin in 
Islam, thus it must be differentiated from giving up one’s life for the cause of Islam. The 
opinion of the president of the European Council for Fatwa and Research, Shaikh Yusuf 
al-Qaradhawi published in Donohue and Esposito (2007) distinguishes between suicide 
as a selfish act of weakness and escape, and martyrdom as sacrifice ‘for the sake of a 
higher goal, for which all sacrifices become meaningless. He sells himself to Allah in 
order to buy Paradise in exchange. Allah said: “Allah has bought from the believers their 
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souls and properties for they shall inherit Paradise”’ (2007: 471). For advocates of 
sacrifice and martyrdom, giving up one’s life in this world is a means of achieving 
paradise in the hereafter, the greatest reward.   
In the media under study, the word martyrdom was mentioned at the beginning of 
the war in reference to the martyrs of the past such as the Battle of Karbala. In June, 
however, Dainik Sangram began to use the term differently, making a clear link between 
martyrdom and the anti-liberation war. In an op-ed article by columnist Durmukh (1971a) 
the author declares war, asking for jihad, sacrifice and martyrdom of the soldiers: “Today 
we should rise against Hindustan and its agents in the belief that ‘Those who are killed in 
the path of Allah, don’t call them dead but martyrs.’ We must also remember Allah’s 
words – ‘The death you all are running away from you must embrace’” (Dainik Sangram 
15 June 1971, p. 2). In this way, death is overshadowed by martyrdom, which is 
described as something to be welcomed or ‘embraced’.    
Following the death of the religious leader Mustafa al Madani, the newspapers 
begin to use the term more. In fact, on 13 August, four different news items in the Dainik 
Sangram refer to Madani as a martyr. Maulana Madani’s martyrdom (never death), 
continues to be invoked in the media for several weeks, described as an “irreparable loss 
for the Muslim world” and that his “martyr’s blood would be the beginning of a 
renaissance in Muslim society” (Dainik Sangram 16 August 1971, p. 4). A statement that 
begins to be reiterated after this event is “the blood of martyrdom can never go in vain” 
(ibid). Jamaat-i-Islami student leader Nizami (Dainik Sangram 23 August 1971, p. 1) in 
an op-ed article even quotes Madani as having asked Allah not to deprive one of the fate 
of becoming a martyr. Speakers at a discussion on Maulana Madani talk about 
martyrdom as a necessity when a nation is moving towards downfall and that “Muslims 
never fear death, they do not want to die in their beds but as martyrs on the ground of 
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jihad” (Dainik Sangram 23 August 1971, p. 1).   In two poems published in the 
Independence Day supplement on August 14, reference is made to the lakhs of martyrs 
who gave their lives for Pakistan and whose martyrdom the people must honour by 
giving their own lives (Dainik Sangram 14 August 1971, supplement p. 3), thereby 
encouraging people to attain martyrdom. Another poem, “Imaaner bohin jalo” 
encourages the “generous pouring/flow of blood” and to “seek the crown of a martyr 
(shaheed-gazi68)” for “dying as a martyr is better than living like the dead” (Dainik 
Sangram 14 August 1971, supplement p. 4).   
“The lives of martyrs are inspiration for mumin” claims a Sangram Report with 
the same headline, where the report states:  
Throughout the ages struggling Muslims have done this to end the rule of the ungodly 
and establish Allah’s religion in the world, they have given their lives in struggle, 
smilingly been martyred. But the revolutionary crusaders did not stop. Inspired by the 
ideals of martyrs, the Muslim millat (faith/nation) has moved forward unstoppably, with 
the flag of Islam in hand, moved forward in the spirit of a new life… When the Muslims 
of this subcontinent became vocal in demanding a social system based on Allah-Rasul’s 
rules of rights-justice, many Muslims had to be martyred. (Dainik Sangram 18 August 
1971, p. 1) 
 
Martyrdom is not only reserved for leaders, but is also talked of when reporting 
the death of ordinary people. For example, the Dainik Sangram re-invokes the story of a 
young man, Abdul Malek, who was “smilingly martyred in a monstrous attack” when he 
was demanding Islamic education back in 1969 and how people felt his pain and are 
warmed by his blood which “inspired them to raise the flag of jihad” (Dainik Sangram 19 
August 1971, p. 1). The news story is a passionate one, full of imagery of blood still 
warm and inspiring martyrdom:  
Malek’s martyrdom gave new inspiration to the Muslim spirit. Every martyrdom renews 
the spirit of the Muslim millat, making them aware of their responsibility, heating up the 
																																																						
68	Gazi	refers	to	“one	who	fights	in	the	way	of	Allah/for	the	defence	of	religion”	(Bangla	Academy	Bengali-
English	Dictionary	2007).	Originally,	“one	who	conducts	a	raid”;	also	a	veteran,	or	hero,	in	a	religious	war.	
Ghazi	became	a	title	for	a	victorious	leader	in	a	war,	but	it	was	also	adopted	as	a	family	name.	It	is	
synonymous	with	mujahid	(Adamec	2009).	
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blood of faithful believers. Such a flood of blood will take true Pakistani mujahid forward 
in taking their holy homeland to its destination. That is why they think nothing of 
hundreds of sacrifices. (ibid)  
 
In this way, the discourse of martyrdom is often used to inspire jihad.   
A letter to the editor entitled “We are prepared” reinforces the discourse claiming 
that, to be martyred in the fight for truth is every kamil (one who has attained his end) 
Muslim’s desire. The writer continues, “The people who are taught about martyrdom can 
be gazi too. We want to be gazi in Allah’s court by finishing the enemies of Pakistan and 
Islam and raising the flag of Islam on their blood” (Dainik Sangram 30 August 1971, p. 
2). Another letter published the next day titled “A sad appeal”, talks about the martyrdom 
of Madani as a lesson for all East Pakistanis, about other wars and martyrs in the history 
of Islam and that the martyrdom of mard-e-mujahid Madani cannot go in vain – the 
people must “come forward to protect Islam and Pakistan… InshaAllah the enemy will 
be destroyed. Nachrum minallahe kareeb69” (Dainik Sangram 31 August 1971, p. 2). 
On National Defence Day, President Yahya Khan says that “Those who were 
martyred in the war of 1965 and became gazi by displaying their bravery, should be 
examples for the next generation of armed naval and air forces” (Dainik Sangram 6 
September 1971, p. 1). In a special supplement published on the occasion, the poem 
“Today’s song” graphically describes how “With the blood of martyrs we will paint 
pictures of freedom…” (Dainik Sangram 6 September 1971, supplement p. 1). In these 
ways, martyrdom is made to seem like the ideal goal to be achieved by true Muslims, 
downplaying the pain and death of the actual event and physical, worldly consequences 
and glorifying the act and the promised rewards in the afterlife.   
Any death perpetrated by “Hindus/Indians” is termed as martyrdom, as in an 
incident where Rezakars “finished off” 22 miscreants but where two Rezakars were also 
																																																						
69	“Help	from	God	and	a	speedy	victory”	
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“martyred” (Dainik Sangram 10 September 1971, p. 1). In an editorial published on 
Madani Day, martyrs Abdul Malek and Maulana Madani are said to have been martyred 
(“attaining the deaths they wanted”) by “evil conspirators bearing slogans of regionalism, 
secularism and socialism” (Dainik Sangram 10 September 1971, p. 2) and the only way 
to make good by the sacrifices of the known and unknown martyrs of the province is to 
come forward in sacrifice for the nation. Martyrdom as something desirable and indeed 
desired is repeatedly highlighted in the media, for example by consistently stating that 
Madani “wanted” to be martyred (Dainik Sangram 11 September 1971, p. 1) and that his 
martyrdom can “bring good fortune to East Pakistan” if it can inspire others to give their 
life for the din as Madani did. Madani’s martyrdom is described as a “lesson” for the 
Muslims of Pakistan and the world, his death a “Jewish conspiracy” and his martyrdom 
“a sign from Allah” to follow his lead in sacrificing everything for the cause of Islam 
(Dainik Sangram 14 September 1971, p. 5).    
The months of September and October see the deaths of several “martyrs” being 
covered in the media, such as “madrasa teachers, students and other dindaar (faithful) 
Muslims” (Dainik Sangram 30 September 1971, p. 5) who “fought with their last drop of 
blood”; descriptions of whose “holy faces” and reports of whose bodies being carried and 
buried to slogans of “we won’t let a martyr’s blood go in vain” (Dainik Sangram 14 
September 1971, p. 2) and news of prayers being held for those “martyred [while] 
defending Pakistan” (Hamidi, Dainik Sangram 3 November 1971, p. 2) are published. In 
the news of three other Rezakars “martyred by the bullets of miscreants”, the janaza is 
announced and “Islam-loving people” are requested to attend (Dainik Sangram 8 October 
1971, p. 1). The following day, the news of the burial of, again, the “Rezakars martyred 
by the bullets of miscreants” (Dainik Sangram 9 October 1971, p. 1) is also published. It 
was as if the reports of the killing of Rezakars had to be glorified as martyrdom in order 
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to justify their going to war in the first place as well as to inspire the spirit of revenge in 
others.  
Two days later, an editorial describes the martyrdom of the three “in the jihad to 
defend Islam, Pakistan and Muslims against Jewish-Hindu agents”, and, while grief is 
expressed, consolation is also given, especially to the parents, as follows:  
These sacrificing mujahid who were martyred in the path of Allah have become beloved 
to Allah and gained the high status of martyrdom. Martyrs’ blood will not ever go in vain, 
cannot go in vain. Their parents should find consolation in the fact that their deaths were 
not like that of others’, they died as martyrs, about whom the great Allah declared, those 
who die in the path of Allah are not dead but immortal – they are martyrs, they have 
passed the final test of faith. The Prophet said, martyrs will go to heaven unconditionally. 
Their parents have the pride of being parents of martyrs. They must realise that the status 
of this death is much higher than the deaths of those who were agents of kafir or who 
died while performing some other sin or from natural diseases. (Dainik Sangram 11 
October 1971, p. 2)  
 
The battle and killing and being killed in it is legitimised to the point where the parents of 
those killed are urged to choose pride over sadness in the deaths of their children. 
Following another incident in November in which five people were killed, an 
editorial speaks of their martyrdom as an example of how “India has made up the Mukti 
Bahini of East Pakistani separatists, Hindu youth, Indian agents, escaped prisoners and 
other anti-social elements such as thieves, robbers and murderers and trained them and 
armed them and sent them to East Pakistan” and how they have “martyred lakhs of 
Muslim women-men-children” (Dainik Sangram 13 November 1971, p. 2). Another 
editorial, after describing the “misdeeds” of Hindus, states, “We must descend into jihad 
to defend Islam and Pakistan with the plan of either evicting the miscreants or being 
martyred like true mumin” (Dainik Sangram 15 October 1971, p. 2). Again, the lines are 
very clear between the murderous enemy Mukti Bahini comprised of all sorts of evil and 
anti-social elements and the martyred Muslims.   
Columnist Rastbaj (1971c) in his op-ed piece writes about someone who believed 
that instead of dying at the hands of other Bangali Muslims (from East Pakistan) who 
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sided with the Hindus, it would be better to be killed by actual Hindus (Dainik Sangram 
22 October, p. 2). He claims that in this way, at least he would achieve martyrdom, for 
the death of a Muslim at the hands of a non-Muslim is the way to martyrdom as one is 
fighting against the people of another religion to defend one’s own.    
History is drawn upon, from ancient Islamic wars to the more recent Partition of 
India. For example, a front-page commentary in the Dainik Sangram talks about the 
“thousands martyred by the bullets of Hindus” during the Pakistan movement and how 
now that “Hindu India has again attacked the sacred homeland of the Muslims Pakistan… 
Every Muslim of this country will paint a picture of freedom with their martyr’s blood 
but will not be bound by the chains of slavery of Hindu India” (Dainik Sangram 27 
November 1971, p. 1). 
Direct and indirect references to the Quran are made and interpreted or used to 
imply that violence against non-Muslims is justified in order to protect Muslims and their 
homeland, and that jihad, sacrifice and martyrdom are encouraged.  
For example, columnist Mujahid (1971b) in an op-ed piece in the Dainik Sangram 
refers to verses from the Quran where Allah and the Prophet have said, according to the 
author, “Those mumin (believing) Musolmans who will fight those who defy Allah and 
kill the enemy and are themselves martyred, I have taken their lives in exchange for 
heaven.” This is interpreted by the author of the op-ed piece as “in the Prophet’s hadith 
those who are martyred in the path of Allah are martyrs, and as a reward of their great 
self-sacrifice, they will be given a place in heaven without any questions about their past 
sins.” It is, apparently, better to die as “hizbullah” (Dainik Sangram 15 September 1971, 
p. 3). At a meeting of Jamaat-i-Islami activists, too, speakers proclaim that “Pakistan’s 
Islam-loving people… think of martyrdom as their greatest reward” (Dainik Sangram 29 
November 1971, p. 6). The following day, at another meeting, Jamaat-i-Islami leaders 
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claiming that India did not attack the borders of East Pakistan but the imaan (faith) of 
Muslims, declare, “Muslims are never defeated, they are either martyred, or are victors 
and become gazi” (Dainik Sangram 30 November 1971, p. 1).  
As previous chapters have shown, first, the media served to construct identities of 
the Pakistani Muslim, then depict the inseparability of the nation Pakistan and Islam. 
Eventually, the nation more or less fades into the background and religion takes over. The 
media analysed here did not portray the war as one between East and West Pakistanis or 
Bangalis and non-Bangalis, but as a war between Hindus and Muslims, India and 
Pakistan. As the war progressed, the papers began to construct the battle as one between 
Muslims and Hindus, and that the war was for the sake of Islam. Besides explicit calls to 
jihad, sacrifice and martyrdom, the media under discussion also implicitly encouraged 
violence as a “religious duty” by stating, for example, that it is the religious duty of the 
people to “aid the government to control anti-social elements” (Dainik Sangram 4 May 
1971, p. 2), that it is a “dini duty” to defend Pakistan (Dainik Sangram 4 October 1971, p. 
1), that “Islam-loving people [should] help the brave armed forces to counter Indian 
infiltrators and seditionists” (Dainik Sangram 31 May 1971, p. 1), that people should be 
ready to shed their blood for the unity and solidarity of Pakistan (Dainik Sangram 24 
May 1971, p. 3), that killing those who create obstacles to the practise of Islamic rituals is 
farz (Dainik Sangram 13 May 1971, p. 2).  
The call to jihad, sacrifice and martyrdom are evoked during Victory Day 
celebrations and during remembrance ceremonies and this is then reported in the media. 
For example, religious-political leaders declare that “People should be prepared to fight 
any situation as followers of the kalima tayyiba. Protecting Pakistan is farz like the fight 
to establish Islam” (Dainik Sangram 16 August 1971, p. 1). An editorial in the Dainik 
Sangram dated 31 July states: “There is no doubt that not only every imaandeepto (faith-
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enlightened) Muslim of Pakistan but the whole world’s Muslims will stand behind the 
Pakistani army against this Jewish-Hindu conspiracy.” In this way, aiding the army goes 
beyond the discursive to actual violent action. In praying for the “bravery and sacrifice” 
of the army, Jamaat-i-Islami leader Ghulam Azam also justifies the violent actions of the 
army by saying: “Allah gave the responsibility of protecting his beloved land Pakistan to 
the faithful Muslims but when they failed to solve the problem politically, Allah 
protected his beloved land through the army” (Dainik Sangram 5 August 1971, p. 4).  
At a discussion in remembrance of Maulana Madani, it is declared that “The 
enemies of Islam have today taken up arms, made martyrs out of many, the history of 
Islam is not only about martyrdom but also killing the enemy… If we do not all come 
forward to avenge the killing of the alem, we will have to answer to Allah” (Dainik 
Sangram 23 August 1971, p. 1). This ominous statement is an implicit call to violence, 
not only for the sacrifice and martyrdom of oneself but the killing of others. The battle 
was thus constructed as a war for Islam in the name of Allah and in which victory is 
guaranteed.    
As Apter (1997) notes with regards to the legitimisation of political violence, 
‘When death is the measure of devotion to noble causes, even the victims become co-
conspirators if they accept it as some historical necessity’ (1997: 2). 
 
7.3 The Media as “Deputies” 
Judith Butler in her book Frames of War: When is Life Grievable? addresses how 
visual and discursive fields are part of war recruitment and war: ‘we have to understand 
how popular assent to war is cultivated and maintained, in other words, how war waging 
acts upon the senses so that war is thought to be an inevitability, something good, or even 
a source of moral satisfaction’ (2016, Introduction to the Paperback Edition, para 1). 
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Butler’s is a perspective on how the Western media use images to mobilise war and states 
regulate the media to frame reality, but it can be applied as easily to this study in trying to 
understand ‘how the senses are part of any recruitment effort’ (ibid: para 6). Butler 
argues that in the West ‘soldiers are recruited with the promise of escaping poverty or 
acquiring job skills’ and do not ask whether or not the war is justified and that ‘if soldiers 
fail to be interpellated by the visual and narrative accounts of the wars they fight, then 
they start to lose faith in what they do…’ (ibid: para 10). This study has shown that in the 
case of anti-liberation fighters in 1971 Pakistan, this is in fact what it was done. Soldiers 
were interpellated, given a just cause and made to identify with it, giving them the faith to 
fight. 
Apter (1997) states, ‘People do not commit political violence without discourse’ 
(1997: 2) where discourse  
becomes important as a way of connecting moral principle and interests… constitu[ting] 
a boundary between the acceptable and the unacceptable interest. Those acceptable need 
to reinforce principle. It is in the mutual reinforcement of principle and interest that 
discourse becomes both conceptually, and on the ground, self-reflexive, legitimizing, and 
no matter how reprehensible the act, not a matter of the “event” alone. (1997: 3-4) 
 
As such, while the Pakistani government and military went to war on the 
battlefield against its Bangali population, its media acted as one of its ‘deputies’, the 
intellectuals of the dominant group ‘exercising subaltern functions of social hegemony 
and political government’ (Gramsci 2011: 191). The media is a reflection of the battle on 
the ground, with discursive violence and direct references to jihad, sacrifice and 
martyrdom increasing as the war progressed and, even more so, as it was drawing to a 
close, with the defeat of the anti-liberation forces imminent. Jihad was used as a 
mobilising call, interpellating people to take part in the battle and to give up their lives. 
Martyrdom was glorified as the ultimate, desired outcome of the life of any good, true 
Muslim.  
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It is worth noting, however, that jihad, sacrifice and martyrdom, whether or not 
these are the exact terms used to refer to such concepts, are not characteristic of only 
Islam, or even only religious conflicts. While other religious and irreligious wars have 
been based on the premise of struggle and defensive as well as aggressive violence, the 
notions of sacrifice and martyrdom have characterised conflicts as far apart 
geographically as the Czech Republic and Sri Lanka. It should also be noted here that the 
term ‘shahid’ is also widely used in Bangladesh to refer to those killed during the 
Language Movement of 1952 as well as to the freedom fighters of 1971. In fact, 
December 14, the last violent attack on the part of the Pakistani army to wipe out the 
Bangali intelligentsia by targeting university professors, journalists, etc., is nationally 
observed as “Martyred Intellectuals Day”, not because they were killed “in the path of 
God” as defined in the later and more specific definitions of martyrdom shown above but 
in the earlier, more general classification of those who died in pain and suffering. 
Interestingly enough, while the 1971 Pakistani media repeatedly referred to the deaths of 
anti-liberation forces as martyrdom, especially at the hands of Hindus/the Indian army, 
the discourse of the shahid that prevails in Bangladesh today is of those who fought not a 
religious war but what they believed was a just war, in the sense of it being a battle for 
justice. With the recent execution of several convicted war criminals in Bangladesh, there 
is also some debate over whether they should be allowed to have the word shahid 
engraved on their tombstones as has been done in some cases by their families. As 
Baretto (2009) referred to earlier in the chapter has said, it indeed takes a community to 
make a martyr, but it also depends on relations of power and the dominant ideological 
discourse in circulation at any given time. 
The following chapter explores the issue of sexual violence during Bangladesh’s 
Liberation War. It examines the discourse – or its absence – surrounding the mass rape of 
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Bangali women during the independence movement and the significance of the 
mis/representation or its complete lack thereof and the implications of such discursive 
silences. 
 
 
Fig. 4: Legitimisation of Violence through Discourse 
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Table 4: The framing of violent discourse in Dainik Sangram and Dainik Pakistan in 1971 
 
Defending	Islam	and	Pakistan	 • Hindus	want	to	make	East	Pakistan	
HIndubhumi	(land)evict	the	enemies	of	
Islam	and	Pakistan	
• finish	off	those	involved	in	armed	
conspiracy	against	Pakistan	and	Islam	
• break	the	poisonous	fangs	of	
Brahminism	
• defend	against	the	barbaric	attacks	of	
imperialist	Indian	invaders	
• reference	to	al-Badr	war,	Karbala	
• defend	Islam,	Pakistan	and	Muslims	
against	Hindu-Jewish	agents	
• use	imaani	shokti	(strength	of	faith)	
Jihad		 • declare	jihad	against	India’s	imperialist	
activities	
• unity,	sacrifice	and	jihad	
• jihad	as	religious/dini	duty	
• jihad	as	holy	duty	
• jihad	as	farz		
• jihad	against	those	in	the	way	of	justice	
and	peace	
• jihad	as	a	test	of	faith	
• battle	for	identity	
• words	not	enough,	must	join	battle	
• jihadi	inspiration,	from	past	martyrs,	
on	current	citizens	and	students	
• fight	with	life	and	property	
• without	jihad,	practical,	ethical,	
religious	responsibilities	will	remain	
unfulfilled	
• weapon	of	la	ilaha	il	Allah		
• jihad	in	the	path	of	Allah	
• wajib	
• rewarded	with	sawab	and	ganimat,	or	
in	event	of	death,	martyrdom	with	all	
sins	forgiven	
• jihad	as	form	of	revenge	
• jihad	against	anyone	defying	Allah	or	
taking	up	arms	against	Muslims	
• those	who	hesitate	are	munafiq		
• jihad	is	permitted	and	encouraged	
• war	is	the	only	solution	
• jihad	as	yardstick	for	measuring	the	
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faith	of	Muslims	
• soldiers	of	Islam	against	forces	of	the	
devil	
• warriors	of	Islam	
Sacrifice	 • embrace	death	
• reference	to	sacrifice	of	Muslims	
during	the	Partition	and	in	the	current	
war	
• sacrifice	to	defend	the	homeland	of	
Muslims	
• sacrificing	for	nation	is	the	greatest	
death	
• sacrifice	in	the	path	of	Allah	
• sacrifice	to	defend	sacred	ideology-
based	homeland	Pakistan	
Martyrdom	 • reference	to	battle	of	Karbala,	Partition	
• those	killed	in	the	path	of	Allah	are	not	
dead	but	martyrs	
• those	running	away	from	death	must	
embrace	it	
• martyr’s	blood	beginning	of	Muslim	
renaissance		
• blood	of	martyrdom	can	never	go	in	
vain	
• Muslims	would	rather	die	martyrs	than	
in	their	beds	
• seek	the	crown	of	a	martyr	
• Dying	as	martyr	better	than	living	like	
the	dead	
• lives	of	martyrs	are	inspiration	for	
mumin		
• smilingly	martyred	
• martyrdom	as	a	lessonblood	of	martyrs	
will	bring	freedom	
• martyrdom	is	desired	
• death	at	hands	of	non-Muslim	leads	to	
martyrdom	
• martyrs	are	Allah’s	beloved	
• martyrs	are	immortal	
• Muslims	are	never	defeated,	only	
martyred	
• guaranteed	entry	into	heaven	
• if	martyred,	all	sins	forgiven	
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CHAPTER 8 
DISCURSIVE SILENCES: THE ABSENCE OF WOMEN AND OTHER(S) OF 
THE 1971 WAR 
Words alter, words add, words subtract. –Susan Sontag 
 
The idea that language is the ‘cloak of thought’ used more to conceal and mask 
than to reveal, was never truer than in the case of the genocide of Bangladesh. – Rubina 
Saigol  
 
The history of rape in wartime is said to be as long as the history of war itself, but 
for the longest time, it has been treated as an unfortunate byproduct of war (Baaz and 
Stern 2013). The causes of increased sexual violence in wartime vary. For example, 
Wood (2009) cites some causes, including opportunity, individual and group incentives 
such as revenge, militaristic masculinity, etc. Furthermore, the causes, strategies and 
forms of wartime sexual violence have varied in different contexts, playing a major role 
in some, minor in others and none at all in certain conflicts. It was only beginning in the 
1990s, following mass rape during the conflicts in Rwanda and Bosnia-Herzegovina that 
rape as an actual weapon of war started to receive policy, media and scholarly attention, 
and that the ‘systematic use of rape in warfare was defined as a war crime for the first 
time by the international tribunal for the former Yugoslavia’ (Goldstein 2001: 1).  
However, despite this definition, there remain concerns about the difficulty of 
addressing such a sensitive issue and especially its impact on victims/survivors. Anna 
Hedlund (2016) notes that not only do warring parties exploit the global concern over 
sexual violence but that the focus on rape as a weapon of war may actually overshadow 
other atrocities that occur in wartime and that even in addressing the issue of rape as a 
weapon of war, understanding the framework, which includes the historical, political and 
economic context of a conflict, is important. Wartime rape is not an isolated incident and 
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neither does it occur symmetrically over all conflicts around the world, it is not limited to 
women being the only victims and only men being the perpetrators (Wood 2009, 
Hedlund, 2016). Hedlund (2016) goes further to suggest that in order to gain a more 
complete understanding of sexual violence in wartime, more ethnographic research based 
on direct encounters with perpetrators – and not victims, as most work around wartime 
rape has focused on – is needed.  
Finally, as Cohn (2013) points out, “women” are not a monolithic group but vary 
by age, race, class, ethnicity, religion, etc., and are also influenced by the multiple social, 
cultural, economic and political forces which structure their lives, and generalising the 
issue of “women and war” runs the risk of committing ‘conceptual violence to the 
realities of women’s lives’ (Cohn 2013: 2). It is thus important to bear in mind that 
violence, too, may affect every woman in every culture and society differently, and that 
even the lines between sexual violence in wartime and in peacetime are often blurred. 
This chapter explores the discursive language as well as silences around the issue 
of gender violence in particular, and of the absent Other in general, in the anti-liberation 
media of 1971 Pakistan. Through a discourse analysis of the newspapers Dainik Sangram 
and Dainik Pakistan, it examines the language of the media, who it addresses, who it 
excludes and what significance and implications this may have. 
 
8.1 Sexual Violence in Times of War 
Sexual violence in wartime is a complex phenomenon and is now seen by 
scholars not only as one that occurs during ‘war’ as opposed to ‘peace’, but as happening 
on a continuum (Cohn 2013, Cockburn 2009). Cynthia Cockburn, for example, notes that 
there are at least three broad warning signs that precede political violence or armed 
conflict – ‘economic distress; militarization; and divisive shifts in ideology in the way 
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identities are represented’ (Cockburn 2009: 158). While all three also occurred prior to 
the battle of 1971, for the purposes of this study, the third is the most relevant.  
Cockburn, in her study of violence as a continuum occurring throughout pre-, 
during and post-conflict times, argues that a shift in discourse, especially in media 
representations, can be detected prior to political violence or armed conflict and that this 
discourse can ‘stoke the violence of national patriotism against a rival nation, point a 
finger at “the enemy within,” or deepen the sense of ethnic belonging in opposition to 
some “other” from whom “we” are different and by whom our culture or our religion, our 
very existences, is threatened’ (2009: 161). This divisive discourse, argues Cockburn, 
renews the patriarchal familial ideology and ‘deepening the differentiation of men and 
women, masculinity and femininity, preparing men to fight and women to support them’ 
(ibid). As  Nira Yuval-Davis has suggested in her discussion of gender and the nation, 
‘the more primordial the rendering of people and nation, the more are the relationships 
between men and women essentialized’ (cited in Cockburn 2009, ibid) – men by 
physique and tradition by which they are expected to protect women, children and the 
nation or “motherland”, and women by biology and tradition by which they are to 
maintain the home, raise children according to the nation’s values and sacrifice their men 
when needed in wartime. Cockburn cites the example of Yugoslavia during the war in the 
1990s and the restrictions on the reproductive freedoms of women by urging them to 
leave employment to tend to their ‘natural duties’ with the increased strategic importance 
of birth rates.  
Such restrictions manifest themselves in a different way in the case study, 
especially after the war with an abortion/adoption campaign for the “war babies”, but 
even more relevant prior to and during the war was what Cockburn refers to as an ‘ethic 
of “purity”’, legitimising the cleansing of internal enemies of the state as well as aliens on 
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the land. As she notes in her discussion of Yugoslavia, purity is a particularly dangerous 
ethic for women, where in extreme forms of patriarchy, men’s honour is seen to become 
dependent on it and, I would argue, the perceived need to protect and/or avenge it 
becomes more acute. For Cockburn (2009), the most prominent sex differences in war 
can be found in the brutalisation of the body where, not only because of physical 
differences between women and men, but also because of the differences in cultural 
meanings ascribed to the male and female bodies, women and men are abused and 
tortured differently and die different deaths. In her discussion, she refers to Ruth Siefert’s 
three explanations for this, namely, the booty principle, whereby along with the 
conquered territory, the victor in any war also wins the right to (violate) the enemy 
women; secondly, the rape and humiliation of the enemy women which results in the 
humiliation of enemy men who failed to protect their women; and thirdly, the official 
sanctioning of rape by officers in order to promote soldierly solidarity through male 
bonding. While evidence of the latter has been found in various compilations of oral 
histories (Ibrahim 2007) and memoirs of even Pakistani military officers, the second 
principle, of humiliation, is particularly pertinent to the Bangladesh war. Similar to 
Cockburn’s notion of bodies being used as “ethnic markers” in the war in Yugoslavia, in 
Bangladesh too, a prime goal was to impregnate Bangali women with good Pakistani 
Muslim “seeds” and in the process, humiliate the women and the men who could not 
protect them.  
Of Cynthia Enloe’s three categorisations of rape – recreational rape, national 
security rape and systematic mass rape, the case of Bangladesh in 1971 is most likely to 
fall under the third, ‘as an instrument of open warfare’ (Enloe 2009: 240). As she puts it, 
‘rape in war has been part of a deliberate policy, not just ethnicity-run-wild’ (ibid: 252, 
original italics). Bina D’Costa (2011) attributes this to the  
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deeply engrained idea that Pakistani Muslims were the vanguard of the nation – that they 
were born to rule the new state and to ‘instruct’ the Bengalis on how to become ideal 
members of the nation – that was largely responsible for the indiscriminate killing of 
Hindus and the mass rape of Bengali women. In a way, the forced impregnation of 
women was also meant to instil the ideologies of Pakistan in the Bengali psyche. 
(D’Costa 2011: 101) 
 
D’Costa proposes that rather than being a vicious act, the killing of Hindus was a 
strategic policy which the Pakistanis thought would rid the nation of discord. The 
Pakistani need to “purify” the nation by killing off Hindus or forcing them to go to India 
“where they belong”, for Bengali women connected to a “Hindu” identity resulted in 
indiscriminate and vicious mass rape by the Pakistani military (ibid) aided by its auxiliary 
forces. 
Following on from Linke and Smith (2009) who, in talking about the relationship 
between militarism and sexuality, contend that ‘the state is embodied in the soldier and 
the body of the soldier becomes a physical extension of the state’ (2009: 219) with rape 
enforcing masculine visions of power, I propose that the nation is embodied in women 
and that the bodies of women become a physical extension of the nation. In fact, the state 
is the authority with the power to control and direct, practices that become embodied in 
the male and always “masculine” soldier. In contrast, the nation comprises the people, 
society, culture, things to be nurtured and thus may be seen as being of/related to woman. 
As Carol Cohn writes: 
Nationalist ideology frequently symbolizes the nation, the homeland, as a woman; it is 
the (symbolic) body of the women/mother/land that the male citizen soldier must protect 
against violation, penetration, conquest. Conversely, physical women and their bodies are 
seen as the repository and reproducers of national, racial, ethnic, tribal, or religious 
identity – they are the vessels through which men of the nation or other collectivity can 
(re)produce new members of the group; thus, their bodies are the territory over which 
men must have control in order to assure the continuation of their national identities, 
bloodlines, and their familial and national honor. (Cohn 2013: 14)    
 
The targeting of women in military conflicts results from misogynist practices 
combined with the fact that women are seen as carriers of culture, and their bodies, as 
Kelly (2000) suggests, become ‘both territory to be conquered and vehicles through 
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which the nation/group can be reproduced’ (Kelly 2000: 50). As such, rape during 
religious or sectarian conflicts, such as the case in 1971 East Pakistan, becomes a tool of 
ethnic cleansing, but also as a tool to either impregnate women so that they bear the 
“enemy’s” children, or prevent them from becoming mothers in their own communities 
by making them socially unacceptable or physically unable to bear children.  
Sharlach (2000), in her study on rape as genocide in Bangladesh, Bosnia, and 
Rwanda, attributes this to dominant perceptions of women as symbols of honour in their 
role as ‘mothers of the nation and transmitters of culture’ in some communities that then 
stigmatise rape victims/survivors doubly for having brought dishonour upon both 
themselves and the community. The actual rape is followed by a ‘second rape’: the 
ostracism of the women from those communities and their own families, where they 
become pariahs.  
 
8.2 The Mass Rape of 1971  
The birth of Bangladesh in 1971 saw the mass violation of Bangali and Bihari 
women (Brownmiller 1975, Debnath 2009, Mookherjee 2002). According to official and 
unofficial sources, between 200,000 and 400,000 Bangali women are said to have been 
raped during Bangladesh’s liberation war (ibid). Reflective of the population of 
Bangladesh, 80 percent of the women reported to have been raped were Muslims, but 
Hindu and Christian women were not spared and girls aged eight to women aged 75 were 
sexually assaulted, some raped on the spot, others abducted and held by force in military 
barracks (Brownmiller 1975). As Brownmiller points out, ‘The Pakistanis were also 
Moslem, but there the similarity stopped. Despite a shared religious heritage, Punjabi 
Pakistanis are taller, lighter-skinned and “rawboned” compared to dark, small-boned 
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Bengalis. This racial difference would provide added anguish to those Bengali women 
who found themselves pregnant after their physical ordeal’ (Brownmiller 1975: 82).  
Even as the Pakistani forces surrendered in December 1971, some reportedly 
claimed to be leaving their “seed” behind in the women they had impregnated in the mass 
rape (Sharlach 2000). Following the war, there were 25,000 documented cases of 
abortion, as well as a number of “war babies” being put up for adoption in foreign 
countries (Brownmiller 1975). Apart from this work which had drawn international 
attention to the Bangladesh case, there has been little academic attention to these crimes. 
However, in the last ten years, Bina D’Costa (2011), Nayanika Mookherjee (2006) and 
Yasmin Saikia (2011) have worked on issues of silence, social causes and consequences 
of these crimes. Among the several works of non-fiction by Bangladeshi writers, 
however, Neelima Ibrahim’s Ami Birangona Bolchhi first published in 1998 was one of 
the first and most detailed collections of the stories of seven “Birangona”, as the 
government labelled the women after the war ended.  
Sexual violence in general, and not any less so in wartime, is difficult to talk 
about for its victims and perpetrators and thus to write about for researchers. It was also 
difficult to obtain such interviews for the purposes of this research, the focus of which 
anyhow is not the personal stories of those involved but the media discourse surrounding 
it. In what follows, I focus on the representation – through both language and its absence 
– of the issue of gender violence in particular, and gender as well as absent ‘Others’ in 
general, in the Pakistani media of 1971 as reflected in the newspapers Dainik Sangram 
and Dainik Pakistan. Discourse generally is about what is said, how it is said, by whom, 
in what context and why. It is, essentially, about language. But the empirical findings of 
this research show that it can also be about the the absence of language, or silence.  
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8.3 Discursive Silences 
Women have been discussed as secondary in the Liberation War of 1971, talked 
about as victims of sexual violence, with little mention of their active contribution to the 
war, as supporters of the freedom fighters and, to an extent, as active combatants. When 
at the end of the war, the rape victims were given the title of “Birangona” or war heroine, 
to honour their sacrifice and help with their reintegration into society, stories of the 
process of their rehabilitation – from a “marry-off campaign” to skills training – were 
published in the Bangladeshi media. But this process did little to reinstate these women in 
society (Islam 2012). In fact, as Saikia shows, some women actually claim the Birangona 
title to be their ‘greatest sorrow’ (Saikia 2013: 153). Indeed, all documentation related to 
the rape of the women and subsequent termination of pregnancies were destroyed, 
supposedly to protect their identities as a part of the process of rehabilitation. For the 
most part, the war heroines of Bangladesh’s Liberation War remained silent in their 
suffering, and it is only in recent years that they have begun to attract attention of 
researchers and the media. 
There are several ways to interpret silence. Ephratt (2008) writes, ‘in cases of 
nonverbal experience such as absence and loss (death), silence is to be seen as the 
preferred mode of expression, but in many such cases also as the most authentic and most 
adequate, hence the only possible way to communicate the emotional experience’, which 
may well be true of the survivors of sexual violence of 1971. Not taking this 
interpretation into consideration may be inadvertently taking away the agency of these 
women. Yet, it would also be naïve not to consider the fact that this may have not been a 
case of agency for at least some of the women, that it may have been a forced silence due 
to the discourses prevailing in society – those of the ideal Pakistani Muslim, female 
chastity, social taboos, etc.  
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This silencing of women is evident in oral histories such as the classic 
compilation by Nilima Ibrahim (2007), Ami Birangona Bolchhi (I am the Birangona 
speaking). The first story, for example, is that of Tara Banerjee, a Hindu girl aged 18 at 
the time of the war, later and better known as Mrs. T. Nielsen, who was handed over by a 
local Razakar to the Pakistani army, kept captive and raped for months until she was 
rescued at the end of the war. Tara underwent the state-organised skills training as a 
nurse, had her pregnancy terminated and when her family refused to take her back, she 
applied for further training in Poland and then later ended up marrying a Danish 
journalist and settling in Denmark. While Tara says that she will be forever grateful to the 
Father of the Nation Prime Minister Sheikh Mujibur Rahman for leading the Bangali 
people to independence and later bestowing the honour of Birangona to the women 
victims of sexual violence, she still (at least until 20 years later when the book was 
written) fostered a hatred for the nation and society which, despite the label, did not in 
reality make possible the reintegration of women like her into society. The fact that she 
had to change her name, leave the country and start over, shows the need to conceal and 
dispense of the identity of a raped woman in order to survive. 
In writing about the post-liberation government’s silencing of a spectrum of 
voices, especially women who had experienced sexual violence, D’Costa (2011) cites the 
lack of documentation pertaining to rape camps, the use of rape as a war strategy in 1971 
or the testimonies of the rape survivors of 1971, as having been a deliberate destruction 
or due to negligence. Stories that were told initially, contends D’Costa, were done so 
strategically to attract international attention and, subsequently, to gain financial and 
technical support in rebuilding of the new nation-state. Even though international 
organisations worked for the rehabilitation of war babies in post-conflict Bangladesh, 
D’Costa argues that their ‘actual narratives have been entirely excluded from the official 
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construction of history-making’ which she attributes to ‘a complex combination of 
maintaining traditional norms, strategic silence by the state, and the negotiated survival 
strategies of women who became mothers through wartime sexual violence’ (D’Costa 
2011: 80).  
 
8.3a Anti-liberation discourse and absence 
In the anti-liberation discourse, as reflected in the media, women were rendered 
invisible, as the empirical research for this study has found. The few times that they are 
mentioned are as Muslim women and girls being violated by Hindu men, and, more than 
anything, as Muslim mothers and sisters, whose honour must be defended by Muslim 
men. In fact, the archival research showed that in the masculine discourse of the war of 
1971, there are only good Muslim men, bad Hindu men, and Muslim women victims. 
Others – Muslim men who may not be good, Hindu men who may not be bad, Muslim 
women who are not necessarily victims and non-Muslim women in general, are nowhere 
to be found. What these absences and silences say about the war will be the subject of 
analysis of this last empirical chapter of this study.    
Yasmin Saikia in her study of an ‘inner history of the war’ argues that the 
‘forgotten, hidden memories belong to women who were terrorized, brutally sexualized, 
and marginalized in the war’ and that though they were not directly involved in battle, 
they ‘became the site on which violence and power were inscribed’ (2011: 4). This is 
reflected when comparing historical events and the media coverage at the time. While 
some stories of rape survivors made it to the newspapers and reports on their 
rehabilitation abounded in the post-conflict press in 1972, in 1971, women were almost 
nonexistent in the media and their plight completely absent. In the discourse of a war 
apparently between Muslims and Hindus, Pakistan and India, there were no reports of 
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Muslim men raping Muslim women (or for that matter, Hindu women), which was 
essentially what occurred during the war in frighteningly large numbers as mentioned 
above.  
Women were neither the audience nor the subject of the news of 1971. The media 
discourse was dominated with references to Muslim men and Muslim “brotherhood”. 
While Hindus in general were portrayed as the enemy, it was only Hindu men who were 
specifically depicted as justified targets of violence. Women were largely absent from the 
entire discourse, except for Muslim women as victims. Several news stories reported that 
Muslim women were being raped by Hindu soldiers in Pakistan, as well as being 
kidnapped from refugee camps in India and violated. Such reports served at least three 
purposes – to instil fear, to strike at the ego and honour of Muslim men, and, ultimately, 
present the protection of Muslim women from Hindu criminals as a prime duty of the 
ideal Pakistani Muslim man. 
For example, the Dainik Sangram newspaper plays on the vulnerabilities of 
parents of young women to instil fear, to create hatred for the enemy and as a result, 
support for the Pakistani army. It reports, for example, that “Guardians of Muslim girls 
are living in unimaginable fear and anxiety because Hindu goondas with the help of the 
Indian army are known to be routinely raping Muslim girls and women” (Dainik 
Sangram 9 September 1971, p. 1). An op-ed piece published on October 19 talks about 
not only “Hindu goondas” but also peacekeepers in refugee camps in India raping 
Muslim women.  
These stories do not only report “events” but also their consequences if nothing is 
done. For example, an editorial published in late August in the Dainik Sangram recalls 
warning those “confused by Indian propaganda and getting involved in self-destructive 
activities against their own country, including violating the honour of East Pakistani 
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Muslim women and men, that the same will happen to their mothers’ and sisters’ honour 
and their life and property at the hands of Hindus” (Dainik Sangram 28 August 1971, p. 
2). The story describes the “lustful looks” of Hindu goons towards Muslim “mothers and 
sisters” and reports on Muslim girls being taken away from their parents in the dark of 
night and turned into objects of consumption of Indian soldiers. 
These news stories create a stark polarisation in which Hindus are portrayed as 
the enemy, particularly as the perpetrators of sexual violence against Muslim women. 
They not only avoid the role of Muslim men, but also completely exclude Hindu women. 
In a letter to the editor, the writer claims they “want to save our Muslim mothers and 
sisters from Indian conspiracy” (Dainik Sangram 9 September 1971, p. 2). Another letter 
published on October 19 and actually entitled “Protect the honour of Muslim women” 
says that along with all other grievances, “the thought of Hindu goondas playing with the 
honour of Muslim women is driving us crazy. Hindustani goondas take away young 
Muslim girls from their families in the evening in trucks and return them after sunrise. 
The saddest thing is that lecherous Hindu soldiers don’t take any Hindu women for this. 
As Muslims we can’t tolerate this scene anymore.” This particular letter has a number of 
implications: Hindus are goons and rapists, even, or perhaps particularly, soldiers of the 
Indian army. Muslim women are victims. Muslim men should not tolerate this. In saying 
that Hindu women are not being picked up, it even seems to imply that it would have 
been more bearable if the alleged Hindu perpetrators were raping Hindu women as well. 
Also, it seems to say that Muslims (not human beings in general) should not be tolerating 
such crimes against Muslim (and not all) women. The letter further describes past 
instances of oppression of Muslims where other Muslims waged jihad against the enemy 
and the writer beseeches the government to take steps to “save Muslim women from 
becoming victims of Hindu goondas” (ibid).  
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Another news report in the Dainik Sangram tells the story of a young man who 
had initially joined the Bangali freedom fighters but who, after witnessing the “Muslim-
hating attitude and behaviour of Hindu goondas” returned to Pakistan to work for Islam 
and the nation. This man was “troubled by the inhuman torture/rape of Muslim mothers 
and sisters in India by Hindu goondas and by the cruel order to kill East Pakistan’s 
innocent Muslims” (Dainik Sangram 1 October 1971, p. 1). He says he witnessed the 
torment of Muslim women – they were stripped naked, tortured and dishonoured and the 
sadness in their eyes reflected the severe suffering inflicted on them. First-hand accounts 
such as these serve even better than straightjacket news and quotes from the authorities in 
creating emotional turmoil with the objective of inducing action (in support of Pakistan) 
in readers/the audience. 
The authorities also played a part. For example, General Niazi of the Pakistan 
army and last governor and martial law administrator of East Pakistan was quoted as 
saying that “defending Pakistan is defending one’s own home, when anyone defends their 
country they defend the honour of their mothers and sisters and secure their children’s 
future” (Dainik Sangram 20 October 1971, p. 1). It may be noted here that Niazi himself 
was said to be a notorious rapist during the war of 1971 as reported in the Hamoodur 
Rahman Commission Report, the enquiry commission appointed by the president of 
Pakistan in 1971 (D’Costa 2011), thus making questionable exactly which women’s 
honour was to be defended, presumably pure West Pakistani Muslim women, for it was 
Bangali Hindu and Muslim women who fell prey to him. 
Women, particularly Muslim women, were portrayed only as “mothers and 
sisters”. In this way, Muslim women are made to feel like one’s own by labelling them as 
family members, who must be protected, whose honour must be defended, by defending 
the nation. Even if women were mentioned in general, it could have been assumed that it 
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included all women, from all groups and religions, but by specifying “Muslim” women, 
the discourse excluded all non-Muslim women. Hindu women, who were a significant 
proportion of the population, are completely absent from this discourse, as if they do not 
exist, or, perhaps even worse still, as if their honour does not matter, or that their honour 
is not the honour of the nation to be defended. 
Thus, while there may not be a direct call to sexual violence based on religion in 
the discursive language of the media, through exclusion based on religious identity, 
silence around the perpetrating Muslim self and absence of the victimised religious 
Other, the missing discourse around the mass rape of 1971 can be said to have had 
religion-based implications.   
 
8.4 The Question of Religion 
Just as discursive language creates meaning, so does discursive silence. The 
silence around the rape of Hindu as well as Muslim women by Muslim men suggests that, 
unlike violence against Hindus which is justified in the media, sexual violence in general 
and against Muslim women in particular, is taboo. Does this mean then that it is 
acceptable for Muslim men to kill and maim Hindus but that violating women is not?  
In an interview, Dr. M.A. Hasan70, the convenor of the War Crimes Fact Finding 
Committee of Bangladesh, describes the planned and purposive “impregnation of 
Pakistanis in the Bangali womb”. According to him, Bangali women were violated 
throughout the duration of the war with mini brothels even being set up to serve the 
soldiers of the Pakistan army. “They [the Pakistanis] thought they were a superior race 
																																																						
70	Dr.	M.A.	Hasan.	Personal	interview.	19	October	2014	conducted	at	his	medical	chamber	in	Mirpur,	
Dhaka.	A	former	member	of	the	Pakistan	Army,	Dr.	M.A.	Hasan,	a	doctor	by	profession,	worked	as	a	
coordinator	with	the	law	enforcement	agencies	after	the	war	rescuing	women	victims	of	sexual	violence.		
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like the Aryans and would create Pakistanis in Bangali wombs, that they would change 
their religion and identity, change their genetic makeup by raping women, and so 
Brahmin women were especially targeted but also Bangali women who were affiliated 
with pro-liberation forces. The Pakistanis justified their actions by claiming that women 
were ‘ganimater maal’ (spoils of war) and that this is fair in war. These were not isolated 
incidents, but widely practised in the Pakistan army.” 
Dr. Hasan believes that rape was used to break the Bangali morale. “Those who 
were impregnated were supposed to give birth to true Pakistanis, while other women 
were confined and used as comfort women, moved from bunker to bunker. Some of the 
women who were rescued said that after being violated their legs were cut off. The 
Pakistanis were paranoid, triggered by a wrong sense of identity. 
“They raped women in the name of Allah. One victim reported being raped by a 
soldier who was wearing a tabeez/tawiz (an amulet or locket usually containing verses 
from the Quran or other Islamic prayers and symbols) with ‘Allahu’ written on it. It was 
swinging in her face, that’s all she could see and that’s all she remembers now. This 
happened across Bangladesh, in the name of religion, in the name of Allah, they said 
‘Narae taqbeer Allahu akbar’ (a call to God’s greatness) before setting fire to houses. 
Several women in Rajshahi were locked in a room and raped en masse after the 
proclamation of ‘Narae taqbeer Allahu akbar’. 
“Women’s breasts were amputated, or had flags stuck on them. It was seen as a 
symbol of pride, of having eliminated the mother figure. The more they became defeated 
on the frontline the more they violated women, even women who were running away, 
they tried to leave a mark on them, wounded them, left an imprint on them, [what they 
thought was an] imprint of Islam.” 
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These images did not make it to the media. Whether or not these acts were 
planned and systematic, whether or not they made the perpetrators proud, they were not 
something to be publicised.  
The discourse of the ideal Pakistani Muslim man included the jihadi and the 
martyr in the path of God, but not the rapist. Yet, as subsequent research has shown, rape 
was a major weapon of war during the independence struggle of Bangladesh. If nothing 
else, this contradiction between reality and mediated discourse shows just that – how 
differently a discourse can be constructed, through language as well as through silence 
around certain issues, from reality. Interestingly, discourse also seems to vary between 
different sub-groups even within the same primary group. Thus, while soldiers on the 
ground seem to have been fed the discourse of raping women in the name of God as 
shown above, the greater Pakistani population was not privy to this strategy of war and 
were rather instigated to fight by being told stories of their women being violated by the 
enemy. This then shows that there is nothing inherent, let alone constant, in discourse, 
and that it can be designed differently for different audiences to suit the needs of the 
powerful who construct it.  
Maleka Khan71, a social worker who was a part of the rehabilitation process of the 
victims of sexual violence during the war, argued in a personal interview that religion had 
nothing to do with the war, often referring to the fact that her brother, who was Muslim, 
had been shot and killed. The percentage of Hindu women raped was small in total as the 
majority of the population were Muslim. “Yes, in many Hindu villages, everyone was 
raped, but so were Muslims in the ten surrounding villages. Most of the women who had 
abortions were Muslim.”  
																																																						
71	Maleka	Begum.	Personal	interview.	13	December	2014	conducted	at	her	office	in	Tejgaon,	Dhaka.	
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As Khan continued with her account, it began to become clear as to why it is not 
easy to attribute the mass rape of 1971 to religion. “It is true they had a target, Hindus 
were given priority, if they ever caught them they never let them go… but neither did 
they spare the Muslims. Just as they [the local collaborators] pointed out Hindu homes, so 
they pointed out the homes of Muslims, Bangalis. Yes, they abused religious propaganda, 
but if they had not victimised Muslims then I would have said that, yes, religion was at 
work here, but they killed everyone – Hindus, Muslims, women, young men, freedom 
fighters. They disrespected religion, they disrespected culture. Their greed was material.” 
This reinforces the idea that religion was not what caused the war or the sexual violence, 
but that it was abused as an excuse to justify it. This was accordingly reflected in the 
media in its identification of the Hindu enemy as perpetrators of rape posited against the 
good Pakistani Muslim man as shown in previous chapters, as well as Muslim women as 
the only victims.  
In Khan’s opinion, religion played more of a role after the war, with Muslim 
women feeling the brunt of it: “I am a person of the field. I saw pain. The pain they got, 
our Muslim women who were oppressed/tortured, they are still hidden, society hasn’t 
changed. Hindu women are relatively progressive, they have somehow integrated into 
society and got on with their lives. But the Muslim women are still in hiding. I am asking 
the government to call them freedom fighters. At least before they die, they will know 
honour.”  
It is worth noting that after decades of movement for the recognition of the war 
heroines as freedom fighters, the Bangladesh government in October 2015 bestowed the 
title of Freedom Fighter and its associated facilities and benefits, to 41 Birangona/war 
heroines. The list still remains separate from that of the original list of freedom fighters, 
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and the process of selecting women for this list – based on the Birangona filing 
applications which are then scrutinised and approved by local authorities – is ongoing.   
 
8.5 An Incomplete Narrative 
Bina D’Costa in her book Nationbuilding, Gender and War Crimes in South Asia, 
discusses three parallel narratives about the liberation war in present day Bangladesh – 
the government-sponsored official narrative which glorifies the war, the fiction and non-
fiction Bangla literature which touches upon people’s suffering, and ‘the experiences of 
survivors as found in their silences’ (2011: 104), particularly women and girls who were 
raped and impregnated or raped and killed, and their families – all of which, she argues, 
have contributed to the general silencing and secrecy of women who endured sexual 
violence during the war. In addition is the silencing of the Bihari narrative of the war – 
the non-Bengali speaking community which had migrated to East Bengal (later East 
Pakistan) from India following the assignment of Bihar to India by the British in 1947. 
D’Costa notes that there is no documentation of the experiences of the Bihari community 
which in many cases supported the Pakistan Army in Bangladesh during the war and thus 
after the war faced the wrath of the Bangalis. In fact, based on her fieldwork interviews, 
D’Costa has found that violating Bihari women was also seen as a way of avenging the 
wartime abductions of Bangali women during the war.  
In this way, it may be said that even in pro-liberation, post-liberation Bangladesh, 
a certain ‘memoricide’ of the war has occurred, a term that Nur Masalha (2012) uses to 
discuss the Palestinian 1948 catastrophe. As he notes, by changing, distorting and 
silencing narratives, destruction of memory or memoricide takes place. This argument 
can be applied to the ways in which Pakistan continues to deny that a genocide against 
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the Bangalis had taken place and that rape was used as a strategy in the battle against 
them. As Saigol (1995) writes: 
They erase Bangladesh by not telling the tale. There are many ways of not telling. One of 
these is to tell a different story, to speak half the truth. The story of Bangladesh is 
silenced between half truths, and full lies. If ever speech is used to create silences, it 
happens in the case of Bangladesh. One liners and short phrases on Bangladesh at the end 
of chapters cover up oceans of unspoken horrors. The idea that language is the ‘cloak of 
thought’ used more to conceal and mask than to reveal, was never truer than in the case 
of the genocide of 1971. (Saigol 1995: 1026)    
 
This is, of course, not unique to the case of Pakistan. Ruth Wodak (2011), in her 
analysis of post-war anti-Semitism in Austria, shows how the nation is mythologized as 
being the first victim of the Hitlerite regime and thus shifts responsibility of its atrocities 
on to Germany, followed by a silencing, a taboo of the Austrian past, which if brought 
forth is met with a discourse of justification.  
Memoricide, as this study has shown, began during the war itself through the 
exclusion of certain narratives, particularly those of women, in the media under study. 
The media focused on the ideal Pakistani Muslim man, as its subject and as its audience. 
Non-Muslims were either the enemy or absent, women were either victims or absent. 
This incomplete story later formed an incomplete history of the war of 1971, and 
unfortunately, this was not limited to that of the defeated Pakistani side but, as has been 
shown through the academic works cited above, also by the victorious Bangladeshi side 
through its erasure of the Bihari narrative, as well as suppression of the authentic plight 
of the Birangona. Not coming to terms with one’s history tends to result in a repetition of 
it, and this is evident in the case of the oppression of ethnic minorities by the Bangladeshi 
state and the repression of the Baluch population by the Pakistani state in recent years.  
The final chapter of this dissertation weaves together the findings of the thesis and 
their implications to history as well as the present, and their significance in the current 
political context of Bangladesh and the world. It also lays out unanswered questions of 
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this study as possible avenues for much-needed future research on the role of ideology, 
discourse and the media in religion-based conflict. 
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CHAPTER 9 
CONCLUSION 
History, despite its wrenching pain, cannot be unlived, but if faced with courage, 
need not be lived again. -Maya Angelou 
  
9.1 Key Findings  
This thesis addressed the role of media framing of religious-based discourse in the 
legitimisation of political violence and war and how these frames become naturalised 
knowledge and tools for mobilisation. Examining the case of Bangladesh during its 
independence struggle from Pakistan, it has explored the use of religion in anti-liberation 
discourse during the war. While East Pakistani Bangalis, the majority of whom were 
Muslims, were fighting for independence based on their ethnic and cultural differences 
from West Pakistan, Bangali collaborators within East Pakistan sided with the West 
Pakistani government and military in defending the unity of Pakistan which they 
considered to be a homeland for Muslims and which they thought should remain united 
on this basis.  
The analysis thus explored how ideology, to paraphrase Louis Althusser, 
interpellates its intended recipients and helps construct particular imaginations of 
nationhood which, in this particular case, is based on religious identities rather than 
national ones.  As such, the research examined the media discourses in the Dainik 
Sangram and Dainik Pakistan newspapers over the nine months of the war between 
March and December 1971 and addressed how the religion-based ideology was 
reproduced in the media to construct particularistic and divisive identities and mobilise 
recruits.   
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The discourse analysis of the the two newspapers showed the media under study 
functioned as an ideological status apparatus, which along with other state institutions, 
was used by the Pakistani government, military and its auxiliary forces in East Pakistan 
to:  
§ Construct a discursive imagination of Pakistan as an Islamic state based on 
“Islamic nationalism”. 
§ Construct imagined identities based on a politics of difference that made 
distinctions between (Pakistani) Muslims and (Indian) Hindus. 
§ Legitimise violence against the Bangali population based on these 
constructions and identity formations, including sexual violence against 
Bangali women, which, as this research showed, was not discussed in the 
media under study.  
The findings revealed that these discursive constructions selectively used 
particular quotes from the Quran and Hadith, references to Allah, the Prophet 
Muhammad and famous battles in Islamic history as well as references to historical 
animosity between Muslims and Hindus based on Hindu domination and Muslim 
subservience, especially during the Partition of India. Using these strategies, the media 
played a role in summoning or interpellating intended audiences, exhorting them to 
action as a duty demanded from “good, true Muslim Pakistanis” fighting against Hindus 
by sacrificing their lives and wealth, and embracing martyrdom in exchange for rewards 
in the afterlife.  
Based on the analysis, the study showed that the media were instrumental in the 
dissemination of this discourse, underlining how media, functioning as ideological state 
apparatus, not only constructs particular ideologies to interpellate intended recipients, but 
also seeks to drive them to action. As Althusser has argued, ‘ideologies are systems of 
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meanings that install everybody in imaginary relations to the real relations in which they 
live’ (cited in Macdonnell 1986: 27). While this research does not assume that recipients 
were indeed interpellated by this discourse, it has shown how the media becomes a 
discursive tool used by the state in wartime.  
The study also showed that the media analysed here were complicit in 
‘memoricide’ (a term Nur Masalha (2012) used to discuss the Palestinian Nakba) of the 
war of 1971 through suppression of the authentic plight of the Birangona or war heroine 
as the survivors of sexual violence were named by the post-conflict Bangladeshi state 
during and after the war, but also through erasure of the Bihari narrative, the violence and 
sexual violence by the Bangali population against non-Bangalis residing in East Pakistan 
seen as, and who largely were, supporting the Pakistani state (D’Costa 2011). Thus, 
discourse was constructed not only through the use of language but also through its 
absence or silence.  
As Antonio Gramsci has noted, supremacy of a social group manifests itself 
through domination and intellectual and moral leadership, creating hegemony, or 
‘“spontaneous” consent given by the great masses of the population to the general 
direction imposed on social life by a dominant fundamental group’ (Riaz 2003: 304).  
The intellectual and moral leadership, an important component of hegemony, can be and 
usually is, elicited by presenting an ideology that on the one hand universalizes the 
corporate interests of the dominant/prominent class, while on the other hand, apparently 
representing the interests of the subordinate groups/classes… Thus there exists an 
intrinsic relationship between hegemony and legitimacy. Lack of hegemony undermines 
legitimacy. (Riaz 2003: 304)   
 
This is where the role of ideology becomes vital, for without an ideology which 
appears superior compared to other ideologies, hegemony cannot be established. The 
findings of this study show how ideology was used discursively in order to maintain the 
hegemonic rule of the state. This discourse attempted to justify the position of those who 
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opposed liberation in the belief that Pakistan should remain strong and united as a 
Muslim nation. 
As Philip Oldenburg has written,  
The genocide attempted by the Pakistanis in East Bengal was thus not an excess 
committed by overzealous battlefield soldiers lusting for revenge; it was a cornerstone of 
the attempt to keep Pakistan united. Justification went beyond the notion that Hindus 
should be driven out to where they belonged-to India-leaving East Pakistan “pure”. 
(Oldenburg 1985: 730)   
 
Discourse was used to produce knowledge about national, individual and 
collective identities, thus producing a particular and selective version of truth during a 
historical period. It is useful at this point to refer back to Jorgensen and Phillips (2002) 
who note that the world does not consist of realities and truths but our categorisations of 
it, that is, of products of discourse and that these are historically and culturally specific, 
varying with context and changing over time. ‘Knowledge is created through social 
interaction in which we construct common truths and compete about what is true and 
false’ (Jorgensen and Phillips 2002: 5). This is not to say that reality does not exist or that 
meanings and representations aren’t real, but that they gain meaning through discourse 
(ibid: 9).  
Language, then, is not merely a channel through which information about underlying 
mental states and behavior or facts about the world are communicated. On the contrary, 
language is a ‘machine’ that generates, and as a result constitutes, the social world. This 
also extends to the constitution of social identities and social relations. it means that 
changes in discourse are a means by which the social world is changed. Struggles at the 
discursive level take part in changing, as well as in reproducing, the social reality. 
(Jorgensen and Phillips 2002: 9)  
 
Words themselves do not hold meaning, and the meaning of words change from one 
discourse to another. As Macdonell (1986) suggests, ‘meanings are part of the 
“ideological sphere” and discourse is one of ideology’s specific forms’ (1986: 45). As 
such, words find meaning in the context in which they are spoken, by and to whom, and 
also in the context of what is not said. Discourse is the sum of these articulations. 
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This study has focused on the media’s construction and use of discourse, 
particularly through the framing of ideology. Less emphasis has been placed on specific 
strategies as such. For example, analysis of the material has shown an abundant use of 
quotes by political and religious leaders as well as religious texts. As Pecheux has argued, 
‘words, expressions, propositions, etc., change their meaning according to the positions 
held by those who use them’ (cited in Macdonnell 1986: 24), an argument evident in the 
quotes used in the Dainik Sangram and Dainik Pakistan newspapers attributed to the 
president, ministers, army generals, and not least, religious scholars, leaders and activists.  
Barbie Zelizer has also shown in her study of presentational practices of public 
discourse with the ideologies and authority they embody how particular quotes lend 
authority to unspecified collective sources behind the news, to journalists themselves and 
‘create a collectivity of news audiences by offering journalists a way of simultaneously 
connecting different audiences to preferred readings of news’ (1989: 369). In this way, 
the numerous citations and quotes based on religion used in the Pakistani wartime media 
studied here also serve to authenticate the ideological discourse being disseminated. 
The ideological discourse studied in this thesis was only one of many floating 
about in 1971 Pakistan and practically speaking, the fact that the war was won by the pro-
liberation, pro-Bangladesh side is testament to that. However, anti-liberation was a 
significant discourse, aimed at a specific target group which did function in a certain way. 
Examination of the media as one of the sites of power, ideology and discourse – though 
the causal effect is impossible to determine – was thus crucial. 
 
9.2 Contributions of the Research 
This research has provided an in-depth analysis of the importance of media 
frames in conflict during an important time in the history of South Asia. While extensive 
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research has been carried out on communal violence in South Asia, especially during the 
Partition, a detailed and critical analysis of media material itself is lacking, whereas this 
study shows just how important media discourses have always been. This study addresses 
the gap in terms of the focus on the role of the media and communication of religious 
discourses which facilitate this violence. In contemporary Bangladesh, for example, the 
focus on post-liberation and pro-liberation discourse tends to neglect the key themes of 
the discourses used to oppose liberation in 1971, not in the least, the “iteration until 
saturation” of religion-based ideology to the point of the war being referred to as jihad. 
Thus, in terms of further research, this study lays a replicable approach for related 
studies on media discourses during Bangladesh’s Liberation war, including the West 
Pakistani media, the East Pakistani media which supported liberation, and the Indian 
media. The research can also be expanded to audience and reception studies in order to 
understand the relationship and any consequences of the discourses on the audience.   
Furthermore, this study moves attention to the media in the Global South. Indeed, 
most of the global research conducted on religion, violence and the media focuses on the 
(mainly Western mainstream) media’s coverage of religious conflict and groups after the 
fact rather than the perpetrators’ use of media in representing themselves and in 
recruiting and mobilising followers to violence before and during their occurrence. This 
study opens up new and detailed ways of looking at how perpetrators of violence use 
media as a discursive tool to represent themselves and justify their actions in the name of 
religion.  
The methodology can be replicated in the study of ideology, media discourse, and 
the complex interplay of the relationship between media and nationalism, identity, 
conflict, gender and absence. While this particular project may be specific to the case of 
Bangladesh’s war of independence 45 years ago, the methodology can be effectively 
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replicated to study any conflict-ridden society of the past, present and future, especially 
conflict purportedly based on religion, around the world. The study can serve as a model 
for research not only on newspapers but, increasingly relevant today, digital media 
discourses. It can serve as a model for the study of online and social media and digital 
discourses used by IS and other groups around the world, something that is becoming 
increasingly relevant in contemporary conflicts. Its methodology may be replicated in 
similar research in other contexts, including in relation to IS, Al Qaeda and other groups 
in the Middle East; Boko Haram, Al-Shabab and others in Africa; and militant groups in 
South Asia such as the Taliban in Afghanistan, Jama’atul Mujahideen, Ansar al Islam and 
Hizb ut Tahrir in Bangladesh, the radical party Shiv Sena in India, Lashkar-e-Taiba and 
other rebel groups in both Indian- and Pakistani-administered Kashmir and the Taliban 
and other extremist groups in Pakistan.  
The study has shown the importance of historical context which has not been 
studied enough, especially in the context of continuing conflicts in South Asia, such as 
Kashmir. The role of ethnicisation or the construction of ethnicities and religious-ethnic 
identities do matter, as was demonstrated in the case of the Yugoslav War in the 1990s. 
The role of myth in this process as outlined by Velikonja (1998) discussed in Chapter 3 is 
particularly interesting in the context of this study. Also relevant is Cohen’s (1998) 
observation that while religion itself was not a prime factor in the motivation of violence 
in the Balkans, ‘ethnocultural divisions, and especially negative historical memories 
linked to episodes of religiously-based violence among the various confessional 
communities… played a significant and indirect role in generating’ the war (Cohen 1998: 
44). The examination of religious factors in the complex interplay of history, politics and 
culture has become particularly important with the rise of extremist groups like Al Qaeda 
and the interest in them after the attacks of September 11, 2001 and, most recently, IS. 
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This research can also act as a starting point for further investigation into the media’s role 
in creating discursive silences, by looking in greater detail at the issue of gender and 
sexual violence, and minority or defeated groups, such as the Biharis in East Pakistan. 
Theoretically speaking, the dissertation has laid out in great detail the relationship 
between ideology, discourse and power and how they work together to form identities of 
the Self, the Other, and map out a plan of action based on these. It has also shown that 
whereas most studies of ideology are limited to the materialistic, that is, class struggle, 
ideology is in fact everywhere, for discourse is everywhere, in everything we say and do, 
and wherever there is discourse, there is some form of ideology at work. Specifically, this 
study has expanded on the role of the media in this process.  
 This said, some clarifications are needed. This research did not set out to prove 
that the media discourse was actually what drove the violence during the war, but only 
that it contained the discourse which possibly contributed to it. In fact, it was even 
difficult to get accurate statistics on the readership of the newspapers studied for this 
dissertation. Audience and reception studies could potentially explain the relationship 
between the discourse and the action.72 Such studies could add to the knowledge on 
identity formation through discursive means but with focus on the receiver/audience 
rather than the discourse itself.  
Having said this, this research can serve as a model to study not only religion-
based discourses of conflict but diverse movements of media and media technologies in 
mobilising conflict and can be taken in several directions in order to understand the 
																																																						
72	Avalos	(2005)	points	out,	causality	is	difficult	to	establish	as	‘historical	events	are	not	usually	repeatable	
under	exactly	the	same	circumstances’	and	even	apparent	causes	may	be	nothing	more	than	a	correlation	
(Avalos	2005:	20).	Disentangling	religious	from	other	causes	such	as	political	and	economic	is	even	more	
difficult.	Avalos	argues	that	it	is	also	useful	to	distinguish	between	necessary	and	sufficient	causes,	where	
some	violence	would	not	occur	if	it	was	not	prescribed	in	religion,	but	then	again,	religious	belief	in	itself	
may	not	be	sufficient	to	cause	it	either.		
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various aspects of the phenomenon. Theories of communication and conflict are mostly 
limited to analysis of Western mainstream media and particularly the framing of 
terrorism, but with the increasing use of new media by extremist groups such as IS 
especially, there has also been a rising interest in these. However, again most analysis is 
restricted to these groups’ use of media to engage and recruit members. What remains 
less studied is the ideology these groups spread about themselves for this purpose and to 
justify their acts of what they themselves refer to as terrorism.  
This research shows that the use of religious-based discourse and its 
dissemination precedes the digital age, underlining the fact that media had always been 
part of social and political processes. However, the same methodology can be used to 
study digital discourses, i.e., how language and discourse are used in the digital world 
and online media to recruit followers and mobilise them to violence. The use of quotes 
from the Quran and Hadith, motivational quotes by spiritual leaders, comparison of 
today’s soldiers to heroes in Islamic history, reference to religion as allowing, even 
encouraging war in its defence, the glorification of sacrifice and martyrdom, and the 
absence of women except as mothers, daughters, wives and victims of rape, are themes 
present in both discourses of 1971 Pakistani media and IS today. In addition, due to 
having modern digital technology at its fingertips, visuals such as images in magazines 
and social media and elaborate video clips depicting gruesome violence figure largely in 
IS media. This study can be used to understand discourses used by such groups and their 
claims to religious authenticity and legitimacy and how these can be countered. Such 
studies are not only relevant but crucial to understanding how religious ideology, 
discourse and rhetoric are being used for political gain and power across the world and 
how this is driving identity formation as well as a new form of globalisation and 
transnational movements, resulting in these groups gaining strength ideologically through 
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the use of such discourses and physically through the growing recruitment of followers 
using these ideological discourses.  
Therefore, despite being a historical study, this project does not end with 1971 
Pakistan and Bangladesh. It provides important empirical evidence of the use of religion 
in war, and of the use of media not only as an instrument but as an important element in 
political and social processes then and now. The methodology can be applied to research 
on the past, as well as contemporary and future conflicts in which religious ideology 
plays a key discursive role. The analysis can help to open up questions of not only 
discursive language and its normalising of the violent imaginary as well as acts, but of 
silences and their role in memory-making and “memoricide”. The study lays the 
foundation for further research on the important and complex interplay of religion, 
culture and communication in historical, contemporary and future conflicts anywhere in 
the world.   
 
9.3 Limitations of the Study 
The “limitations” of this study are what I prefer to think of as opportunities – for 
related, expanded and even completely new studies in the area. In fact, given the dearth 
of research on the discursive use of religion in Bangladesh’s Liberation War, the thesis 
offers a good starting point for further research. As Althusser suggests, ‘no ideology 
takes shape outside a struggle with some opposing ideology’ (cited in Macdonnell 1986: 
33). In fact, it is not essential for the ruling ideology to be the dominant ideology, and 
unlike repressive state apparatuses, ideological state apparatuses are not always 
homogenous and unified (Macdonnell 1986). That is to say, there are, at any given time a 
number of ideological discourses in action and often in struggle with each other. 
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This study focused on the discourse of two Pakistani newspapers, the Dainik 
Sangram, which was a mouthpiece of the main anti-liberation party of East Pakistan, and 
the Dainik Pakistan which was a government-owned newspaper in East Pakistan. Other 
than some advertisements published in December 1971 in the West Pakistani daily Dawn, 
the study did not include other West Pakistani newspapers or any other media and 
propaganda material. This was due to the fact that other West Pakistani newspapers 
relevant to this study were in Urdu, a language in which I am not proficient. This 
limitation extends to the literature review, which is again limited to English and Bangla 
sources, whereas there may have been significant – but to my knowledge, not 
indispensable – Urdu material beyond my scope. However, the volume of material for 
analysis gathered from the two newspapers studied here was more than adequate for this 
particular project. 
The study did not address the pro-liberation army’s use of discourse, its possible 
construction of ethnic identities and the Other, and any use of religion on its part during 
the war. As Bangladeshi journalist Kamal Lohani73 said in an interview, the Swadhin 
Bangla Betar Kendra, the pro-liberation radio station working underground, began daily 
transmission with a Quran recitation and broadcast a programme titled “The Liberation 
War from an Islamic Perspective”. The study did not address Indian discourses of the war 
and their construction of Pakistan and Pakistanis and Bengal and its own significant role 
in the war or the Bihari narrative, i.e., that of the non-Bangali community in East 
Pakistan who were subjected to violence by Bangalis at the end of the war. Thus, this 
study does not claim that the Pakistani state-sponsored discourse and its reflection of the 
																																																						
73	Kamal	Lohani,	journalist.	Personal	interview.	29	December	2015,	conducted	at	his	residence	in	Niketan,	
Dhaka.	
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relationship between religion, politics and society was the only or even the most 
important one in circulation, especially in East Pakistan. 
Other media material such as television and radio content and other propaganda 
material such as posters and leaflets used by groups which opposed liberation and which 
were expected to be found at the outset of this research were unavailable. Again, the 
material that was available in the form of newspapers was more than adequate for the 
study. 
Interviews were conducted of survivors of the war and those who supported the 
liberation of Bangladesh. Those who actively opposed it were and are being tried for war 
crimes and were unavailable for comment. Those who worked for the government such 
as for state television and radio were unwilling to be interviewed.  
Perhaps the most significant absence is the voice of the women survivors of 
sexual violence during the war, whose absence in the media at the time has been 
analysed, but who remain absent in this study as well due to the lack of interviews which 
could have been their form of representation in this case. As mentioned earlier, the 
difficulty of obtaining interviews combined with the ethics of intrusion and imposition, 
be they of voice or silence, has resulted in a lack of which I am keenly aware. Yet, the 
empirical data for this research is the media, and interviews, as in the chapter on 
identities, serve only to provide context, which, weighed against the sensitivity of the 
circumstances, can be done without. Because this is a study of media discourse, their 
voices, while they would have enriched the dissertation, were not indispensable to its 
primary analysis.  
These are all narratives which can be, indeed beg to be, explored further in great 
detail, if steps are to be taken to rectify the “memoricide” of the Bangladesh war. 
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9.4 Epilogue 
As the “Dhaka/Gulshan Attack” as it has come to be known in Bangladesh of July 
1, 2016, finally came to an end after eleven long hours, focus began to shift from the 
victims of the attack to its perpetrators. To everyone’s shock, the attackers, aged between 
17 and 28 years, were not the expected madrasa-educated youth from impoverished 
backgrounds, or even seemingly “abnormal” or isolated individuals, as the recent media 
discourse of radical youth insinuates. Except for one man who was from outside the 
capital and educated in a madrasa, the rest were English-medium-educated young men 
from affluent families based in Dhaka. As their identities began to be confirmed, people 
who had known them expressed their shock and horror. Photos from their Facebook 
profiles surfaced in the social media – laughing, party-going, “next-door-neighbour” type 
of young men who had, according to family and friends, become “religious” and 
withdrawn in the past two years and had disappeared from home in the last several 
months. For the nation as a whole, but for the urban elite of Bangladesh in particular, 
who had previously believed that “extremism” was something perpetrated by people in 
places faraway, it was a brutal wake-up call.  
IS claimed responsibility for the attack and released photos, and two and a half 
months later, videos, with the men posing with guns and machetes in front of the IS flag, 
criticising the democratic system and political leaders and justifying their own actions. 
The Bangladesh government, however, continues to deny the existence of IS in 
Bangladesh, claiming that the perpetrators of these and other attacks in the past three 
years were affiliated with local militant groups such as the Jama’atul Mujahideen 
Bangladesh. Either way, religion-based terrorism has become a cruel reality for the 
country. Globalisation and modern communication and media technologies have served 
to blur the lines between local and global terror, making it easier to have “soldiers of the 
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Caliphate” as IS refers to its fighters, waging battle not only in the warzones of Syria and 
Iraq, but in their own home countries, motivated and mobilised by militant groups around 
the world. 
A Bangladeshi publisher, writer and editor who was targeted by militants in 
October 2015 and forced into exile in Norway, was selected by author Margaret Atwood 
for the Pen International Writer of Courage award on 13 October 2016. He was recently 
quoted in The Guardian as saying, “Anyone who wishes to counter [us] can do so through 
their writing. But please do not issue fatwas to have me, to have us, killed. Do not 
dispatch undercover assassins with knives and guns…If [the Islamic fundamentalists] 
have any logical ground, they can reply logically, by writing. I always think that text and 
books and writing can be the change in our social structure, in our mentality”74.  
In a similar vein, in order to respond to the discourses of violent militant groups, 
it is important to have counter discourses, and this can only be made possible by a deeper 
understanding of the original discourses. This study has been a small step towards 
enhancing this understanding of one of the most crucial and complex issues of our times.  
																																																						
74	 The	 Guardian,	 online,	 Available	 at	 https://www.theguardian.com/books/2016/oct/13/margaret-
atwood-selects-tutul-for-pen-writer-of-courage-award	[Accessed	14	October	2016].	
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APPENDIX 
 
Sample News Reports Scanned from Dainik Sangram and Dainik Pakistan 
newspapers 
 
 
12 Indian spies killed at the hands of heroic rezakars, 2 captured – Dainik Sangram, 17 September 1971 
 
 
 
Prayers for Pakistan’s unity and solidarity – Dainik Pakistan, 20 November 1971 
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APPENDIX 
 
Sample Excel Worksheet of Coded Empirical Findings – Dainik Sangram 
 
 
Newspaper Date Pg. Genre Headline Author Notes/Translated	excerpts Theme
Dainik	
Sangram
05.10.7
1
1 News Shashontontro	toiri	na	
howa	porjonto	khomota	
hostantorer	proshno	
othena:	Mia	Tofael
Mia	Tofael	Muhammad	said,	the	country	is	
currently	going	through	a	test,	that's	why,	
those	who	believe	in	Islam	and	Pakistan,	
their	responsibility	is	to	dedicate	themselves	
to	the	country's	security	and	okhondota.	
Islam	and	Pakistan
Dainik	
Sangram
05.10.7
1
2 Editorial Juddhoi	ekmatro	
shomadhan
War	is	the	only	solution.	The	victory	of	
Muslims	does	not	depend	on	numbers	and	
arms	but	on	 imaan .	It	is	our	belief	that	
mojlum 	can	be	spared	from	 zalimer	octopus	
Victory	of	Muslims	not	from	
numbers	and	arms	but	imaan,	
jihad,	war	Is	the	solution
Dainik	
Sangram
05.10.7
1
2 Post-ed Musolman	mrityunjoyi Md.	
Tajammul	
Hossein
Muslims	especially	don't	think	death	is	
harmful,	they	are	always	prepared	for	death,	
they	desire	death	by	martyrdom,	there	are	
many	who	buy	 kafoner 	clothes	from	before...	
Stupid	 jotthechhachar 	fascists	do	not	
understand	there	is	no	use	in	trying	to	scare	
such	Muslims	(who	buy	their	 kafoner 	clothes	
from	before	like	the	old	man	cited).	Muslims	
don't	die	multiple	times,	only	once.	Muslims	
Muslims	want	martyrdom
Dainik	
Sangram
07.10.7
1
1 News Islamabad	
Biswabidyaloy	
udbodhonkale	
president	-	Torun	
shomajer	shamne	
Dainik	
Sangram
07.10.7
1
2 Editorial Rejakar	o	
deshpremikder	dayitto
Those	patriotic	people	who	are	hiding	from	
fear	of	the	miscreants	or	are	in	 sontrosto	
situation,	in	order	to	defend	themselves	and	
to	fight	the	challenge	to	the	country	from	
internal	and	external	enemies	should	come	
forward	with	jihadi	inspiration.	If	not,	under	
the	current	circumstances	of	the	country,	
their	boishoik,	ethical	and	religious	
Jihad	is	duty
 
 
 
 
Sample Excel Worksheet of Coded Empirical Findings – Dainik Pakistan 
 
 Dainik	Pakistan 20.11.71 1 News Jumaatul	Bida	palito	-	Pakistaner	oikyo	o	shonghotir	jonno	bishesh	monajat Special	prayers	for	Pakistan's	unity	and	solidarity	and	the	pride	of	Islam	and	the	Muslim	world
Dainik	Pakistan
02.12.71 1 News
Sylheter	janoshobhae	-	Shesh	
roktobindu	diye	matribhumi	rokkhar	
shongkolpo
Slogan	-	down	with	Hindu	expansionism.	General	Niazi	said,	not	
only	our	own	country	but	we	have	the	support	and	sympathy	of	
the	whole	Muslim	world,	because	we	are	warring	for	Islam.	
Slogan,	war	for	Islam
Dainik	Pakistan
02.12.71 6 News
Shesh	roktobindu	diye	juddho	korbo:	
Ishak
Maulana	Ishak	advised	the	people	to	be	true	Muslims	and	to	fight	
the	war	with	their	last	drop	of	blood	in	order	to	defend	the	land's	
marjada	and	independence.	He	reminded	of	the	tradition/heritage	
(oitijhyo)	of	Muslims	during	times	of	war	and	said	if	we	fight	
selflessly	in	the	name	of	Allah	we	will	be	able	to	defend	that	
tradition	and	ultimately	victory	will	be	ours.
True	Muslims,	war	with	last	drop	
of	blood,	war	in	the	name	of	
Allah
Dainik	Pakistan
08.12.71 2 News
Hindusthan	shorbodai	pororajyo	
dokholer	bikrito	chintae	attoniyojito
New	expression	of	old	Brahmin	policy…	Hindu	puran	is	full	of	
examples	of	how	the	so-called	powerful	gods	forced	others	to	give	
in	to	their	probhutto.	This	is	not	only	in	religion	but	in	everyday	life	
one	class	of	Hindus	used	to	deprive	the	others.	Hindu	society	was	
very	isolated	and	divided.	No	sacrifice	will	be	considered	too	great		
to	defend	Pakistan	the	homeland	of	Muslims.		
Old	Brahmin	policy,	no	sacrifice	
too	great	for	Pakistan	homeland	
of	Muslims
Dainik	Pakistan
08.12.71 4 News
Dhaka	…	shobhae	-	Matribhumi	
rokkhae	shorboshokti	niyoger	aobhan
All	of	Pakistan,	especially	the	people	of	East	Pakistan,	called	upon	
to	eliminate	the	attackers	and	defend	Pakistan's	holy	land.	People	
should	be	inspired	by	jihad	to	defend	Islam's	largest	durgo.	With	
Allah's	grace	the	soldiers	of	Islam	will		gain	victory	against	devilish	
(shaytani)	forces.	
Pakistan's	holy	land,	jihad,	
Islam's	largest	durgo,	soldiers	of	
Islam	will	gain	victory	agains	
devilish	forces
Dainik	Pakistan
08.12.71 4 News
Pakistaner	adorsho	o	orthonoitik	
kathamo	okkhunno	rakhun:	Nawazish	
Ahmed
Nawazish	Ahmed	talked	about	the	pre-independence	days	and	
described	the	woes	of	the	Muslims.	Muslims	were	socially	and	
economically	persecuted	by	the	majority	Hindus.	In	jobs	and	other	
professions	Muslims	had	no	future.	It	was	for	the	honour	of	
Muslims	and	status	of	their	existence/identity	and	economic	and	
socio-political	necessity	that	Pakistan	was	created.	
Muslim	persecution	by	Hindus	
pre-independence
 
	
